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Political Institutions and Preferences for Social Policy in the Post-communist World
Israel Marques II
Who supports social policy in the developing world? Most of what we know about micro-level
preferences for social policy comes from well-developed, wealthy countries of the OECD, where
governments can credibly commit to policy enforcement and implementation. This dissertation
explores preferences for social policy in post-communist countries, where weak constraints on
government officials create challenges for the welfare state. In doing so, it provides novel insights
both into the nature of social policy debates in these countries and into the business and popular
coalitions which support (or oppose) social policy.
I draw on existing theories of political economy to propose four pathologies of poor institu-
tions that can shape support for social policy – misappropriation, contract enforcement, free-riding,
and macro-economic risk – by altering the distribution of those that win and lose from it. Misap-
propriation stems from officials’ ability to divert funding away from intended uses. While for most
this imposes additional dead-weight costs on social policy, the politically well-connected can ben-
efit from diverted funds to decrease social policy costs where institutions are poor. The contract
enforcement mechanism emerges due to the inability of weakly constrained states to enforce con-
tracts. Predictions are similar to misappropriation, but actors are also cannot trust other private
actors with control of social policy. Free-riding emerges when bureaucrats are unwilling to expend
effort to ensure tax compliance. Again, this imposes dead-weight costs on most, but can garner the
support of tax evaders, who can free-ride. Finally, the macro-economic risk mechanism suggests
that macro-economic volatility is heightened in settings with weak institutions, which increases
both individual risk and support for social policy.
The empirical portion of the dissertation tests the observable implications of each of these
mechanisms. Chapter 2 provides a first-cut, cross-national test of part of the argument using
micro-level data from a cross-national survey of all 28 post-communist countries: the Life in
Transition Survey. I draw on draw on work on informality in the post-communist world to identify
individual characteristics associated with tax evasion. I interact these characteristics with various
cross-national proxies for institutional quality to test the free-rider mechanism. Consistent with it,
I show that those associated with evasion support social policy more where institutions are weaker.
If the mechanisms I propose matter, then we should observe actors appealing to their logic
during concrete social policy debates. Chapter 3 tests this proposition using the case of the 2001
pension reforms in Russia. It combines analysis of the legislative debates surrounding reform with
in depth content analysis of Russian media drawing on an original dataset of all mentions of reform
from 352 Russian newspapers, journals, and trade magazines. Using these sources, I show that all
four mechanisms were indeed major concerns during the pension reform.
Chapter 4 tests the theory at the firm level, using a survey of 666 Russian firms to look at
preferences where institutional quality is weak. I test whether firms that should support the welfare
state in such settings – those with political connections and a comparative advantage in hiding
income, revenue, and payrolls from the authorities – actually do so. In addition to providing some
support for the misappropriation and free-riding mechanisms, this chapter is a contribution in its
own right: it is among the first to use surveys to study firms’ preferences for social policy.
The previous survey chapters provided little leverage on the direct effect of institutions. Chap-
ter 5 uses a survey experiment conducted on 1600 respondents to attempt to adjudicate between
these explanations. Using a simple framing experiment, I provide three different treatment groups
with information about bribery, tax evasion, and the extent to which private pension funds commit
fraud to test the misappropriation, free-riding, and contract enforcement mechanisms, respectively.
The chapter offers mixed results, likely due to a number of caveats with the implementation of the
experiment that complicate inference. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by drawing together
and summarizing the evidence produced in previous chapters and discussing its implications.
The dissertation makes contributions to both the study of the welfare state and the political
economy of institutions and investment. First, the dissertation explores preferences for social
policy in the developing world and introduces institutional quality concerns to this literature. It
also highlights the importance of understanding how individual level characteristics interact with
macro-level ones to shape preferences for the welfare state. My work adds nuance to research
on macro- micro- interactions, however, by focusing attention on the ways certain groups can
abuse social policy to pass costs onto others rather than heightened risk. Second, it advances our
understanding of how institutional quality shapes economic decision making and provides evidence
as to how different pathologies of poor institutions shape decisions. It also provides greater insight
into who can profit from government policy when institutions are poor.
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Introduction
Who supports social policy in the developing world? Existing work on preferences for social policy
has largely focused analytical attention on the more developed countries of the OECD, providing
invaluable insights into the micro-foundations of preferences for the welfare state.1 Yet for all we
know about micro-level preferences, it is unclear if theory and evidence from the well-developed,
wealthy countries of the OECD can explain outcomes in poorer countries with weaker constraints
on the state (i.e. institutions), more varied developmental trajectories and historical legacies, and
greater socio-economic variation (Mares and Carnes, 2009). Do similar groups support social pol-
icy everywhere? Or do conditions unique to the developing world lead different types of individu-
als and firms to support social policy there? This dissertation takes the latter position, arguing that
weak institutions in the developing world serve as an important, understudied factor conditioning
the preferences of individuals and firms.
Why might existing work not generalize to the developing world? Empirically, existing work
has been limited to countries that are not broadly representative of the broader community of na-
tions. The empirical foundation of existing work on micro-level preferences for social policy rests
primarily on four surveys – the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social
Survey (ESS), the General Social Survey (GSS), and (to a lesser extent) the World Values Survey
(WVS). With the exception of the WVS, these surveys primarily cover more developed, OECD
countries, with a few Eastern European countries or more developed Latin American countries
added in various waves.2 The problem is reproduced in macro-level studies and the literature on
1For a summary of findings on individual preferences, c.f. Alesina and Giuliano (2011). For important theoretical
contributions tying these to macro-level variation in the welfare state, c.f. (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001,
Iversen, 2005). For broader discussions of the origins and trajectory of welfare states, c.f. Esping-Anderson (1990),
Huber and Stephens (2001) and contributions in Hall and Soskice (2001), Pierson (2001a).
2To be precise, the ISSP includes between 11 and 26 OECD countries, Cyprus, Russia, and Latvia (depending on
1
micro-level firm preferences, which has mostly drawn on Western Europe, Anglo-saxon countries,
and Japan to test its theories.3 As I demonstrate later in this chapter these countries are quite similar
to each other on a number of macro-economic and institutional dimensions and are differ substan-
tially from the rest of the world. As I argue below, this is particularly true when one considers the
quality of institutions: formal and informal constraints on the state. In the OECD countries, strong
institutions make it much more difficult for the state to engage in opportunism, theft, inconsistent
policymaking, and other abuses of power.
Theoretically, the homogeneity of institutional quality in existing samples has been stifling.
Standard models rest on the assumption that once social policy is enacted, governments fully im-
plement it as legally prescribed. Benefits are properly targeted and fully paid to those groups
legally entitled to them, taxes are paid in full by those that owe them, and political accountabil-
ity allows citizens to keep politicians and officials from opportunistically manipulating or abusing
policies.4 In other words governments are bound by humanly devised constraints on their actions
(North, 1990), whether formal laws or informal practice. Theory that disregards this assumption
has been scarce.
Lack of theory is a problem, because weak state capacity and low accountability fundamentally
challenge the rule of law in developing settings. Weak institutions allow government officials to
engage in self-serving opportunism that increases transaction costs for others (North, 1981, North
and Weingast, 1989) and dissipates government funds (Olson, 2000, 1993), thus making social pol-
icy less predictable. It also decreases the credibility of policy commitments to benefits provision,
with important consequences for how costs and benefits are perceived. While many models of
micro-level support for social policy include a catch-all “dead-weight” cost term that could plau-
sibly be interpreted as this sort of leakage, most analysis has treated this term as a tax disincentive
the survey wave). The ESS covers from 17 to 22 European countries (including some post-communist states) and the
GSS covers the US.
3The best example of this is the body of work surrounding varieties of capitalism, which is explicitly oriented
towards Europe, see Hall and Soskice (2001). C.f. also contributions in Pierson (2001a) and Garrett (1998), Garrett and
Mitchell (2001), Hausermann (2010). Seminal contributions in establishing firms’ support for social policy primarily
focuses on the US, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries (Mares, 2003a, Swensen, 2002, 1991). Some recent
exceptions to this trend that instead focus on the developing world include, Brooks (2008), Haggard and Kaufman
(2008), Rudra (2008, 2007), Segura-Ubiergo (2007), Weyland (2007, 2005), Wong (2003).
4An exception to this trend is work on welfare state retrenchment and reform. In some models, citizens are moti-
vated by mistrust that the welfare state will remain solvent, which motivates their preferences, c.f. Kato (2003).
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effect (Becker, 1985, 1983). As far as I know, Mares (2005a) offers the only interpretation con-
sistent with weak institutions.5 Consequently, we know relatively little about support for social
policy in settings where institutions are weak. Given widespread consensus that institutions matter
for basic economic outcomes and decision making, this is particularly surprising.6
In this dissertation, I join a small, but growing, body of work that highlights the importance
of institutional quality for individual level preferences for social policy (c.f. Ansell and Samuels
(2014), Berens (2012), Mares (2005a)).7 This dissertation is agnostic as to the type of institutions
states possess to constrain themselves, following Rodrik (2000a)’s argument that there are many
ways for states to tie their hands and generate credible commitments to policy. Instead, I consider
how the failure of institutions – broadly conceived – to force the state to enact policy as statutorily
mandated shapes preferences.8 In doing so, I extend pioneering efforts examining the relationship
between institutions and social policy in two ways. First, I attempt to open the black box of insti-
tutions to provide a better account of why poor institutions shape social policy preferences. I argue
that fear of government misappropriation of funds, institutionally induced macro-economic risk,
free-riding, and weak contract enforcement between private parties all have important implications
for preferences over the design of the welfare state. These various pathologies of weak institutions
shape individual and business perceptions of the costs and benefits of social policy, which in turn
affect support for social policy.
Second, I push beyond existing work to argue that poor institutions create winners, as well
as losers. Drawing on recent work on the political economy of investment, I argue that some
groups can take advantage of weak institutions to mitigate or shift costs onto others (Boix and
Svolik, 2013, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Haber, 2007). Whereas such groups would be paying
full price for social policy in settings with good institutions, the unique opportunities afforded by
weak institutions allow some individuals and firms to pay less or receive more than they would
otherwise. I focus specifically on the politically well-connected and on tax evaders. My argument
5For examples of how this term is used in formal work, see for example the classic Meltzer and Richards (1981)
model and extensions such as Moene and Wallerstein (2001) and Iversen and Soskice (2001).
6C.f. (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, Easterly and Levine, 2003, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012, Noorud-
din, 2003, North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009).
7Carnes and Mares (2014a,b) briefly acknowledge that tax evasion may play into the preferences of informal sector
workers (i.e. independents) but do not analyze this possibility in-depth.
8A fuller discussion of my conception of institutions can be found in chapter 3.
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implies that the welfare state may have unexpected (from the standpoint of existing theory) support
in settings with poor institutions. It also has potentially important implications for broader debates
about the sources of state capacity and support for economic reform.
In this chapter, I lay out my case for the importance of institutional quality for understand-
ing social policy preferences in the developing world. In the next section, I briefly define what I
mean by social policy and argue that institutional considerations, although not addressed directly
in existing work, are a logical extension. This makes lack of emphasis on institutional consider-
ations particularly surprising. In section 2, I show how the samples used by existing studies to
examine preferences for social policy have biased this work against theory that takes into account
institutional quality. In particular, I show that the focus on Europe, the Anglo-Saxon countries,
and Japan in existing research creates samples with relatively homogeneous, high quality insti-
tutions and contributes to the understudy of institutional quality. In this section, I also introduce
the main sample of countries from which I draw much of the evidence in this dissertation – the
post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia – and motivate this sample as more rep-
resentative of conditions in the developing world. Section 4 previews the argument, lays out the
plan of the dissertation, and concludes.
1 Institutional Quality and the Welfare State
Before reviewing existing work on preferences for social policy, it is worth briefly defining what I
mean by social policy.9 In existing work, the term social policy tends to be loosely defined. Any
program that provides aid to individuals in alleviating risk – active labor market policy, poverty al-
leviation, redistribution, vocational education and retraining, healthcare, unemployment, pensions,
etc. – is a social policy.10 Most studies of support for social policy approach preferences more
abstractly, however. This body of work builds on the insight that specific programs often differ
wildly in who benefits from them and how across countries. This work argues that specific pro-
grams are composed of fundamental design decisions – over financing, eligibility, payment timing
9For a more extensive discussion, c.f. chapter 1.
10For an excellent overview and justification of this approach, c.f. Hall and Soskice (2001), Hausermann (2010),
Mares (2003a).
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and distribution, management, etc. – that both generalize across different types of policies and
have important repercussions for who benefits from policy and how (Hausermann, 2010, Mares,
2003a, Pierson, 2001a). Even where studies tend to concern themselves with specific programs,
they nonetheless tend to highlight design decisions in their theory that allow insights from one type
of program to apply to predictions about others Iversen and Soskice (2001), Rehm et al. (2012).
In this dissertation, therefore, I conceive of social policy quite broadly as any program designed
to alleviate individual level risk. Analytically, however, I narrow my focus to three design choices
over social policy that are both universal and are strongly affected by poor institutional quality:
individuals’ preferences over the degree of redistribution in programs (i.e. the link between an
individual’s contributions and her benefits), the types of risks covered, and who controls (i.e. man-
ages and enforces) social policy. By understanding how specific program fit into each of these
elements, I argue that it becomes possible to apply my theory to any social policy.
Turning to existing work on preferences for social policy, it is important to note that it has, until
relatively recently, assumed that government commitments to social policy are credible and carried
out faithfully according to law.11 That is, the state is constrained, whether formally or informally,
in such a way as to prevent it from opportunistically interfering in social policy. In the classic
Meltzer and Richards (1981) model used as the baseline for much of the literature, citizens are
taxed some percentage of their income, which is then evenly distributed as a lump sum.12 Transfers
are not perfect, however, and there is an additional term meant to capture wastage that decreases the
amount of benefits individuals receive. Crucially, however, this term is generally interpreted as the
dead-weight cost of taxation on overall production in the economy, rather than government wastage
or malfeasance due to weak constraints on the state. While subsequent formal work has analyzed
the effects of this dead-weight cost on preferences, interpretations of the term have focused on the
economic disincentive effects of taxes.13 Only in the case of Mares (2005a)’s pioneering work has
the dead-weight cost term been interpreted in a way that recognizes the possibility of wastage due
to government incompetence or malfeasance. As I discuss below, this is surprising given what we
11For examples of recent work that subvert these assumptions, c.f. (Ansell and Samuels, 2014, Berens, 2012, Mares,
2005a).
12I discuss this set-up in greater depth in the next chapter.
13Becker (1985, 1983). For more examples of recent models that adopt the language of disincentive effects for
dead-weight costs, c.f. Iversen and Soskice (2001), Moene and Wallerstein (2001).
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know about how the state acts in situations in settings with weak institutions, where the state and
its officials are weakly constrained from acting opportunistically.
Similarly, more recent work in the political economy tradition has emphasized the importance
of perceptions of income volatility on support for social policy. One branch of this literature, build-
ing off of the traditions of de Tocqueville (1935) and Marx (1852), argues that perceptions of social
mobility and opportunities to move up the income ladder shape support for social policy (Benabou
and Ok, 2001, Hirschman, 1973, Piketty, 1995). If one believes one will be wealthy in the future,
then one opposes social policy today even if poor. Similarly, if one believes that effort is more
important to income than structural factors and chance, one also opposes social policy (Alesina
and Glaeser, 2004, Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). Another branch
instead focuses on individuals’ perceptions of risk. This work tends to be very nuanced about
the types of risks that might matter, with evidence that risks related to income and employment
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2001, Rehm et al., 2012), skill specificity (Iversen and Soskice, 2001),
occupation (Rehm, 2009), macro-economic downturns (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014, Margalit,
2013, Ravallion and Loshkin, 2000), security of employment (Carnes and Mares, 2014a,b, Rueda,
2006), or trade-exposure (and unemployment) in one’s industry Adsera and Boix (2002), Cameron
(1978), Garrett (1998), Garrett and Mitchell (2001), Mares (2005a), Rodrik (1998, 1997) shape
preferences. however, neither branch references concerns about the ability of politicians to deliver
fully on the welfare state and institutions as a way of insuring that politicians do deliver fully are
not considered in any of these works.14
How might institutions alter perceptions of the costs and benefits of the welfare state? Re-
call that North (1981) defines institutions as human constraints on human interaction. This broad
view encompasses everything from laws to informal practice. For North, however, the specifics
of how the state is constrained are less important than the implications of a lack of constraints.
Institutions are critical to preventing the government, as an actor with a monopoly on violence
within its territory, from abrogating or opportunistically altering its contracts and commitments to
the populace (i.e. its laws) (North, 1990). Drawing on the pioneering work of Coase (1960), North
(1990, 1981) argues that where poor institutions weakly constrain the state, officials can alter the
14Mares (2005a) does consider institutional quality, but she does so separately from trade exposure.
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rules of the game as they see fit to benefit themselves. This opportunism creates additional, dead-
weight costs for investors that ultimately discourage investment. A direct manifestation of these
costs are government expropriation of property (c.f. Olson (2000, 1993)) or contract enforcement
(North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009, North and Weingast, 1989). Indirect manifestations include
opportunistic policy reversals conducted on an ad hoc basis (c.f. Frye (2010), Kydland and Prescott
(1977)). As costs and uncertainty mount, investors face increasing risk of losing money on their
investments. Thus, knowing that they have little ability to prevent the state from modifying the
rules of the game in ways that favor its own interests, investors do not invest (North, Wallis, and
Weingast, 2009, North and Weingast, 1989). Central to the argument are two elements that appear
in micro-level work on social policy: dead-weight costs and risk.
Extending this work to social policy is relatively straightforward if one regards social policy
as a type of investment: contributions made today are paid out tomorrow according to some pre-
dictable formula. Whereas for standard investments dead-weight costs flow from rent-seeking on
the part of government officials, in social policy they are also tied to the ability of government
officials to drain social policy funds by siphoning off tax monies for unintended purposes, whether
self-enrichment or simply other policy priorities. As Mares (2005a) argues, dead-weight costs can
also arise on the revenue side, since weak institutions go hand-in-hand with tax evasion – whether
due to weak state capacity or the inability to punish officials for lazy or inconsistent enforcement.
By contrast, risk stems from the effect of weak institutions on the broader economy, which allows
for policy reversals and opportunism that increase macro-economic volatility and perceptions of
risk (Frye, 2010, Henisz, 2000, Mobarak, 2005, Nooruddin, 2003, Rodrik, 2000b).
Work on social policy preferences and on the political economy of investment are also similar
in that they emphasize the importance of countervailing pressures on individual economic decision
making. On the one hand, income and wealth matter quite a lot in determining the costs of social
policy. On the other hand, risk shapes expectations about benefits. Many models explain the
paradox of support for social policy amongst the wealthy by examining the trade-offs between
these pressures (Benabou and Ok, 2001, Iversen and Soskice, 2001, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001,
Rehm, 2009, Rehm et al., 2012). Here too, recent work on the political economy of investment also
suggests parallels. Individuals and firms looking to invest in settings with weak institutions face the
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trade-off between the benefits (returns) of investing and additional costs that emerge when there are
no constraints on the state and its ability to act opportunistically. Thus, the failure of institutions
to constrain the state, depending on the precise consequences of these failures, sheds light on the
trade-offs high income earners make in deciding whether or not to support social policy.
So far this discussion has mostly focused on the ways in which institutional quality imposes
additional costs and risks. An important emerging trend in work on the political economy of invest-
ment, however, is the suggestion that poor institutions create winners, as well as losers. General
investors unquestionably lose from weak institutions and weakened property rights. Others, how-
ever, may be able to mitigate the costs of poor institutions, shift them to others, or actively take ad-
vantage of them to profit. In particular, individuals who are well-connected to the state (Gehlbach
and Keefer, 2011, Haber, 2007, Magaloni, 2008) or who can insulate or hide their investments
(Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003) have greater protections. Empirical work has demonstrated con-
nections matter in regimes with weak accountability (Earle and Gehlbach, 2015, Faccio, 2006,
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006) and that regimes with institutions that can protect invest-
ment by well-connected in-groups generate investment even without formal political accountability
(Boix and Svolik, 2013, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012). Thus, far from suffering from poor institu-
tions, some groups can take advantage of them to secure privileged access to public goods and
to profit. Similarly, work on support for market reforms has also highlighted the ways in which
institutions condition perceptions about who wins and who loses from reform, vastly changing the
preferences of otherwise similar groups in countries with differing levels of political accountabil-
ity and institutional quality (Denisova et al., 2009, Grosjean and Senik, 2008a,b). In this work,
poor institutions can dampen the gains from market endowments, making free markets much less
attractive to those who would normally most benefit
The fact that poor institutional settings create both winners and losers has important conse-
quences for micro-level preferences. (Swensen, 2002) and (Mares, 2003a) both suggest that the
ability of some firms to gain non-labor market benefits from social policy or to pass on social pol-
icy costs to consumers were important in diminishing opposition to social policy amongst firms.
Political connections in weak institutional settings can provide similar types of non-market benefits
that relax concerns about dead-weight costs (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011, Gehlbach, 2008). Similarly,
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the possibility of tax evasion means that some firms and individuals will pay less for their social
policy benefits than others (Mares, 2005a). In the case of both connections and tax evasion, the
fundamental costs that individuals and firms expect to pay are lower than would be the case where
institutions are good and the playing field more level. Thus these groups reap disproportionate
benefits enabled by poor institutions. Such considerations are natural extensions to the importance
of the cost/benefit trade-off implicit in existing models.
The remainder of the dissertation is dedicated to developing and extending these insights and to
arguing that institutional quality is of fundamental importance to micro-level preferences for social
policy. What matters are not the specifics of how politicians can be constrained, but what happens
in the absence of constraints and how the pathologies of weak institutions shape the preferences.
To preview the argument in simplified form, my theory is rooted in the intuition that institutional
quality alters the distribution of winners and losers of social policy, but that the various pathologies
of institutional failure govern who wins and loses. Specifically, I focus on four specific pathologies
that emerge in the presence of poor institutions. These pathologies are not necessarily mutually
exclusive and in some cases generate similar predictions about who supports (or opposes) different
types of social policy. Each produces at least one unique observable implication, however, which
allows it to be distinguished from the others.
The first pathology, misappropriation, begins from the premise that government officials are
poorly constrained and monitored where institutions are weak. This allows them to misappropriate
social policy funds for use in unintended ways, such as subsidizing well-connected firms, lining
their own pockets, or funding other programs and imposes additional dead-weight costs. For the
average individual or firm, this should decrease support for social policy. For the well-connected,
however, misappropriation creates opportunities to tap into social policy funds or receive other
benefits that may mitigate dead-weight costs and increase the attractiveness of social policy.
The second pathology, macro-economic risk, is somewhat related. When constraints on the
state are weak, opportunistic policy-making and constant opportunistic policy reversals can result
in greater macro-economic volatility. This in turn places individuals and firms at greater risk, and
therefore may heighten preferences for social policy as insurance.
The third pathology, free-riding, stems from the inability to monitor the effort of lower level
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officials, which allows them to shirk their duties. While this can result in rent-seeking, it also
means that officials are less likely to expend effort in collecting taxes from groups that are harder
to audit. Consequently, such groups take advantage and engage in tax evasion. On the one hand,
this imposes dead-weight costs on the populace as a whole, since cheating decreases social policy
revenue. This should weaken support for social policy. On the other hand, those able to engage
in tax evasion can decrease their social policy costs. Depending on how social policy benefits are
assigned, they may still reap benefits, thus allowing them to free-ride. Free-riders therefore are
more likely to support social policy.
Finally, I consider the case where poor institutions make contract enforcement problematic. As
with misappropriation, only those with political connections can count on the state enforcing their
contracts. Others become vulnerable to opportunism and rent-seeking. What sets this pathology
apart, however, is that simply removing control of social policy from the state does not reduce the
costs of poor institutions. Private parties are also unable to contract credibly with each other unless
one (or both) have political connections that ensure the state will enforce their contracts. This
decreases support for social policy for the average actor, but not for the politically well-connected.
2 Contributions of the Dissertation
This dissertation offers several potential contributions to the literature on the welfare state and
to broader debates in comparative politics about reform and state capacity. First, with respect
to the welfare state literature, the main contribution of this dissertation comes from a broader
consideration of how, and when, the micro-level preferences of both individuals and firms in the
developing world differ from those in the developed world. As Mares and Carnes (2009) note, the
evolution of the welfare state in the developing world differs substantially from observed patterns in
the 14 – 18 countries of the OECD that have received the lion’s share of empirical attention. They
argue that collinearity and homogeneity in this sample along a number of variables has hampered
tests of competing theories, while also precluding examination of factors – such as the nature
of political regimes – that differ in the developing world. Although Mares and Carnes (2009)
focus primarily on welfare state outcomes, their argument extends to micro-level preferences. This
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dissertation thus joins a rapidly growing literature that examines micro-level preferences for social
policy in the developing world.15
Second, this dissertation focuses attention on an important feature of developing countries
that has gone understudied in the literature on preferences for social policy: institutional quality.
While the theoretical models underpinning most recent scholarship on preferences for social policy
potentially support extensions that introduce institutional quality, only a handful of studies have
actually taken this step (c.f. Ansell and Samuels (2014), Berens (2012), Mares (2005a). As I
noted in the introduction to this chapter, the failure to consider institutional quality is likely due
to the narrow context in which most studies were developed and tested. Indeed, the lion’s share
of work on micro-level support for social policy in comparative political economy is dependent on
a handful of surveys that mostly draw from the developed world: the International Social Survey
Project, the European Social Survey, and the General Social Survey of the US.
The focus on these three surveys is problematic, because their country samples are relatively
restricted. The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) surveys cover between 11 and 26
countries (depending on the wave) from within the OECD, in addition to Cyprus, Russia, and
Latvia. An even more restricted sample of 11 countries is often used in order to test theories
requiring fine-grained economic or unemployment data, which is generally unavailable outside of
a handful of developed OECD countries.16 Studies using the European Social Survey (ESS) have
comparable coverage to ISSP, with a sample of between 17 and 22 countries that covers most
of Europe, the Baltics, and Russia (Finseraas, 2008a, Rehm, 2009). Finally, the General Social
Survey (GSS) is limited to a single country, the United States, although it does allow for analysis
across states (Rehm et al., 2012). Although a sizable group of studies, particularly more recent
ones, have moved to the World Values Survey, which covers a wider sample, this grouping remains
a minority in the existing literature (c.f. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina
and Giuliano (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014)). To see the
potential consequences of limited samples, consider the representativeness of the ISSP and ESS
15For prominent recent examples of work examining developing countries, see Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina
et al. (2001), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), Berens (2012), Carnes and Mares (2014a,
2013), Cramar and Kaufman (2011), Ravallion and Loshkin (2000), Wegner and Pellicer (2011).
16This ISSP sub-sample includes Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the US. Survey research that uses this sample include, Corneo and Gruner (2002), Cusack et al. (2006),
Iversen and Soskice (2001), Kenworthy and McCall (2008), Rehm (2011), Rehm et al. (2012).
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country samples relative to the universe of all countries. Table 1 summarizes variation in various
macro-economic indicators for the country samples of several popular survey instruments, the post-
communist countries, and the non-OECD countries of the world from 1990 to 2006.17 As should
be clear from the table, the ISSP and ESS samples are not particularly good comparisons to the
rest of the world along most dimensions. Average GDP per capita in the ESS and ISSP countries is
four times greater than in the developing world, while income distributions in these countries tend
to be quite a bit flatter (by about .1 on the GINI index). Government expenditures are also about
5% of GDP higher in the developed world. Only if one considers exposure to trade are the ISSP
and ESS samples reasonably close to the developing world average, although the restricted sample
of ISSP countries differs substantially from developing world averages.
Table 1: Selected Macro-variables for Major Survey Samples
Survey GDP per Capita GINI Trade Openness Government Expenditure Informality Rule of Law Control of Corruption Freedom House
ISSP Full 31138 32.6 96.43 19.7 38.66 1.3 1.41 6.75
(17302) (4.33) (50.15) (3.26) (11.2) (0.68) (0.87) (0.82)
ISSP Sub-sample 38874 31.8 74.89 20.05 . 1.57 1.75 6.95
(9054) (5.77) (38.45) (3.31) . (0.35) (0.51) (0.15)
ESS 33819 31.04 95.97 20.13 38.97 1.41 1.52 6.89
(17035) (3.54) (53.29) (3.5) (11.78) (0.51) (0.77) (0.23)
post-communist countries 4552 34.24 101.77 16.51 45.65 -0.33 -0.36 4.66
(4101) (4.32) (31.32) (4.53) (17.72) (0.73) (0.62) (1.86)
World 8900 43.34 90.28 15.45 48.45 -0.15 -0.16 4.4
(17340) (9.79) (49.48) (6.44) (19.04) (0.9) (0.86) (1.93)
GDP per Capita, Trade Openness (%GDP), and Government Expenditures (%GDP) taken from World Bank data. Control of Corruption and Rule of Law
from Kaufmann et al. (2010). Informality is percentage of firms not reporting revenues taken from BEEPS survey data (various waves). All variables
are averages from 1990–2006. See text for sample composition.
The degree to which country samples drawn from the ISSP and ESS are unrepresentative
of conditions in the developing world become even more stark when one looks at measures of
institutional quality. Looking at a proxy for the size of the informal economy taken from the
World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS), the global average of firms
that do not report sales to authorities is around 48.5%, about 10 percentage points higher than
in the ISSP and ESS samples. Similarly, the ISSP and ESS country averages along the World
Bank’s Rule of Law measure are 1.3 and 1.41, respectively, versus the non-OECD world average
of -0.15 (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Since World Governance Indicators (of which the Rule of Law
17The ISSP sample and ESS samples include all countries that have ever appeared in any wave of these surveys. The
ISSP sub-sample includes Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the US. Survey research that uses this sample include, Corneo and Gruner (2002), Cusack et al. (2006), Iversen
and Soskice (2001), Kenworthy and McCall (2008), Rehm (2011), Rehm et al. (2012). The post-communist country
sample includes the 28 formerly communist countries of Eurasia and Eastern Europe and the global sample includes
all 160 non-OECD countries.
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measure is one) are normalized to produce a global mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one, this suggests that the ISSP and ESS samples have much better institutions than average. More
importantly, variation in both of these samples is relatively small (SD=0.68 and 0.51, respectively),
meaning that identifying effects of institutions may be particularly hard using these samples. An
examination of the World Bank’s Control of Corruption measure tells a similar story: samples
from the ISSP and ESS score highly and vary little. Finally, Freedom House’s measure of political
accountability also shows that the ISSP and ESS countries are outliers, scoring at nearly the top
of the democracy scale. Although democracy is by no means synonymous with good institutions,
this suggests that government responsiveness and accountability are higher in the ISSP and ESS
samples than the global average. Taken together, these results suggest that existing work based on
the ISSP and ESS are not reflective of the diversity of institutional quality in the rest of the world.
Table 1 therefore suggests a possible answer to the question of why existing work has not
focused on institutional quality, despite the theoretical reasons to suspect it might be important:
it is not a problem in the countries commonly examined. When institutional quality is uniformly
high and governments can credibly commit to their policies, there is less need to consider issues
such as misappropriation of government funds, tax evasion, contract enforcement, etc. that are
associated with poor institutional settings. Moreover, table 1 suggests that even if existing studies
of micro-level support for social policy took institutions more seriously, it would be difficult to find
an effect in samples such as the ISSP or ESS: there is simply too little variation.18
Third, this dissertation also contributes more broadly to the expanding literature on economic
reform and attitudes towards the market. Traditional work in this area has argued that individu-
als support reform based on expectations about gains from the move to freer markets, which are
informed by individual level factors (Duch, 1993, Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, Gibson, 1996,
Kaltenthaler et al., 2006). More recent work has built upon this foundation to argue that poor in-
stitutions dampen returns from these individual endowments, leading those who would otherwise
benefit from the market to oppose reform and support reprivatization (Denisova et al., 2009, Gros-
jean and Senik, 2008a,b). This body of work has not considered how poor institutions interact
with the welfare state, however. I therefore extend some of the theoretical insights of this literature
18It is worth noting that this lack of variation extends to countries such as Greece or Portugal now associated with
economic mismanagement, tax evasion, and corruption for periods before the financial crisis.
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to the study of social policy. My work distinguishes itself, however, because it recognizes that
poor institutions can have positive effects on the expected returns of some – those with privileged
connections or who can free-ride – in addition to negative effects. I also advance this literature by
linking specific pathologies of poor institutions to attitudes.
Finally, my work also touches on broader debates on the sources of state capacity. Taxation
has long been understood to both a cause and consequence of state capacity (Easter, 2002, Tilly,
1992). Recent contributions to the literature on the determinants of state capacity have emphasized,
however, that the nature of taxation and state capacity depends on the incentives of political elites.
(Gehlbach, 2008), for example, argues that low state capacity emerges as an equilibrium in some
post-communist states where economies are dominated by large, concentrated actors and the state
wishes to maximize revenue while minimizing effort. Here the state focuses on collecting revenue
from easy to tax sectors and provides political favors in exchange. Similarly, Acemoglu et al.
(2011) also focus on collusive arrangements by political elites that preclude investment in state
capacity, although they focus on arrangements between political elites and the bureaucracy. The
latter derive rents from weak institutions and therefore support the former, resulting in lower levels
of redistribution. (Besley and Persson, 2009) also suggests that weak state capacity is a strategy
for reproducing elite power and, by extension, controlling the extent of redistribution. In all of this
research, state capacity matters in part for its redistributive implications. My work compliments
these accounts, but highlights the ways in which popular groups can benefit even from inefficient
redistribution where state capacity is weak. Consequently, my work suggests that micro-level
support for weak institutions may be wider than previously thought, extend to actors outside of the
elite, and flow through channels, such as social policy, outside of pure exchange.
3 Why the Post-communist Countries?
In this dissertation, my main country sample consists of the 28 post-communist countries that
emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I focus on these countries for several reasons. First,
as the previous section noted, the post-communist countries are reasonably representative of the
rest of the world. Returning to table 1, the post-communist countries are a bit poorer than the world
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average in terms of GDP per Capita, although much closer than the country samples of the ISSP and
ESS. Similarly, government expenditures are higher in Eastern Europe, as a percentage of GDP,
than the world average but are close. Most importantly for this dissertation, however, the post-
communist countries are a much closer approximation of the global distribution of institutional
quality. For example, in the post-communist countries 52% of firms reported they did not reveal
all of their sales to the government as compared to 48% for the world as a whole. Similarly, in the
post-communist countries rule-of law and control of corruption are slightly worse than the global
average, but are closer on both point estimates and variation than the ISSP and ESS samples.
In fact, the only measure where the ESS and ISSP do better versus the world average is trade
openness. Thus, this sample provides reassurance that theory built on it generalizes.
Second, any study of how country level factors (inequality, trade openness, etc.) shape indi-
vidual preferences faces some causal inference problems. According to the dominant theoretical
framework of the welfare state – the “varieties of capitalism” approach introduced in Hall and
Soskice (2001) – path dependency and mutually reinforcing institutional clusters are critical to
explaining the origins and development of the welfare state.19 Work on welfare state reform and
retrenchment has also focused heavily on the importance of path dependency for understanding the
preferences of actors and how they interact to achieve concrete policy goals (Hausermann, 2010,
Kato, 2003, Pierson, 2001a, 1994), as have some of the few studies of this in the developing world
(Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). Taken together, this work suggests that any theory of preferences
for social policy that does not take historical legacies seriously can suffer from serious causal in-
ference problems. At the limit, endogeneity concerns would make it difficult to sustain a theory
not deeply rooted in the past. This is particularly the case for theory that seeks to link institutional
quality to individual economic preferences, since institutions have important effects on inequality
(Easterly and Levine, 2003, Engerman and Sokolof, 2008) and may be shaped by reactions to it
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
One way to overcome the challenges posed by the importance of historical path dependency is
to attempt to select country cases with similar legacies, allowing one to exploit variation within the
cases to mitigate endogeneity and generate inferences. While one should not overstate similarities,
19For more on the historical institutionalist methodology that underpins the approach in the Hall and Soskice (2001)
volume, c.f. Thelen (1999).
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the post-communist countries are an excellent country sample in this regard for two reasons. Re-
gardless of their prior history, all of these countries spent significant amounts of time under the rule
of ideologically similar single-party regimes. As Haggard and Kaufman (2008) note, the Commu-
nist Party’s drive to bring all economic activity under the umbrella of the state forced it to create a
social contract of sorts, providing basics such as housing, health care, pensions, and full employ-
ment in exchange for worker acquiescence to the socialist project (Cook, 1993). The result was a
system nominally rooted in universal coverage that limited inequality. Although variation existed
across countries, the general outlines of the Communist welfare state were nonetheless similar
throughout the region.20 Just as critically, for many of the post-communist countries, Communism
represented a decisive break with past institutions. Although not plausibly exogenous everywhere,
the experience of Communist rule nevertheless represented a sharp break and had a profound ef-
fect on individual attitudes even controlling for pre-communist historical factors (Pop-Eleches and
Tucker, 2014).
In addition, the end of Communism created a profound crisis due to the tight integration of the
Communist party into society. As Offe (1991) argues, the demise of Communist parties through-
out the region meant that the post-communist states had to reconstitute their political elite and
rebuild the foundations of state capacity in the absence of party structures that had been integral to
both. Simultaneously, the post-communist states also suffered one of the most profound economic
collapses in modern history as a consequence of the collapse of the command economy. While
there was significant variation in the depth of the crises across the post-communist countries, all
nonetheless faced similar challenges to their welfare states stemming from the need to insure ade-
quate funding in the face of economic collapse, demographic crisis, and rampant informality and
tax evasion (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Milanovic, 1998, Remington, 2011, World Bank, 2000).
Although countries ultimately adopted differing solutions to these problems, the fundamental chal-
lenges they faced were quite similar and imposed quite similar starting constraints on them all.
In this dissertation, I draw on the common experience of Communism and the common chal-
20For a discussion of the distributional achievements, and failures, of the Communist system, see for example
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Chandler (2004), Deacon (1983), Ferge (1979), Flakierski (1986), Haggard and
Kaufman (2008), Kende and Strmiska (1987), Milanovic (1994), Remington (2011). Chandler (2004) provides a
particularly good discussion of the contradictions inherent in the Communist welfare state by drawing on qualitative
evidence and party communications from the Soviet Union. For practical accounts of the determinants of deviations
from equality, see also Clarke (1995), Morrison and Schwartz (2003).
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lenge of transition as a means of mitigating, although not entirely eliminating, causal inference
issues related to historical legacies. My argument is that these features ease the burden of separat-
ing out the influence of historical legacies on preferences in the post-communist states. Because
political and welfare state institutions were roughly similar, variation across the region is unlikely
to be caused wholly by pre-existing legacies. At the same time, the common challenges faced
by countries in the region after the collapse of Communism likewise suggest that variation across
countries is not a product of the challenges to the welfare state stemming from past decisions. This
suggests that the similarities are strong enough to provide stronger analytical leverage than we
would find in alternative, comparable samples.
I wish to be clear, however, that I do not claim that the post-communist countries have com-
pletely identical historical legacies or that individuals within them were equally effected by Com-
munism. A large body of work shows pre-communist historical legacies conditioned the extent to
which Communist ideology penetrated individual countries within the Communist bloc with im-
portant consequences for developments during the transition (Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2007,
Stark and Bruszt, 1998, Stark, 1994). Following Alesina and Fuchs-Shundeln (2007) and Pop-
Eleches and Tucker (2014), however, I argue that individual level exposure to Communism is
more important for explaining current attitudes and preferences than these deeper historical fac-
tors. Although there is some residual variation, the decisive break caused by Communist rule and
the subsequent transition make this variation less than we would find in any other country sample.
Relying on a region where Communist legacies are so strong does carry with it a few problems,
however. As noted above, initial conditions just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, endogenous
to each country’s experience under Communism, are important for explaining subsequent political
and economic reform (Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2007, Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008, Stark
and Bruszt, 1998). Consequently, the effect of institutions may actually have more to do with the
legacies of Communism, making Communist legacies an important alternative explanation for my
findings. In this dissertation, I take two approaches to dealing with legacy effects. First, I attempt
to control, where possible, for factors associated with exposure to Communist legacies. If institu-
tional variables are still significant predictors of attitudes towards social policy in the face of such
controls, it suggests that institutions have explanatory power independent of Communist legacies.
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Specifically, in chapter 2 I make use of a number of determinants of exposure to Communist ide-
ology – age, country of origin, party membership – to show that the link between institutional
quality and support for social policy remains robust even in the face of individual level legacy ef-
fects. Second, and more broadly, I argue that even if macro-level institutional quality is a function
of a country’s experiences with communism, any relationship between institutional quality and
support for social policy at the micro-level likely has more to do with proximate experiences with
institutions. That is, if we ask respondents why they support social policy (or do not) answers will
likely draw on institutional logic rather than the effects of Communism on modern institutions.
Indeed, I show this is the case in chapter 3. There, my analysis of the discourse of social pol-
icy reform in Russia indicates, that the popular press made clear distinctions between institutional
quality arguments against pension reform and arguments that drew on a sense of betrayal of the
Soviet social contract.
Another issue is that emerging work on the importance of Communist legacies and attitudes
towards the welfare state suggests that the post-communist countries may be unique. Pop-Eleches
and Tucker (2014) show that exposure to Communism is an important predictor of attitudes towards
the welfare state, among other policy areas, even controlling for a host of other explanations.
Consider the aggregated evidence presented in figure 1. This figure shows average support (on a 10
point scale) for the statement that “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for”, taken from the World Values Surveys (WVS) conducted from 2000–
2008 (waves four and five) for various geographic regions. While the survey instrument has a
number of problems, the WVS is one of the few surveys that covers a large sample of countries
across different regions in the world and this instrument is the only question on preferences for
social policy posed on it. As such it is commonly used in cross-national work (c.f. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara (2004)).
Although the question wording is vague and unspecific, it does evoke social policy insofar as it is
asking about provision to others within the context of government assistance.
Figure 1 suggests that the post-communist states differ substantially from other regions. The
average level of support for government responsibility for providing for citizens in the post-communist
countries is high compared to other regions (6.88), although the Middle Eastern countries are also
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Figure 1: Support for State Responsibility in Providing for Everyone
very likely to believe that the government should take responsibility for providing social policy
(6.97). In comparison, Asian countries and Latin America differ only modestly from each other
(6.08 and 5.99 respectively) and only modestly from the developed countries of Western Europe
(5.95). This would suggest, as numerous studies have found, that communist legacies are important
in shaping the preferences of individuals in favor of social policy (Alesina and Fuchs-Shundeln,
2007, Corneo, 2001, Corneo and Gruner, 2002). This caveat notwithstanding, the advantages of
being able to control for common institutional legacies outweighs the potential external validity
problems that arise. While this legacy may explain higher levels of support for social policy in
post-communist countries generally, it cannot fully explain variation between them.
Finally, I choose to focus on the post-communist countries as my key cases, because prefer-
ences for social policy in the region are important in their own right. The triple transition facing
the post-communist countries created the need for radical welfare state retrenchment in the face
of mounting deficits and rising poverty. Moreover, demographic pressures and economic down-
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turns in recent years have negatively impacted post-communist welfare states, leading to strong
pressures for retrenchment and further reform (Sokhey, 2015). Existing work on social policy
in the post-communist setting has primarily been focused on the process of reform (Chandler,
2004, Cook, 2007, Sokhey, 2010) or its consequences (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Remington,
2011). Fewer studies have honed in on the micro-foundations of support for the welfare state in
post-communist countries, so we lack a more general understanding of actors’ pre-strategic pref-
erences in this space. Consequently, exploring preferences in these countries is important to better
understanding the coalitions that form around social policy reform and the positions they take.
More broadly, expanding our understanding (or validating existing theories) of preferences into
new parts of the world is an important research task. Who supports and opposes welfare state for-
mation, alteration, and retrenchment is critical to understanding the future trajectory of the welfare
state and the extent of social conflict over it. Attempts to alter the welfare state are contentious and
can easily erupt into massive street protests and social unrest (Pierson, 2001a, 1994).21 Although
no regimes have been directly toppled by pensioners’ protests, the history of mobilization in many
of the post-communist countries implies that mass protests can be problematic for stability. Mass
unrest over social policy reform has the potential to lay the foundation for the type of electoral
protests common in the region, as well as to forge the types of broad coalitions that have led to
revolution. Perhaps more crucially, many governments in the region rely on social policy in or-
der to retain support for their electoral authoritarian projects. Consequently, understanding where
different actors’ preferences lie is of significant substantive value to policymakers and scholars.
4 Plan of the Dissertation
In this chapter, I began by arguing that existing theory of micro-level preferences for social policy
– developed and tested primarily in Europe, the Anglo-saxon countries, and Japan – is unlikely to
travel well to the developing world. Theoretically, existing work is premised on the assumption
that governments can commit to social policy and that the welfare state is managed and financed
21For a good example of how contentious alterations can be, see Robertson (2010), who discusses reactions in Russia
to attempts to diminish transfers by converting them from in kind benefits to cash transfers in 2005. Contemporary
protests in Europe over austerity and retrenchment, and the protests they spawned, are also good examples.
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as set out in statutes. In the developing world, however, poor quality institutions are pervasive and
governments are likely to suffer from a number of failures that call into question whether funds
will be collected and distributed as legally prescribed.
The remainder of this dissertation seeks to expand on this critique by developing a broad theory
of support for social policy in settings with poor quality institutions and to test discrete elements
of this theory. Chapter 1 lays out the argument. I motivate my focus on three specific aspects of
social policy: the degree of redistribution, the types of risks covered, and control over social policy
implementation. I then argue that weak institutions engender a number of different pathologies,
which have quite different and important implications for the preferences of individuals firms over
the welfare state. I emphasize four of these pathologies: the ability of officials to misappropriate
funds away from their intended usage, increased macro-economic risk, free-riding, and weak con-
tract enforcement. For each pathology, I discuss the winners and losers created and define a set of
hypotheses about who should, and should not, support social policy in the face of each. Taken to-
gether, this chapter provides a broad theory linking institutional quality and preferences for social
policy.
The empirical portion of the dissertation seeks to test discrete aspects of the broader theory
laid out in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 steps back and aims to provide a first-cut, cross-national test of the
argument using micro-level data from a cross-national survey of all 28 post-communist countries:
the World Bank’s Life in Transition Survey. This chapter provides a cross-national plausibility test
of my theory that focuses specifically on free-riding. I first examine the relationship between insti-
tutions and preferences using various cross-national indicators as proxies for institutional quality.
I show that while there is no direct relationship between institutions and preferences for redistri-
bution, some groups are more supportive of social policy where institutions are poor. Drawing on
work on informality in the post-communist world, I argue that these are the precise groups that are
most able to engage in informality and tax evasion. These findings are consistent with predictions
associated with the free-riding pathology. I then show that my results are also robust to controlling
for variation in the institutional legacies of communism across the sample.
Chapter 3 provides a different type of plausibility test of my theory. If institutions – specifi-
cally the four pathologies of weak institutions I identify – matter, then we should observe actors
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appealing to the logic of my theory in concrete social policy debates. This chapter sets out to
test this proposition using data collected from the Russian pension reforms in 2001. The chapter
combines analysis of the legislative debates surrounding reform with in-depth content analysis of
Russian media during the reform period. The latter draws on an original dataset of all mentions of
reform from 352 Russian newspapers, journals, and trade magazines. Using these sources, I show
that rent-seeking, free-riding, and weak contract enforcement (between the populace and private
pension providers) were indeed all major concerns during the pension reform. By studying the nar-
ratives constructed by key social groups – business, labor, and the press itself – I provide concrete
examples in this chapter of how institutionalist logic seeps into the calculations of real actors and
how this logic is distinct, and more proximate, for these actors than the legacies of communism. I
also show that the logic of my theory permeates debates in predictable ways.
Chapter 4 tests the theory at the firm level, using a survey of 666 firms from 11 Russian regions.
Because the number of regions is so low, it is difficult to directly test my institutional explanation
for social policy preferences. Instead, I make the assumption, supported by the data, that the quality
of institutions in Russia’s regions is generally low by Western Standards. Given this assumption, I
explore whether firms that should support the welfare state when institutions are weak – those with
political connections and a comparative advantage in hiding income, revenue, and payrolls from
the authorities – actually do so. In addition to providing some support for predictions related to
the misappropriation and free-riding pathologies, this chapter is a contribution in its own right. To
my knowledge it is one of the first studies to use surveys to explore firms’ preferences for social
policy.
Finally, chapter 5 takes a step back and attempts to explore the logic underpinning my insti-
tutional explanation at the individual level. The previous survey chapters provided little leverage
on the direct effect of institutions. One interpretation is that this is due to the small number of
countries/regions in each survey. Another is that there is simply no direct effect of institutions,
only conditional effects on the preferences of particular subgroups of the population. Chapter 5
uses a survey experiment conducted on 1600 respondents to attempt to adjudicate between these
explanations. Using a simple framing experiment, I provide three different treatment groups with
information about bribery, tax evasion, and the extent to which private pension funds commit fraud
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to test how misappropriation, free-riding, and contract enforcement, respectively, shape support
for different aspects of social policy. While the chapter finds no evidence of a direct effect of in-
stitutional quality on individual preferences, a number of caveats with the implementation of the
experiment make it difficult to make firm conclusions. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by




An Institutional Logic of Social Policy
Preferences
In the previous chapter, I presented the central question of this dissertation – what shapes prefer-
ences for social policy in the developing world? I suggested that while existing work has much to
contribute to our understanding of social policy, applying these insights to the developing world re-
quires a better understanding of the effects of institutional quality on preferences. I pointed out that
existing work has largely ignored institutional quality for two reasons. Theoretically, governments
are assumed to be able to credibly commit to policy. This assumption is rarely tested or even se-
riously questioned in existing work. Empirically, most studies make use of samples of developed
OECD countries, where there are almost universally good institutions (by global standards) and
therefore no reason to question how their absence alters predictions.
A large body of work has shown that institutions matter for economic outcomes, particularly
investment, and suggests that they play a crucial role in conditioning expectations, however. Social
policy shares some characteristics with investment: actors make payments today in the hopes of
reaping benefits tomorrow if eligible. In this chapter, I build on the commonalities in the literature
on social policy and investment in order to develop a theory of social policy preferences in poor in-
stitutional settings. In the next section, I begin by defining the social policy space that institutional
quality may influence, focusing on three elements of social policy: the degree of redistribution,
the types of risk covered, and control over implementation. Section 2 reviews expectations about
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preferences over these dimensions in the existing literature (i.e. in the absence of institutional
concerns). Section 3 lays out four pathologies of poor institutions, which can alter expectations
about the costs and benefits of social policy and influence preferences. I then discuss predictions
about who supports different aspects of social policy where each pathology holds. The final section
concludes.
1 Designing Social Policy
Before discussing preferences for social policy, it is important to first define the term and discuss
how it is conceptualized in this dissertation. Social policies are programs, whether public or pri-
vate, designed to alleviate individual risks, such as sickness, disability, unemployment, old-age,
poverty, etc. In the real world, the term encapsulates a broad variety of programs, including but not
limited to poverty alleviation programs, pensions, unemployment or disability insurance, health
care, and active labor market policies. Although one could explore the preferences of individuals
over these specific programs, doing so is complicated by their complexity. For any given program,
policymakers must make a number of discrete decisions about size, scope, financing, and admin-
istration. Ostensibly identical programs that target a similar type of risk, pensions for example,
can differ substantially in outcomes at both the macro- and micro-level depending on these choices
(Hausermann, 2010, Mares, 2003a, Pierson, 2001a, Swensen, 2002). As a consequence, a theory
of individual and firm preferences requires attention not only to the name of the program and the
type of risk it addresses, but to key design elements that distinguish programs in one jurisdiction
from programs with similar goals elsewhere. Empirically, there is some evidence that individu-
als indeed distinguish between different elements of the welfare state and that preferences over
the welfare state cannot be reduced into a simple, overarching “welfarism” variable that describes
preferences over all programs (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012, Svallfors, 1995).1 Firms too
tend to distinguish between different elements of social policy, favoring particular configurations
1For a better intuition and explanation of this point, c.f. Esping-Anderson (1990) and Mares (2005a), who offer
trenchant critiques at attempts to view the welfare state as a one size fits all policy space defined by expenditures. It is
worth noting, however, that although individuals can make distinctions between components of the welfare state, there
is some evidence that individuals have difficulty distinguishing between fine grained distributive difference between
social policy programs Barber et al. (2013).
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and opposing others even when there is general agreement that a given risk needs to be addressed
(Mares, 2003a, Swensen, 2002). In order to properly model preferences for social policy, it is
therefore important to first disaggregate social policy programs into their component decisions.
There is little consensus in the literature on how to disaggregate social policy. The literature
in political science, for example, focuses on micro-level preferences over the level of benefits
provided and the role of government in provision (c.f. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina et al.
(2001), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Finseraas (2008a,b), Haggard et al. (2013), Margalit (2013),
Rehm (2009)). Although more recent work has explored preferences over the types of risks covered
by the welfare state (c.f. Alesina and Fuchs-Shundeln (2007), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014),
Iversen (2005), Iversen and Soskice (2001), Rehm (2011), Rehm et al. (2012)), these analyses are
typically used as as robustness checks rather than integral tests.2 Studies of macro-level welfare
state outcomes, by contrast, have looked at a wider range of elements of social policy. Along with
micro-level work in sociology, this literature has explored preferences over such elements of social
policy as financing (Kato, 2003, Myles and Pierson, 2001, 1997, Sihvo, 1995, Svallfors, 1995,
1991), benefits pay-outs (i.e. PAYG versus full funding) and levels (Hausermann, 2010, Myles and
Pierson, 2001, Pierson, 2001a), institutions and procedures (Svallfors, 1995, 1991), administration
(Mares, 2003a, 2001), risk coverage and pooling (Hausermann, 2010, Mares, 2003a), externalities
and effectiveness (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012, Sabbagh, 2006), and ideological concerns
over justice and egalitarianism (Sabbagh, 2006, Sihvo, 1995). As a general rule, existing work
has eschewed comprehensive typologies in favor of embracing a narrow focus on aspects of the
welfare state that best match theories being tested.3
Recall that existing work on the political economy of investment suggests that institutional
quality shapes economic preferences by altering expectations about costs, benefits, and risks (North,
Wallis, and Weingast, 2009). Drawing on this work, here I focus on the three aspects of the welfare
state that are most closely tied to expectations about costs, benefits, and risks: the degree of redis-
tribution, the risks covered, and who controls programs. Redistribution encompasses choices over
the distribution of costs and benefits amongst individuals and firms, governing the extent to which
some groups subsidize participation by others. Risk encapsulates a set of decisions about whether
2Although for exceptions, c.f. Iversen and Soskice (2001), Rehm (2011).
3With notable exceptions such as Esping-Anderson (1990), of course.
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there will be more or less coverage for specific types of risks (i.e. unemployment, sickness, etc.).
Finally, control constitutes preferences over whether there should be more or less state (as opposed
to private) involvement in administering social policy. Conceptually, each of these elements en-
capsulates a number of related design decisions, making them worthwhile simplifications of social
policy that allow for principled theory building. As a rule, I theorize generally about each element
under the assumption that while each includes a variety of different policies, preferences over some
sub-components of each element are correlated. Nonetheless, where sub-components of my three
broad categories generate different predictions (as with different types of risk), I point these out
below.4
Before moving forward, it is important to make some additional caveats about the way I treat
these elements of social policy. First, in focusing on redistribution, risk, and control, I leave aside
several potentially important welfare state dimensions related to individuals’ ideological procliv-
ities and post-facto assessments of welfare state outcomes. The former ultimately reflect individ-
uals’ prima facie relationship to the welfare state, regardless of the policy options on offer, while
the latter reflect perceptions of policy efficacy and abuses once enacted (van Oorschot and Meule-
man, 2012). I exclude them, since the former have no clear relationship to institutional quality
and the latter are post-facto considerations. Nonetheless ideology is a potentially powerful alter-
native explanation for variation in preferences, particularly if ideology and institutional quality are
themselves the product of common factors (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). As a consequence,
while I do not deal with preferences over ideological dimensions of social policy, I do attempt to
account for them empirically in order to reassure that variation is not due to underlying ideological
concerns.5
Second, the interconnected nature of most welfare state programs creates a great deal of con-
tingency in preferences and outcomes. This contingency emerges due to interactions between
policies, which can cause two otherwise identical programs to produce different outcomes in the
presence (or absence) of other welfare state programs. Consequently, individuals perceptions of
4These elements of the welfare state are often referred to loosely as dimensions in the existing literature, c.f.
Hausermann (2010), Myles and Pierson (2001), van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012), Pierson (2001a), Svallfors (1995,
1991). I eschew this usage, because the elements of the welfare state I explore are not purely continuous. Risk, for
example, consists of several sub-types of risk, whereas control also includes decisions about which private actors
should administer social policy in the absence of the state.
5For more discussion of this point, c.f. chapter 3.
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who wins and who loses from social policy depend greatly on the nature of these interactions and
how they shape expectations. Although the dominant Varieties of Capitalism approach to the wel-
fare state takes this as a core tenet (c.f. Hall and Soskice (2001)), even in this tradition work on
individual level preferences has tended to consider programs and design components of social pol-
icy (control, redistribution, etc.) separately (c.f. Iversen and Soskice (2001), Rehm (2009), Rehm
et al. (2012). Broader work on micro-level preferences has also tended to ignore the ways in which
social policy program compliment each other in order to generate clean predictions about types of
programs or design components of social policy.6 In this dissertation, I take this standard approach
in the literature and set aside the question of preferences for social policy given complimentary
program (or lack thereof). My theory of social policy preferences under poor institutions considers
programs separately, in order to generate ceteris paribus predictions over a given element of social
policy – degree of redistribution, risk coverage, and control – holding all others constant. This
approach produces a tractable model that provides clean predictions and testable implications for
the remainder of the dissertation. It is also a key first step in a broader theory of social policy
preferences that acknowledges the importance of interactions between different types of program.
The final caveat is related. In the real world social policies are sometimes made up of multiple
interlocking pillars, each with its own configuration over control and redistribution, that nonethe-
less address a common risk. Three-pillar pension programs, which combine tax financed state
benefits with a privately controlled investment component and voluntary contributions, are a com-
mon example. In this dissertation, I generally simplify the analysis of such policies by treating
them as a single policy that takes on intermediate values over control or redistribution, depending
on the exact configuration of the pillars.7
6For an excellent overview of this literature, c.f. Alesina and Giuliano (2011).
7It is worth noting that this approach assumes that the multi-pillar systems themselves are deliberate choices of
actors. Studies of the adoption of multi-pillar systems in the Post-communist states tend to emphasize these systems
as a consequence of the legacy of existing social policy programs, which retard rapid adoption of market mechanisms




To borrow loosely from Mares (2003a), redistribution encompasses policy choices that govern the
extent to which the costs and benefits of social policy are apportioned amongst various actors.
The most obvious element of redistribution is the policy mechanism linking contributions made
by a given actor to the benefits received. Where policy is more redistributive, everyone receives
similar sized benefits. Those who contribute more effectively subsidize those that contribute less.
Conversely, where policy is less redistributive there is a close correspondence between how much
one contributes and how much one receives back in the form of benefits. Here, those who pay
in the most receive the most benefits. Decisions about the formula by which contributions accrue
benefits are therefore one of the most important policy decisions made about redistribution.
Other policy choices are also important to determining the degree of redistribution of any
given social policy. First, choices about eligibility (i.e. who is covered by social policy) can be
used to include (or exclude) groups (c.f. Hausermann (2010), Mares (2003a), Moene and Waller-
stein (2001)). On the one hand, states can choose universal systems, where benefits are allocated
according to citizenship or residency requirements and available to all. Here an individual’s ben-
efits are less connected to her contribution history, since entitlement comes from non-contribution
criteria. On the other hand, states can instead opt for a targeted system, where benefits accrue
to particular groups based on some pre-established criteria. Where these criteria are based on
need, there is little link between benefits and contributions. Where they are based upon actuarial
principles, however, benefits are explicitly tied contributions and/or risk.
Second, financing is also an important element of redistribution (c.f. Hausermann (2010), Kato
(2003)). Conceptually, the tax base of the welfare state can be designed such that the burden of
funding the welfare state is either borne by everyone or specifically by the employed. The former
occurs when the welfare state is funded from the general budget using broad-based taxes, such as
income taxes, VAT, user fees, sales tax, etc. These broad based taxes tend to be associated with
greater redistribution, since contributions and benefits are only weakly linked to labor market ef-
fort. By contrast, contributory (also known as insurance) financing is drawn from levies on the
wages of workers. These payroll taxes and/or mandatory contributions tend to be more clearly
linked to individuals’ contributions, although the strength of this link depends on other policy
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choices. Even within systems that finance social policy based on taxes on the employed, how-
ever, the distribution of taxes can also have important implications for the degree of redistribution
provided by a policy. Taxes levied according to actuarial criteria, whereby those most likely to
draw benefits pay the most, have a low degree of redistribution compared to flatter taxes, which
redistribute across occupations.
The final policy choice over redistribution involves choices about the timing of benefits payouts
and mostly applies to pensions and some forms of unemployment insurance (c.f. Myles and Pierson
(2001), Pierson (2001a)). Some welfare states choose to create Pay-as-You-Go (PAYG) systems,
where benefits are paid out of current receipts. PAYG systems implicitly make current contributors
to social policy funds responsible for the benefits of current recipients. Consequently, even in
notionally defined systems (in which contributors receive future benefits indexed to contributions)
future payouts depend on policy continuity and the fiscal health of the system. Contributions and
benefits are therefore only weakly linked and these systems redistribute among generations. The
alternative to PAYG systems, which more tightly link contributions to benefits, are capitalized (or
fully-funded) systems, in which contributions accumulate into funds that pay out benefits according
to each individual’s total contributions plus interest. Such systems perfectly link contributions to
benefits and therefore have a low degree of redistribution.
Taken together, these decisions all describe the extent to which the contributions of tax payers
are redistributed to the rest of the population. For individuals and firms, decisions about whether to
support more or less redistribution are therefore about whether some groups should subsidize oth-
ers. Part of the complexity of redistribution, however, is that states can adopt various combinations
of policies that mix design elements. For example, in Russia, the health care system combines
contributory social policy (5.1% of wages up to a cap) with universal distribution and PAYG tim-
ing, thus muddying the link between contributions and benefits. Russia’s pension system, on the
other hand, combines the same contributory taxation (22% of wages up to a certain cap) with a
hybrid distribution scheme that combines a minimum, universal defined benefit pension with a
fully-funded, individualized insurance component. Aggregating choices about the financing, dis-
tribution, and timing of social policy into a single issue dimension makes sense, however, because
preferences between these sub-components tend to be highly interdependent (Mares, 2003a). This
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suggests that it makes more sense to think about policy along a general continuum ranging from
more to less redistribution. For individuals and firms, what matters is whether their contributions
are tightly tied to their benefits, not how this is accomplished.
1.2 Risk
Risk encompasses policy choices over the types of risks – unemployment, old age, illness, family
expansion, etc. – that the welfare state covers. Because coverage of different types of risk imply
differences in eligibility, there is some overlap between my conception of risk and of redistribu-
tion.8 In this study I treat these categories separately, however, because the types of risk that can be
covered by social policy have important implications for the time-horizons of individuals expecting
to benefit from these social policies. Such concerns fall outside of my conception of redistribu-
tion, thus warranting separate treatment in light of the importance of time horizons in the extent
work on the political economy of investment and institutions (c.f. North, Wallis, and Weingast
(2009), North and Weingast (1989), Olson (2000, 1993)). It is also worth noting that unlike the
redistribution dimension, which collapses neatly into preferences over stronger (or weaker) links
between contributions and benefits, the risk dimension has two distinct sub-components that actors
can form preferences over. Roughly speaking, risks can be grouped based on the extent to which
individuals can predict them: predictable, life-cycle risks and less predictable, extraordinary risks.
The first sub-category of risk – life-cycle risk – involves risks related to the life cycle, such
as old age, childbirth, or the need to care for elderly family members (Bonoli, 2006, Hausermann,
2010, Iversen, 2005). These strongly correlate with basic demographic characteristics, which pro-
vide a greater degree of predictability. Although there is some element of unpredictability or
voluntarism to certain types of life cycle risk – notably child-birth – these are nonetheless strongly
correlated with characteristics such as gender and age that allow individuals to anticipate their on-
set. Child-birth, for example, is more likely within particular age bands, while risks tied to old-age
occur with near certainty to everyone as they near the end of their lives. The strong ties between life
8C.f. Mares (2003a), who argues that the extent to which risk is reapportioned between members of a population
is a function of eligibility, among other things. For Mares, the types of risks covered are an important determinant of
the degree to which costs are being apportioned, consequently she defines these two elements of the welfare state as
part of a broader conception of “risk redistribution” [15-16].
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cycle risk and demographics have an important implication for preferences: individuals can gener-
ally predict when (or if) they will need to take advantage of benefits, giving them greater certainty
over timing and time horizons. These tend to be rather long, as individuals rarely face life-cycle
risks when they are young and first entering the work force, with the exception of childbirth.
By contrast, the second category – extraordinary risk – is fundamentally unpredictable and
uncontrollable. Unemployment, illness, divorce, and other such risks may or may not occur to
a given individual during their lifetime, and there is relatively little individuals can do to protect
themselves directly. Although strongly associated with some individual level characteristics, as
far as the individual is concerned extraordinary risk is exogenous. As a consequence, the time
horizons associated with policies designed to protect against such risks are unpredictable: one may
need them tomorrow or never. The unpredictability of time horizons has important implications
for social policy (discussed below), since it increases individuals’ uncertainty about payouts.
Preferences over the risk dimension are therefore actually distinct preferences for more (or
less) coverage of life cycle risk and/or more (or less) coverage of extraordinary risks. While related,
preferences between the two are not necessarily correlated and cannot be grouped together in a
principled way. Thus, individuals and firms can prefer high levels of coverage for both, neither, or
some mix of the two.
1.3 Control
Finally, control encapsulates choices over who collects, administers, and distributes social policy
funds, as well as decisions over how to adjust social policy in the face of changing circumstances
(Mares, 2003a). Whereas redistribution and risk largely determine who stands to benefit from
social policy, in theory, control conditions who actually benefits by determining whether social
policy is carried out as described by law. The potential for a disjunct between de jure and de facto
social policy emerges from various sources. Organically, differences between the statutory intent
behind social policy and how it is actually implemented may emerge from conflicts between dif-
ferent groups with differing interpretations about how policy should function (Streeck and Thelen,
2005). Such disjuncts may also emerge when the actors responsible for control of social policy
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differ in their ability to collect, administer, and distribute social policy funds and in their incentives
to make use of discretion (Huber and Shipan, 2002). Some may be better at reducing dead-weight
costs of social policy, for example, or at generating returns from capitalized systems. The prefer-
ences and incentives of those who control policy also shape outcomes, since if preferences diverge
one may face a principal-agent problem.
In this dissertation, I primarily conceptualize control as a continuum describing the extent
to which the state is involved in social policy. At one end of the spectrum, the state takes sole
responsibility for the administration of social policy. At the other extreme exists a purely private
solution, in which the state delegates responsibility to a single private actor: employers, employer
associations, third-party companies (for example private pension funds), or labor unions. Between
the two lies a corporatist system, in which the state and private actors share responsibility for social
policy. The most common such arrangements are tripartite commissions, in which employers,
employees, and government officials (or their representatives) jointly negotiate over social policy
and its implementation.9 As with redistribution, control consists of a large collection of smaller
policy choices that, in aggregate, dictate who has primary responsibility for a social policy. Each
separate aspect of a given social policy – collection of contributions, storage of funds, investment of
funds, distribution, conflict adjudication – can potentially fall under the purview of separate actors.
For simplicity, in this dissertation I do not generate predictions over each of these specific areas.
In the case where preferences are actually for some mix of public-private actors over different
specific areas of responsibility, I instead follow Mares (2003a) and focus on the middle region of
the control continuum: corporatist systems.
I focus primarily on the question of the extent of state involvement in social policy for various
reasons. As I discuss below in section 3 work on institutional quality and investment primarily fo-
cuses on the ways in which institutional failures on the part of the state enable government officials
to take advantage of investors in various ways (North, 1981, North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009,
North and Weingast, 1989). Similarly, the majority of the observable implications of my theory
have to do with preferences over whether the state is involved in social policy at all. Consequently,
9Systems in which private parties or corporatist boards are responsible for social policy are not always responsible
for all aspects of social policy. In many cases, such boards control only the administration and distribution of funds,
rather than collection. In such cases, however, I still consider the private actors or corporatist board to hold control,
even if the state fulfills some functions.
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focusing on more (or less) state involvement is the theoretically most interesting aspect of control
for this dissertation.10 This being said, I do acknowledge that individuals and firms that prefer
private actors control social policy might have differing preferences over which private actors do
so. Firms might prefer that they control social policy directly, while individuals may prefer that
control be vested in labor unions. In this case, a measure of control such as Mares (2003a)’s, in
which preferences over control are operationalized as the extent to which actors delegate responsi-
bility for important aspects of the welfare state, are more appropriate. Where my theory generates
predictions that distinguish between different types of private actors, I adopt this conceptualization.
2 Social Policy Preferences Under Good Institutions
Before moving to my own theory of preferences for social policy in poor institutional settings, it
is worth briefly reviewing existing work in order to fix ideas of what preferences should look like
when one assumes that institutions function well. Existing work can be broadly divided into two
clusters. The first cluster, which I refer to as class theories, focuses on how an individual’s present
income (and its correlates) shape expectations about the relative costs and benefits of the welfare
state. This approach goes back as far as Plato, who argued that the disparity in living standards
between the rich few and the populace at large could lead to social and political upheaval (Republic
VI). More contemporary formulations of the theory argue that preferences over redistribution are
governed by one’s place on the income distribution. Those above the average income support
redistribution and those below it oppose it (Roberts, 1977, Romer, 1975).
The canonical model for class based theories of social policy preferences (and indeed for
the entire literature on micro-level preferences) was formally articulated by Meltzer and Richards
(1981).11 In this model, individuals pay a percentage of their individual income, αi, to the state
10It is worth noting that the distinction between between public, private, and mixed control is one of the primary
motivators of existing theory on preferences for social policy, as well. C.f. theoretical discussion in (Hall and Soskice,
2001, Mares, 2003a). More broadly, dependent variables in the literature on micro-level preferences are almost always
framed around state control of specific policies and, to my knowledge, never distinguishes between different types of
private actors, c.f. Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Iversen and Soskice (2001), Rehm (2009) for examples from all three
of the major survey instruments (ISSP,ESS,WVS) most commonly used in this literature.
11The model I present is based on the individual-level version adapted by Alesina and Giuliano (2011), which is a
bit clearer than the original.
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in the form of a flat tax, τ . This tax is used to finance a lump sum transfer to all citizens, which
follows the budget constraint
n∑
i=1
ταi. Each individual therefore receives a transfer equal to the
average productivity, α times the the tax rate, τ . These transfers are subject to leakage and waste,
which can be expressed by the term ωi paid by each individual. Although rarely explicitly stated in




where ω(τ) is the total dead-weight cost paid by society and is increasing in the tax rate.12 That
is, everyone bears a share of the overall dead-weight costs, but these costs are widely distributed.
This point is often overlooked in existing work and will be important when we consider preferences
under poor institutions.13
Based on this, the basic utility function of individuals can be written as:
ui = αi(1− τ) + ατ − ωi (1.1)
Equation 1.1 simply states that an individuals’ utility is equal to their consumption, which is in turn
composed of three terms representing their after-tax wages, social policy benefits, and any dead-
weight costs associated with social policy, respectively. The key finding of the model is that all
individuals who earn below the average income (α) support redistributive social policy, since they
take in more than they pay. Those above the average oppose redistribution, since they suffer a net
loss. Drawing on the median voter theorem, Meltzer and Richards (1981) predict that redistribution
is adopted in democracies when the median voter is below the median income. The generosity of
such programs (at least in monetary terms), depends on the extent to which the median voter falls
below the average income and dead–weight costs.
The class model’s predictions have been highly influential. One of the most important theories
of the welfare state, power resource theory, uses the class model as a micro-foundation explaining
the working class’ affinity for redistribution. This affinity, in turn, translates into actual redistribu-
tion where interest groups representing labor are powerful and able to elect sympathetic politicians
12Formally, ∂ω∂τ > 0. Few models bother to decompose ω, except to define it as a function increasing in tax rates.
13Perhaps the best example is Mares (2003a), who motivates her model of preferences for social policy by examining
how tax evasion decreases expected benefits for individuals. In her model, tax evasion is expressed as a dead-weight
cost of taxation, but she does not consider how the distribution of this cost potentially alters preferences. Similar trends
exist in other works that explicitly examine dead-weight costs, such as (Becker, 1985, 1983).
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(c.f. Esping-Anderson (1990), Garrett (1998), Huber and Stephens (2001), Korpi (1983, 1989)).
Similarly,work on the relationship between inequality, growth, and redistribution also uses the
Meltzer-Richards model as a micro-foundation, positing that as inequality increases (and the me-
dian voter falls below the average income), the median voter’s preferred tax rate (and thus the
actual amount of redistribution) increases, with important consequences for growth (c.f. Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)).
Of course, the extent to which one would expect the Meltzer-Richards model to accurately
reflect reality depends on the assumptions of the model. Theoretically, it is not clear that the
median voter has the median income. If sections of the populace are disenfranchised or face large
costs to vote, then the identity of the median voter in any given election may be skewed to the right
of the actual median voter (Edsall, 1984, Harms and Zink, 2003). This effect can be exacerbated
by institutions (or the lack thereof) in a given country, which govern how and when citizens can
influence policy (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, Persson and Tabellini,
2000). Empirically, there is not a great deal of micro-level support for one of the central tenets of
the Meltzer-Richards model: inequality exacerbates opposition to the welfare state by the wealthy
Finseraas (2008a).
A second perspective, risk theories, emerged to explain the puzzle of why income is at times
a poor predictor of support for social policy, both for wealthy individuals and employers (c.f.
Iversen and Soskice (2001), Swensen (1991)). In this tradition, individuals still care greatly about
their present income, however they are more concerned with insuring themselves against (or tak-
ing advantage of) future income volatility. Employers appreciate the ability of insurance-based
social policy to stimulate investment in skill and shape the labor market (Estevez-Abe, Iversen,
and Soskice, 2001, Mares, 2001). This perspective mirrors earlier work by de Tocqueville (1935)
and Marx (1852), who argue that pervasive beliefs about social mobility explain the US’ hostility
to redistribution. Hirschman (1973)’s famous “tunnel effect”, in which the poor support redistri-
bution if they believe they will be rich tomorrow, was one of the first contemporary articulations of
the model, which was later extended to cover negative income shocks and insurance (c.f. Iversen
and Soskice (2001), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Rehm (2009)).
Two sets of theories emerged to account for different aspects of the relationship between in-
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come volatility and preferences for social policy. The first focuses on expectations about social
mobility. One version, created by Benabou and Ok (2001) adapts the classic Meltzer and Richards
(1981) model, but extends the game to encompass multiple periods. Individuals set their preferred
tax rate today with expectations about their income tomorrow. Benabou and Ok (2001) find that
regardless of income levels, opposition to social policy grows as individuals become more certain
they can move up the income ladder. A related strain of literature, backed by a wealth of empirical
evidence looks at preferences in light of negative income shocks. Moene and Wallerstein (2001)
model social policy as a form of insurance against income loss by the wealthy. In their model
insurance concerns dominate cost concerns for the wealthy if risk aversion and income volatility
are high. Targeting can alter preferences, however. For the insurance argument to dominate, redis-
tribution has to be targeted primarily at the unemployed, emphasizing its insurance function. For
the general populace, conversely, redistribution is preferable due to their lower wages. A related
strain of literature focuses less on expectations about insurance and more on the effect of past
macro-economic shocks. This literature shows that individuals exposed to traumatizing economic
events (i.e. the Great Recession or the economic transition in Russia) tend to be more risk averse.
This results in support for social policy, although the extent of the effect and its longevity may
be conditioned by individual factors such as ideology (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014, Margalit,
2013, Ravallion and Loshkin, 2000).
The second, first articulated by Iversen and Soskice (2001), focuses more explicitly on insuring
human capital investments. Again building off of the Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, they
argue that future income is contingent on both employment and finding work that suitably rewards
one for one’s investment in human capital (e.g. skills). In their formulation, individuals that have
invested in human capital have skills that pay highly but that are specific to a particular industry
or sector.14 Because their skills are specific, workers with high human capital that lose their jobs
may be forced to take a lower paying position that does not utilize their skills. Thus individuals’
utility is composed of the probability of employment in a high wage, high human capital position,
employment in a lower wage position requiring general skills, and unemployment. The model
offers two key results. First, so long as workers with specific skills are sufficiently risk averse,
14Note, however, that their model applies just as well if one assumes that what matters is occupation, rather than
industry. Rehm (2009) offers empirical evidence that this is the case, even when controlling for specific skills using
Iversen and Soskice (2001)’s industry based measures.
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they will support redistribution. The losses from paying higher taxes are outweighed by income
insurance. Second, and related, the higher the premium workers with specific skills receive relative
to the average wage, the more intense their preferences for redistribution. Higher potential losses
outweigh the higher costs of insurance.
These risk-based models have also served as the micro-foundation for influential theories of
welfare state origins and reform. The “Varieties of Capitalism” literature, to take the most famous
example, argues that capitalist production systems develop jointly with a complex of institutions
that regulate social policy, skill formation, and wage bargaining in a highly path dependent fashion
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). In this framework, generous welfare states emerge, in part, because they
match the needs of firms for highly-skilled labor to the desire of employees to be compensated
for risky investment in skills.15 As Mares (2001) illustrates formally, firms use a cost-benefit
calculus similar to those of individuals. Where the benefits of social policy (in terms of acquiring
skilled labor and holding down wages) outweigh the costs, firms are generally supportive of social
policy.16 Firm calculations about the labor market effects of social policy are, in turn, based on
the assumption that individuals’ utility follows models similar to Iversen and Soskice (2001)’s (c.f.
Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001), Mares (2003a), Swensen (2002)).
2.1 Predictions of the Class and Risk Perspectives
Figure 1.1 summarizes predictions about support for social policy generated by the class and risk
theory families. For the most part, existing work is framed around cleavages that form between
and within classes, which can then be mapped onto individual-level predictors. For class-based
perspectives, cleavages between the rich and the poor or between capital and labor are the most
important. In the former case, the rich oppose social policy, as it forces them to subsidize benefits
to the poor (Meltzer and Richards, 1981). In the latter case, traditional power resource theories
predict that labor and capital clash over who pays for the welfare state, with each side trying to
push the costs of social policy onto the other or (for capital) trying to eliminate the welfare state
15For a good summary of the argument, c.f. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001), Hall and Soskice (2001a).
While I paint the theory in functionalist terms here, the extent to which it actually is purely functionalist is hotly
debated and highly contested. For a discussion of this, c.f. Streeck and Thelen (2005).
16See also Swensen (1991).
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entirely (Huber and Stephens, 2001, Korpi, 1983, 1989). From this perspective, capital always
opposes social policy, since it generally must pay, while labor supports it.
One must be cautious about these predictions, however, as the Meltzer and Richards (1981)
model underpins most of them. As such, many predictions about social policy are generally only
about preferences over redistribution. Control also features in this body of theory, albeit less promi-
nently. Given the potential for principal-agent problems, one would expect labor and capital to
have strong preferences, for direct control of social policy. Labor prefers union control, while
capital prefers policies rooted in individual firms or employers’ associations. For both, corporatist
arrangements are a second best option, as they provide some defense against agency loss. Con-
versely, state control involves total delegation, but may be acceptable where capital or labor can
heavily influence the government (c.f. Korpi (1983)).
Predictions of risk-based theories are much more complex, as a large number of potential
factors are associated with risk of income loss. Among the most prominent of these include ex-
posure to international trade (Adsera and Boix, 2002, Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 1998, Garrett and
Mitchell, 2001, Katzenstein, 1985, Mares, 2005a, Rodrik, 1998, 1997), the specificity and diffi-
culty of acquiring skills (Cusack et al., 2008, Iversen, 2005, Iversen and Soskice, 2001, Moene and
Wallerstein, 2001), degree of unemployment or injury risk (Mares, 2005a, Rehm, 2009, Rehm et
al., 2012), and employment (i.e. insider/outsider or formal/informal) security (Carnes and Mares,
2014a,b, Rueda, 2007, 2006, 2005). In contrast to class-based theories of social policy preferences,
risk theories highlight the importance of cross class coalitions based on these risk factors. In these
accounts, businesses and workers face a commitment problem related to the skill needs of the firm
and the economic preferences of workers. In standard accounts, firms require workers who have
invested heavily in human capital and developed highly specialized skills.17 Such investments only
make sense for workers if their expected returns make up for the time invested in training and cover
risk of income loss, however. Social policy is useful, because it ameliorates risk. Firms find social
policy attractive, because it is generally cheaper than simply paying wage premia.
Turning to specifics, the primary cleavage that emerges along redistribution is between firms
and workers in sectors with a high skill profile (i.e. that require qualified, skilled workers) and
17This description draws heavily from Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001), Iversen and Soskice (2001), Mares
(2003a), Swensen (2002).
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those in sectors with low skill profiles. Intuitively, firms with highly skilled workers prefer that
social policies strongly link workers’ contributions to social policy benefits, because such policies
offer the clearest rewards for investment in skills. This in turn reinforces the labor market strategy
of highly skilled firms and allows them to further incentivize their most productive, most skilled
workers (Mares, 2003a,b). By contrast firms with low-skill workers have less need for social
policy, since they tend to compete by minimizing labor costs rather than maximizing productivity
and quality. While these firms do not object in principle to social policy linking wages to benefits,
they do object to having to pay for it.
The cleavage between high and low skill employers is mirrored amongst high and low skill
groups within labor. High-quality skills are both lucrative and costly to acquire, leading to desire
by workers to insure their investment. Social policy that tightly links contributions and benefits pro-
vides such insurance, while also minimizing subsidies of lower skilled, usually lower paid workers
(Iversen, 2005, Iversen and Soskice, 2001, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Low-skill workers, by
contrast, earn less and therefore maximize their social policy benefits when contributions are re-
distributed. A similar logic plays out between labor market insiders, who have highly protected,
formal sector employment, and labor-market outsiders, who are characterized by weak employ-
ment protection, low wages, and precarious continued job prospects (Rueda, 2007, 2005). As
Rueda (2005) notes, labor-market insiders benefit from welfare state policies that tightly link con-
tributions and benefits; however, redistribution disproportionately benefits labor-market outsiders,
who tend to contribute less.
Sectoral cleavages over policies dealing with life-cycle and extraordinary risks are much more
salient than class cleavages. Within capital, cleavages form based on the underlying demograph-
ics or risk profile of workers. Firms whose labor pool overlaps demographic criteria that predict
life-cycle risks are more likely to support social policy that insures these risks (Hausermann, 2010,
Mares, 2003a). Similarly, those whose employees are at greater risk of extraordinary events (injury,
unemployment, etc.) will be more supportive of policies that insure against such events. Condi-
tional on a skill profile that demands skilled labor, capital is sensitive to the risks faced by the
preponderance of its employees, because it needs to compensate for these risks in order to attract
skilled labor. Within the population at large, cleavages form along lines similar to those amongst
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capital. Individual demographics are one of the key determinants of support for insuring against
life-cycle risks, just as one’s risk profile is a key predictors of extraordinary event risks (Rehm,
2009).
Finally, existing work suggests that intra-class cleavages over who controls the welfare state
are extremely common. Mares (2003a) argues that within capital there are two major cleavages –
between firms of different sizes and those with different skill profiles. The latter cleavage mirrors
those found along other dimensions: companies with low skill profiles have no need for skilled
workers and therefore oppose social policy regardless of control. In the case of the former, the
costs of control largely dictate preferences. For large firms, with greater resources and the ability
to take advantage of economies of scale, control over social policy is not a major burden and allows
them greater flexibility in using social policy to enforce labor discipline and develop skills. Such
firms prefer the greater discretion of running social policy themselves. Small firms, conversely,
cannot readily afford to pay administrative costs, forcing them to make trade-offs between the
advantages of discretion and its costs. Such firms tend to prefer control by peak associations or
corporatist schemes, which allow them to pool costs but retain some say in social policy.
Cleavages also emerge in the general populace. As a general rule, labor prefers to hedge
against agency loss by supporting trade union control of social policy or, as a second best op-
tion, corporatist arrangements that give labor a voice at the table. Highly skill workers have more
leverage over employers, which potentially decreases agency losses from delegating control, how-
ever. This potentially gives them incentives to favor employer control over other forms where their
bargaining power may be diluted by the preferences and participation of low skill workers.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
How have the various theories of social policy preferences been operationalized and how well
supported are they? Table 1.1 summarizes the key measures used in recent papers on individual-
level preferences.18 For each measure, table 1.1 provides the elements of social policy it addresses,
the theory family it relates to, the expected direction of its effect on support for social policy, lists
18I also include those variables which operationalize ideological theories for completeness, even though these are
not central to my study.
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of supporting (and dissenting) studies, and a list of surveys used to test the measure. This table is
meant to both give a sense of the relative robustness of existing theory and the limits of the samples
the theories have been tested on.
A few things should be immediately obvious from the table. First, variables tied to the class
model are by far the most robust. In particular, income and education are both almost always
negatively correlated with preferences for social policy, making them among the most robust results
in the literature. Current income is clearly an important predictor. Second, risk theories also tend
to be robust, although there is a great deal of heterogeneity in which types of risks matter. For
example, risk measured as industrial level unemployment is rarely a significant predictor, whereas
risk measured as occupational unemployment is. This is likely because the latter more accurately
reflects the types of occupations individuals are able to move into in the event that they lose their
job. Other important risk measures include current unemployment, work history, skill specificity,
and evaluation of individual-specific risks (health, etc.). All of these are relatively robust.
Third, there is surprising variability in the extent to which the control variables matter. Age,
gender, employment status, and marital status are significant in some studies, but not others. Inter-
estingly, some of the control variables that have proved most robust – particularly self-employment
– have not been well theorized in the literature.Finally, it should be immediately obvious that most
empirical work has been conducted with the ISSP, GSS, and ESS surveys, which tend to mostly
cover well-developed, OECD countries. Although the WVS offers broader coverage, and features
prominently in studies co-authored by Alesina, it is not as widely used in the literature.
Taken together, table 1.1 implies that existing theory should be relatively robust across coun-
tries. Unfortunately, this does not bear out perfectly. For one thing, once the possibility of cross-
level interactions are introduced, a number of individual level expectations become more complex.
For example, work on social mobility has shown that expectations about future income shocks
can cause even wealthy individuals to support social policy (Benabou and Ok, 2001, Iversen and
Soskice, 2001, Piketty, 1995). In many tests of this hypothesis, expectations about the nature of
the shocks emerge from experience with massive, macro-economic declines (c.f. Giuliano and
Spilimbergo (2014), Margalit (2013), Ravallion and Loshkin (2000)). Work on trade-openness is
also premised on the notion that individuals in exposed sectors in economically open countries will
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support social policy, even if otherwise similar individuals in more closed economies would not
(Cameron, 1978, Mares, 2005a). Similarly, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) finds that individuals sup-
port for social policy diminishes amongst majority ethnic groups in the presence of poor minority
groups that would receive the bulk of benefits, even among those who should otherwise support
the welfare state. In all these cases, macro-level variables condition the effects of individual-level
ones. As a consequence, generalizing existing theory requires careful consideration of the extent
to which cross-country factors might condition our expectations about pre-existing theory. In the
next section, I introduce a theory based on one such factor: institutional quality.
3 Institutions and Social Policy Preferences
Streeck and Thelen (2005) offer a standard definition of institutions for work on social policy,
defining them as “building blocks of social order: they represent socially sanctioned, that is, col-
lectively enforced expectations with respect to the behavior of specific categories of actors...” [9]
(emphasis in original). From this perspective, institutions allow actors (both state and non-state)
to credibly commit to social policy and to following statutory rules for policy implementation by
providing actors with enforcement mechanisms to hold others accountable. For Streeck and The-
len (2005), the nature of the institutions themselves do not matter, so long as actors have common
expectations about enforcement. Institutions, in turn, allow firms and workers to overcome com-
mitment problems and cooperate in investments (in skill, for example) whose utility is predicated
on specific social policies (c.f. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001), Thelen (2004)). By
making sure that all actors involved keep to their commitments – to contribute, to provide benefits,
etc. – institutions lend social policy the predictability necessary for it to properly fulfill its func-
tions. Central to this perspective, however, is the assumption that commitments, once made, are
fully implemented and that institutions themselves prevent actors from cheating.
While social policy preferences in the absence of institutions has been understudied, the liter-
ature has explored the implications of the absence of credible commitment in two narrow senses.
On the one hand, work on welfare state retrenchment has emphasized the ways in which changing
economic structures and demographic trends render existing welfare state regimes fiscally unsus-
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tainable. In such cases, all actors come to the understanding that commitments to social policy
made yesterday are fiscally infeasible, resulting in pressure for reform (Myles and Pierson, 2001,
Pierson, 2001a). On the other hand, commitments to social policy can also be systematically vi-
olated by strategic actors with differing interpretations of how institutions should function and
statutes should be implemented (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In such accounts, institutional change
emerges as a consequence of negotiation and renegotiation carried out by transgressive, boundary-
pushing actors. In both cases, however, institutions are conceived as being in the process of change,
with formal rules ultimately being updated to reflect new realities and then followed. Even in the
case of Streeck and Thelen (2005)’s transgressive actors, institutions circumscribe the extent of
deviations from agreed upon social policy and their constraining nature is ultimately reinforced, if
in modified forms.
Work on the political economy of development, takes a different approach that emphasizes the
ways in which institutions shape the actual behavior of actors, rather than mere expectations. This
literature defines institutions as a set of human constraints on human interaction (North, 1990)
and presumes that institutional failures are more than symptoms of institutional change. In this
literature, weak institutions are a pervasive features of some settings that allow actors to flagrantly
violate and betray the expectations of others. In particular, this literature focuses on the use of insti-
tutions to solve the fundamental commitment problem between the Weberian state and its citizens.
The state’s monopoly on violence in its territory makes it the de facto final arbiter of property rights
protection and contract enforcement in its domain (North, 1981, Tilly, 1992, Weber, 1947). Absent
some sort of check, there is little to prevent the state, from revising property rights and contracts
at the expense of the citizenry (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009, North and Weingast, 1989).
Moreover, these commitment problems extend into the far reaches of the state hierarchy, since
lower level bureaucrats are key to the day-to-day operations of the state and the implementation
and enforcement of law (Shipan, 2004). Such bureaucrats are hard to monitor and can easily bend
policy to match their preferences, minimize effort, or maximize rents (McNollgast, 1987, Weingast
and Moran, 1983). Where institutions are weak and poorly constraining, the opportunities to do so
are even greater (Beazer, 2012). In the case of both top level officials and bureaucrats, the absence
of sanctions, an interested external higher authority, long time horizons, or other incentives, it is
actually the optimal strategy to break commitments where one can profit (c.f. Olson (2000, 1993)).
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What also sets the conception of institutional failure in work on the political economy of
investment apart from accounts in the literature on social policy is a question of stability and
equilibrium. For Streeck and Thelen (2005) or Pierson (2001a), pressures that degrade credible
commitment are ultimately resolved as actors reform and renegotiate the welfare state. Bargaining
is both possible and ongoing, eventually resulting in new institutional arrangements that reassert
the potential for credible commitment. For North (1990), however, institutional weakness is itself
a potential equilibrium brought on by the ability of the state to abuse discretion for profit. The
resulting unpredictability is associated with a number of macro-economic pathologies, including
macro-economic uncertainty, volatility, and risk (Henisz, 2000, Mobarak, 2005, Nooruddin, 2003,
Rodrik, 2000b). The possibility of policy reversals or outright expropriation also create fear of
direct losses amongst investors, who withhold investment (Beazer, 2012, Frye, 2010, Gehlbach and
Keefer, 2012, North and Weingast, 1989). With little investment and extreme volatility holding it
back, economic growth slows (c.f. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine
(2003)). For the state, this is acceptable, so long as leaders are deriving sufficient rents (Hellman,
1998, Olson, 2000, 1993). Others also benefit, to the extent that poor institutions allow them to use
access to state officials to generate rents and accumulate non-market advantages over competitors
such as privileged property rights protection (Gehlbach, 2008, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Haber,
2007), subsidized loans (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011), and other political favors that significantly help
their bottom line (Faccio, 2006, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). In such circumstances, it
is in the interests of the state and its cronies to retard reform (Hellman, 1998). The only solution
is to set up systems to overcome collective action problems to holding the state accountable for
transgressions (North and Weingast, 1989, Weingast, 1997), whether via electoral means (Barro,
1973, Ferejohn, 1986) or through an hegemonic party (Brownlee, 2007, Geddes, 1999, Magaloni,
2008, Reuter and Remington, 2009).
If institutional failures are a pervasive features of political life, what does this mean for social
policy? I begin from the premise that weak institutions have two important implications for pref-
erences for social policy. First, because institutions are weak and the government unable to make
commitments, most actors can never be sure that contributions made today will be paid out in full
as legally prescribed tomorrow. As a consequence, social policy imposes additional dead-weight
costs on most. Second, however, weak institutions create winners, as well as losers. As mentioned
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above, both the state and those well-connected to it can derive benefits from lack of constraints.
If poor institutions weaken incentives for state officials to enforce the law, particularly tax or la-
bor laws, then those most well-positioned to take advantage of this lack of effort can also prosper
(Treisman, 1999). In these and other cases, poor institutions create opportunities for individuals
and firms to mitigate the costs of social policy, shift them onto others, or to derive non-market
benefits (subsidized investment, loans, etc.) from them, all of which should make social policy
more attractive for these actors.
Building on these insights, in this dissertation I argue that institutional weakness manifests
itself in a number of ways, all of which have important implications for social policy preferences.
These various types of institutional failure fundamentally shape how individuals and firms per-
ceive the relative costs and benefits of social policies, which in turn has important implications for
support for social policy. In this chapter, I present four institutional failures – misappropriation,
macro-economic risk, free-riding, and weak private contract enforcement – that I argue shape pref-
erences for social policy. Conceptually, these pathologies alter the expectations of individuals and
firms with respect to to social policy, potentially creating opposition amongst groups that tradi-
tionally favor social policy and vice-versa. This being said, these pathologies of poor institutions
need not alter existing predictions, since their effects are felt equally across most actors. They do,
however, create opportunities for some that do not exist in good institutional settings, leading to
support in unexpected places. They also sap benefits for everyone, leading to lower overall support
for social policy even in cases where relative support does not change. It is also work noting that
these failures need not generate mutually exclusive predictions. In some cases, predictions are
similar along some dimensions.
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the predictions that arise under each type of institutional
failure, focusing primarily on new characteristics of individuals and firms the predict support for
social policy under each. It also presents theoretically important distinctions between the logic
actors would be expected to articulate for each to help fix ideas. Before turning to a discussion
of the institutional failures themselves, it is worth noting that I examine so many in order follow
Elster (1983, 24) and “open up the black box” of theory. For micro-level theories, it is important to
show the links between specific concerns about aspects of institutional quality and actors’ propen-
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sity to support specific types of social policy. This insures a rich theory, generates a large number
of testable predictions, and facilitates the formation of more precise macro-level theories based on
these micro-foundations. It is also worth noting that while I present each of type of institutional
failure and its distinct predictions below, my theory makes no claims that they are mutually ex-
clusive. While each has testable predictions unique to it, these predictions rarely contradict each
other. All of these types of institutional failure may be operative at once and all may be shaping
the preferences of actors.
3.1 Misappropriation
The first form of institutional failure that may shape support for social policy is misappropriation:
the use of funds collected for one purpose for a different one. As discussed above, where institu-
tional quality is poor, politicians and government bureaucrats face few constraints on their ability
to make use of policy for their own ends. Where programs are government controlled, officials
can divert government money to pet projects and investments that enrich themselves or allies, even
if such projects are risky or the funds are officially earmarked for other purposes (Renooy, 1990).
Social policy is particularly vulnerable for two reasons. First, social policies are typically funded
through taxes that are remitted to government organs and put into centralized pools for immedi-
ate payout or investment. Such pools make diversion of funds relatively easy, particularly where
government controls social policy. Second, officials possess huge informational advantages over
social policy beneficiaries about the true state of social policy funds and their ability to pay out
benefits. As such programs are complex, it is difficult for the populace to police deviations from
the law such as rent-seeking or use of funds for other policy priorities (McNollgast, 1987, Wein-
gast and Moran, 1983). While such actions are a danger everywhere, they are particularly likely in
poor institutional settings, where monitoring officials and punishing them for mishandling funds is
significantly more difficult.
In order to see how this type of institutional failure shapes preferences, it is helpful to to look
again at the standard Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, which describes the preferred tax rate
τ used to fund a purely redistributive social policy. Recall equation 1.1 introduced above. In
this equation, ωi represents the dead-weight costs of social policy to the individual. A relatively
47
straightforward way to model the costs of misappropriation to individuals is to redefine dead-
weight costs as ωi(τ, q), yielding:
ui = αi(1− τ) + ατ − ωi(τ, q) (1.2)
where q is a measure of the strength of institutions (i.e. how much they constrain) and ∂ω
∂q
< 0.
As should be readily apparent, the individual’s utility is decreasing in ωi, which means that it is
decreasing in τ but increasing in q.19 Consequently, as institutional quality decreases, individuals
prefer a lower tax rate and therefore less social policy. This finding is consistent with Becker (1985,
1983)’s general model, which shows that support for social policies is inversely related to dead-
weight costs. Taken at face value, then, existing work would predict that as institutional quality
decreases, support for social policy does as well.
It is worth noting that misappropriation does not necessarily negate predictions carried over
from the existing literature. For example, equation 1.2 still yields the prediction that those with
higher than average productivity (i.e. αi > α) will be less supportive of social policy than those
with lower productivity. Similarly, if we extend the model to include risk, we would find that
institutional quality does not alter the prediction that those at greater risk are more likely to support
social policy. Consequently, we would expect that most of the existing predictions of micro-level
work on preferences for social policy – income, risk, gender, age, etc. – should hold in settings
with poor institutions. What changes, at least according to equation 1.2, is that everyone in settings
with weak institutions supports social policy less than those in settings with good institutions.
The baseline model obscures three important dynamics, however. First, while ωi is assumed
to be a function of taxes, its functional form is generally chosen as a matter of convenience. For
most formal models of social policy preferences, the important thing is only that dead-weight costs
increase with taxation. It is not clear to what extent this is realistic, however, since the dead-weight
costs of taxation are akin to a perverse public good: they are non-excludable and paid by all. Shared
amongst an entire population, it is not clear that the costs any given individual bears are high
enough to significantly decrease support for social policy ceteris paribus, since each individual
19Recall that we originally defined ωi(τ) such that ∂ω∂τ > 0. The fact that utility is increasing in q follows from
definition of ω presented above.
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only bears a small portion of the total cost (Olson, 1965).20 To get an empirically noticeable
effect, the scale of diversion of funds would have to be truly large such that each individual bears
noticeable and significant costs.
Second, the baseline model also obscures the fact that while redistribution is subject to large
dead-weight costs in settings where misappropriation is rampant, so are alternatives that tightly
link contributions and benefits. In principle, a tight link between contributions and benefits allows
individuals to carefully monitor their funds and detect misappropriation. In practice, the complex-
ity of policies with a tight contribution-benefit link makes them difficult to monitor. At the limit,
in a system with a one-to-one mapping of contributions to benefits and no redistribution, officials
must track contributions over time, store them (possibly in ways that inflation proof contributions),
and then distribute the appropriate benefits at a later date. Such complexity exacerbates officials’
informational advantages, making it easier to get away with misappropriation and leaving each
step vulnerable. Unless actors have strong means for holding bureaucrats accountable, detecting
misappropriation may not even be enough to hinder it. Consequently, I argue that tighter links
between contributions and benefits make misappropriation even easier than in purely redistribu-
tive settings. It follows that while both options are bad, actors are more likely to support more
redistributive systems if forced to choose.
Finally, and most importantly, equation 1.2 assumes that poor institutions produce a net loss
for everyone. Not everyone loses when institutions are poor, however, potentially allowing groups
that normally do not profit from the welfare state where institutions are good to do so when they
are poor. Indeed, a growing literature in political economy accepts links between misappropriation
and corruption, as symptoms of weak institutions, and economic outcomes, but argues that some
individuals and firms can protect themselves from the dead-weight costs of institutions by invest-
ing in political resources.21 Political connections can produce a number of benefits that shelter
the actors from rent-seeking (somewhat) and improve profits (Faccio, 2006, Faccio, Masulis, and
McConnell, 2006). These include cheap access to credit (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011) or privileged ac-
cess to public goods (Gehlbach, 2008), both of which become easier where social policy funds are
20Formally, imagine ω(t, q, n) such that ∂ω∂t > 0 and
∂ω
∂n < 0. If we do, then the magnitude of the effect of ω on an
individuals’ utility will be decreasing in the size of the populace, although still increasing in taxation.
21Examples of such resources include friendly politicians, party membership, or direct office holding, c.f. Gehlbach
and Keefer (2011), Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2010), Haber (2007), Magaloni (2008).
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larger and create more resources for politicians to divvy to the well-connected.22 Thus, while the
well-connected may not be “winners” from poor institutions in the strictest sense, their privileges
help to offset the costs of social policy in settings with weak institutions.
In terms of the basic Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, one can imagine a simple extension
that adds in an additional, non-welfare state benefit B(τ, q) such that ∂B
∂τ
> 0 and ∂B
∂q
< 0 for
individuals with political connections. This yields:
ui = αi(1− τ) + ατ +B(τ, q)− ωi(τ, q) (1.3)
In this simple extension, support for social policy would be conditional on the relative value of the
dead-weight cost and this new, non-welfare state benefit. Where the latter (in combination with the
welfare state benefits) outweigh the former (and taxes), the well-connected should support social
policy even in the face of dead-weight costs from institutions.
Predictions Given Misappropriation
How then can we apply these insights to derive testable predictions? With respect to the redis-
tribution dimension, two dynamics are at play. On the one hand, as the model above indicated,
support for social policy with a redistributive component should be low in settings with poor in-
stitutions that have high dead-weight costs due to misappropriation. On the other hand, policies
that have a tight contribution-benefit link offer little more protection. Their complexity multiplies
opportunities for officials to conceal the misappropriation of funds, thus increasing dead-weight
costs relative to simpler redistributive systems. Consequently, the general populace should support
simpler, more redistributive programs where funds are more difficult to divert. This being said, due
to dead-weight costs, support for redistributive systems should also be low, although not as low as
for those with tight contribution-benefit linkages.
As noted above, however, in settings with weak institutions, social groups that are well-
connected often benefit from more secure property rights and additional financial benefits. These
22For a concrete example, see chapter 3, which presents examples of these fears during the Russian pension reform
debates of 2001.
50
can mitigate the dead-weight costs of poor institutions in various ways. Most directly, such groups
may be given access to social policy funds, allowing them to derive non-labor market benefits from
a more generous welfare state. Systems that allow for greater misappropriation can provide more
resources. As discussed extensively in the next chapter, during Russia’s 2001 pension reform many
feared that the government would divert social policy funds (particularly from pensions) from state
accounts to invest in well-connected state-owned firms. Indirectly, however, the well-connected
can take advantage of their privileged access to property rights protection in order to verify that
benefits are being assigned to them properly. These possibilities decrease the dead-weight costs of
systems, particularly those with tight contribution-benefit links. As a consequence, these groups
may support less redistribution, if they have other characteristics (high skill, market insider status,
etc.) that would make such policies beneficial to them. We therefore expect that the politically
well-connected support more complex, less redistributive social policies, since these facilitate di-
versions of resources that can benefit them.
With respect to the risk dimension, recall that life-cycle risks tend to involve programs from
which individuals expect benefits at a relatively predictable, highly specific point in the future.
The long-term nature of life cycle risks makes insuring them problematic in settings with weak
institutions, because the inability to monitor and sanction officials creates opportunities for misap-
propriation. The dead-weight costs from this are only likely to compound over time. Thus actors
should oppose insuring risks with long time horizons such as life-cycle risk. Risks tied to extraor-
dinary events, conversely, are fundamentally unpredictable and can occur tomorrow just as easily
as within the next several years. Because insuring against extraordinary events involves shorter
term payouts, there should be less opposition to these types of programs. Again, however, these
concerns only apply to those not receiving additional, non-welfare state benefits from social policy
and those without political protection. For the well-connected, contributing today for policies that
will be paid out tomorrow is less of a risk than for others. Their connections assure them the ability
to curb misappropriation that could dissipate their (or their employees’) future benefits
Finally, misappropriation also has repercussions for expectations about preference cleavages
over the control dimension of social policy. Perhaps the most obvious of these, is that where
the state controls social policy, private actors (capital and labor) will not be able to hold officials
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accountable. Allowing the state to collect, administer, and distribute social policy funds is an open
invitation for the officials in charge to misappropriate. Consequently, the average actor should
oppose state control. As with the other components of social policy, however, politically well-
connected groups are able to defend themselves from the costs associated with misappropriation
by the state and in some cases to benefit from it. As a consequence, these groups have little to fear
from state control.
Summing up the discussion of this section, we would expect the following hypotheses to hold
if misappropriation is at play:
Hypothesis 1. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that the average member of the
populace or firm supports social policies that are less redistributive, cover life-cycle risks, and vest
control in the state decreases.
Hypothesis 2. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that the politically well-connected
support social policies that are less redistributive, cover life-cycle risks, and vest control in the
state increases.
3.2 Macro-economic Risk
The second type of institutional failure that can shape preferences for social policy is macro-
economic risk. Recall that in the literature on institutional quality and investment, opportunism
in the form of policy reversals, rent-seeking, or selective enforcement of laws increases transac-
tion costs for economic actors and injects uncertainty into returns, decreasing incentives to invest
(Frye, 2010, North, 1990, Olson, 2000). The uncertainty enabled by poor institutions has broader
economic implications beyond investment, however, and numerous studies have shown that weak
institutions greatly increase macro-economic volatility (Henisz, 2000, Mobarak, 2005, Nooruddin,
2003, Quinn and Woolley, 2001, Rodrik, 2000b, 1999). Intuitively, where accountability is weak,
there are few roadblocks to opportunistic policy changes or rent-seeking. Constant shifts in policy
and the extent of enforcement, coupled with the potential for outright expropriation, complicate the
formation of market equilibria and force individuals and firms to engage in constant adjustments.
This stokes volatility and can lower the growth trajectory of the economy and lead to economic
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disasters (Mobarak, 2005, Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Sen, 1983).
For individuals, volatility creates uncertainty about the degree of future consumption. Em-
pirically, there is evidence that experience with macro-level volatility has a negative impact on
individuals’ subjective measures of well-being (Wolfers, 2003) and that consumption volatility
imposes real welfare costs on individuals in both developing (Pallage and Robe, 2003) and devel-
oped (Barlevy, 2004) countries.23 In the face of this uncertainty, work on preferences for social
policy suggests that individuals (particularly the high income) will prefer insurance against income
and consumption shocks (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001, Ravallion and Loshkin, 2000). Actual ex-
periences with economic downturns are likely to exacerbate this effect, in so far as they can either
directly influence individuals’ income (i.e. if they are fired in a recession) or their perceptions of fu-
ture economic prospects (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014, Margalit, 2013, Ravallion and Loshkin,
2000).24 Social policy is one way to insure against risk and smooth consumption and income.
Thus, we might expect that institutional quality matters for preferences for social policy indirectly,
via its effect on macro-economic risk. The worse institutional quality is, the more volatile the
macro-economic environment will be, and the more individuals will support social policy.
For firms, increased macro-economic risk has a more nuanced effect. Conventional wisdom
would suggest that firms want to slash costs in uncertain environments, particularly if they antici-
pate economic downturns. Social policy would be a tempting cut, particularly if social polices are
a large portion of firms’ tax burden. Drawing on evidence from firm behavior and lobbying during
the Great Depression, however, Swensen (2002) notes that employers sometimes support social
policy even in the depths of recession, when conditions are unquestionably favorable to cost cut-
ting. Swensen shows that skill intensive, segmentalist American auto firms supported social policy
legislation at the beginning of the Great Recession as a way to prevent low-cost competitors from
undercutting them, while preserving their highly skilled workforce. For Swedish firms during the
same period, social policy legislation was a good way to prevent the emergence of informal com-
petitors. His argument suggests that even where the macro-economic environment is poor, firms in
skill intensive industries can still derive value from social policy.
23Although for a dissent on the welfare cost of consumption volatility, see (Lucas, 1987).
24It is worth noting, however, that Margalit (2013) provide evidence that this effect may not be persistent for those
who are ideologically opposed to redistribution and social policy.
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Predictions Given Macro-economic Risk
The presence of institutionally induced macro-economic risk lends itself to relatively straightfor-
ward predictions. If macro-economic volatility is just another form of risk, then existing models
suggest that individuals should support social policy more as it increases (Iversen and Soskice,
2001, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001) and less as it decreases (Benabou and Ok, 2001, Piketty,
1995). Over the redistribution dimension, however, the literature is somewhat contradictory. On
the one hand, Iversen and Soskice (2001)’s model, based on the Meltzer-Richards framework and
purely redistributive policy, suggests that preferences for redistribution increase as risk increases.
Moene and Wallerstein (2001)’s model, on the other hand, suggests that preferences over redistri-
bution are heterogeneous. Those with higher income support more generous social policy only if
it is targeted narrowly at the unemployed, while the general populace (with its lower wage) prefers
more redistributive, universal policies. Thus, settings with poor institutions are likely to feature
greater demand for redistribution from the general populace, as macro-economic risks are greater.
This prediction is unique among the different forms of institutional failure I explore here.
With respect to the risk dimension, predictions are more straightforward. Because the ma-
jor risk where there is institutionally induced macro-economic risk has to do with the effects of
government opportunism on the economy in general, rather than social policy in particular, the
government is not expected to misuse or divert social policy funds. Consequently, there is no
reason that time horizons should play a special role in the utility calculus of individuals. More-
over, one would expect that increased macro-economic risks are likely to heighten support for both
extra-ordinary event risks and life-cycle risks. In both cases, heightened macro-economic volatility
exacerbates pre-existing risks and increases the attractiveness of additional income from programs
meant to mitigate them. Consequently, we should see increased support for both types of programs.
Similarly, because the government is not a threat to social policy funds per se, it is not clear that
predictions along the control dimension will differ markedly from what one would expect in the
existing literature.
Summarizing, we would expect that:
Hypothesis 3. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that the average member of the
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populace or firm supports social policies that are more redistributive and cover extraordinary
and/or life-cycle risks increases.
It is important to note that only where institutionally induced macro-economic risk is present would
we expect the probability of support for social policy to be higher where institutional quality is
poorer.
3.3 Free-riding
The third institutional failure that can shape support for social policy is free-riding. As with misap-
propriation, it stems from the insight that where institutions are poor, officials face few constraints.
It differs in two respects, however. First, free-riding as an institutional failure stems from the
absence of strong constraints to hold low level bureaucrats accountable, they are unlikely to ex-
ert costly effort to implement or enforce policy (Mares, 2005a, McNollgast, 1987, Weingast and
Moran, 1983). From this perspective, poor institutions are both a cause of weak state capacity and
a consequence. That is, weak constraints on officials are often a function of weak state capacity,
which these officials reproduce and exacerbate by not doing their jobs. Here the pathology of poor
institutions is not limited to corruption and rent-seeking, but also encompasses unwillingness to
enforce laws as written.
Second, whereas the misappropriation focuses on the implications of weak institutions for
management of funds, free-riding instead matters for expectations over revenue. Tax collection is
a costly endeavor that requires a real, credible threat of audit or punishment to insure compliance
(c.f. Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan (2014)). Where con-
straints on officials are weak, it may be difficult to motivate them to exert effort, thus decreasing
fears of audit and increasing tax evasion. For individuals and firms, this creates a commitment
problem, since the state cannot commit to enforcing tax laws equally. Tax evasion complicates
cost-benefit calculations, since the tax base will be narrower than dictated by statute and bene-
fits will be lower than they should be. Moreover, individuals and firms who cannot evade know
that they will be effectively subsidizing benefits for free-riders that can. In her seminal work on
the effects of institutional quality on welfare state generosity, Mares (2005a) develops a model
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illustrating that this fear of free-riding decreases support for social policy for the average worker.
Again, returning to equation 1.1 is helpful for illustrating how free-riding shapes preferences.
Recall that in the pure Meltzer-Richards model, social policy is purely redistributive. For the
average member of the populace tax evasion means less revenue flowing into state coffers, which
decreases benefits. Mares (2005a) argues that this is akin to imposing additional dead-weight costs
on individuals, modeling the cost as a function of the extent of tax evasion. As in section 3.1, we
can model this by defining dead-weight costs as ω(t, q), where q is the strength of institutions (and
therefore the extent of tax enforcement) and ∂ω
∂q
< 0. As before, this set-up suggests that support
for redistribution increases as institutions grow stronger and tax evasion harder.
Whereas Mares (2005a) focuses primarily on the average member of the populace, however, it
is important to note that not everyone loses in settings where tax evasion is rampant. Indeed, those
who can hide a portion of their income from authorities potentially stand to gain quite a lot, so long
as they are eligible to receive benefits. So long as the ability to evade taxes outweighs negative
utility from the dead-weight costs of rampant evasion, tax evaders profit from social policy. Put
another way, the tax savings from evasion may counterbalance (or even outpace) the loss in benefits
from poor institutions. To see this, imagine another extension to the basic Meltzer and Richards
(1981) model:
ui = α(1− ηit) + ατ − ωi(τ, η) (1.4)
where ηi is an individual level measure capturing the proportion of wages the individual reports to
the tax authorities and is subject to taxation. We define it is a function of individual characteristics,
xi, and the strength of institutions, q. We assume that individuals with xi = 0 do not have char-
acteristics that allow them to evade taxes, resulting in ηi = 1, while individuals with xi = 1 are
able to evade taxes such that 0 < ηi < 1. We further assume that for individuals with xi = 1 the
proportion of taxes paid is increasing in institutional quality q or ∂η
∂q
> 0. Following the spirit of
Mares’ model ωi is a function of the tax rate τ and the average level of tax evasion η and decreases
the amount the state has to redistribute (i.e. is a dead-weight cost).
Intuitively, equation 1.4 provides several important insights. First, recall that in the standard
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Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, support for redistribution is declining in income, α, since
higher wages imply higher taxes. The ability to hide income offsets this relationship, however,
since the lower ηi the more of one’s income can be hidden from the state. Consequently, one
would expect support for social policy to be decreasing in ηi, ceteris paribus, since lower reported
wages result in lower taxes. Second, conditional on the characteristics, xi, that allow one to evade
taxes, we would also expect that support for redistribution amongst tax evaders is also decreasing
in institutional quality. This is because by definition ∂η
∂q
> 0, which implies that it is more difficult
to hide taxes where institutional quality is good. Better institutions therefore decrease the effective-
ness of tax evasion and decrease the benefits of free-riding. Third, the exact relationship between
the proportion of taxes an individual pays, ηi, and the average proportion of taxes paid by society as
a whole, η, is also important. For free-riders to support redistribution, personal cost savings from
hiding wages must out pace increases in the overall dead-weight costs of social policy brought on
by tax evasion (i.e. α(1 − ηit) > ωi(τ, η). Finally, it is worth noting that, as with misappropria-
tion, equation 1.4 has no real implications for existing theory based on income, demographic, or
risk-based predictors of social policy. These should continue to hold predictive power in settings
where free-riding is rampant, even though overall support for social policy may be lower.
It is worth noting that the logic above applies to both individuals and firms and does not
depend on who is actually paying taxes. Suppose that individuals are required to pay social policy
contributions. As these contributions erode real wages, employees will likely command slightly
higher wages to compensate, particularly high-wage employees that are of particular value to firms.
If such individuals can evade taxes, however, the firm need not pay this premium. Under some
circumstances, it will be in the interests of the firm to encourage evasion with a premium for
accepting unofficial pay. Depending on the employee’s expectations, a lower premium today might
be more attractive than full benefits tomorrow. Conversely, if firms pay social policy taxes, then
these contributions can weigh on the bottom line. For firms able to evade taxes, doing so decreases
their costs and is a preferred strategy. For individual workers, this is acceptable so long as failure
by firms to make contributions does not weigh on their benefits or firms provide compensation in
exchange for workers looking the other way.25
25For examples of such schemes in the Russian context, c.f. Ovtcharova and Popova (2001), Yakovlev (2001). Note
that this concern is similar to the concerns of some informal workers for Carnes and Mares (2014b), who support
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Who can free ride (i.e. for whom is xi = 1)? Existing work has shown that the amount of
effort that government officials must put into collecting taxes varies both within and across in-
dustries based on business structure, firm size, and the mobility of assets (Alm, 2012). Those
whose business requires large stocks of fixed capital or use immobile assets, such as heavy indus-
try, large-scale agriculture, or extractive sectors, are much easier for tax officials to monitor and
tax (Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008, Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003). Conversely, those involved
in businesses with mobile assets, such as small firms, retail, and human capital intensive services,
require much more costly effort to monitor. Similarly businesses dominated by cash transactions
and high employee turnover are also difficult to monitor (Gimpelson and Zudina, 2012, Ovtcharova
and Popova, 2001, Yakovlev, 2001). Faced with high auditing costs, officials are more likely to
shirk on their responsibility to collect taxes from such groups, allowing them to engage in tax eva-
sion and free-riding, and instead focus on extracting taxes from the more easily monitored (Easter,
2002, Gehlbach, 2008). Empirical work has confirmed that these characteristics are associated
with tax evasion (Alm, 2012, Kleven et al., 2011, Slonimczyk, 2012).
Predictions Given Free-riding
Drawing on the discussion above, preferences over the redistribution dimension are straightfor-
ward. Where redistribution is high, the link between contributions and benefits is weak. Con-
sequently, tax evasion has few penalties and free-riding becomes attractive. Where contributions
and benefits are more tightly linked, however, tax evasion is less profitable. While there is some
utility to shielding income from taxation, social policy benefits are commensurately lower. Thus,
we would expect that individuals and firms with characteristics that make it easier to evade taxes
will be more supportive, ceteris paribus, of systems with a high degree of redistribution.26 Con-
versely, those with greater difficulty in evading taxes are more likely to support programs with
tight contribution-benefit links, where free-riding is much less lucrative and therefore imposes
fewer dead-weight costs.
contributory systems if their income is high enough or if they expect to transition to formal employment.
26This prediction becomes more complicated if tax evaders are particularly wealthy and benefits depend on contri-
butions. In these cases, it might be better to forgo tax evasion and make contributions in order to reap the high returns
on one’s income. For an interesting discussion on cleavages in the informal sector, which shares many characteristics
with tax evaders, see Carnes and Mares (2014a,b).
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Free-riding also has implications for preferences over control. This institutional failure sup-
poses that the state is incapable of enforcing tax laws and policing free-riding where institutions are
weak. Consequently, the average individual and firm is less likely to support state control of social
policy in such settings, since this only perpetuates tax evasion and free-riding. Private control, by
contrast, becomes more attractive. As work on bureaucratic discretion and effort has shown, intro-
ducing private actors to supervise state officials is an excellent way of insuring bureaucratic effort
(McNollgast, 1987, McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Fully private control also provides benefits
over state systems, since private actors are more likely to have the incentives and the means to po-
lice free-riding (usually via control over benefits allocations) and insure compliance. Free-riders,
conversely, prefer state control, as it allows them to take advantage of bureaucrats’ lack of effort
in order to evade taxes. It is worth noting that the irony of this prediction is that while in principle
the state has incentives to attempt to police free-riding, weak institutions make it difficult for it to
do so.
Over the risk dimension, predictions are a bit more complex. On the one hand, it is difficult to
see how the benefits (or costs) of free-riding depend on time horizons. Regardless of when indi-
viduals expect payouts from social policy, free-riding is likely to lead to short falls. Consequently,
one would not really expect there to be distinct preferences on the part of free-riders for life cycle
risk coverage versus extraordinary risk coverage. On the other hand, because free-riding imposes
dead-weight costs on all social policies – regardless of what types of risk they cover – we would
expect that average individual or firm to be less likely to support either life cycle or extraordinary
risk programs in settings where institutions are weak.
Summing up, we would expect the following to be true if free-riding holds:
Hypothesis 4. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that the average member of the
populace or firm supports social policies that are more redistributive and vest control in the state
decreases.
Hypothesis 5. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that those with facility in evading
taxes support social policy that is more redistributive and vests control in the state increases.
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3.4 Contract Enforcement
The final institutional failure that can influence preferences relates to expectations about the ability
(and willingness) of the state to enforce contracts and protect property rights. Recall that the
state is the final arbiter of property rights and contracts within its territory. As discussed above,
in the absence of institutional constraints, officials have every incentive to abrogate agreements
and engage in opportunistic rent-seeking (North, 1990, 1981). An important implication of this,
however, is that officials mediating disputes between parties also have incentives to ignore the law
in favor of whoever is willing to offer the most. Consequently, weak institutions degrade the ability
of governments to commit to contract enforcement between private parties. The consequence is
that private parties also have a hard time committing to each other.
It is important to note that the inability of the state to enforce contracts has similar observable
implications to those of the misappropriation and free-riding arguments. As with those cases, the
state is unable to credibly commit to policy, so actors cannot be sure that the state will live up to
its commitments to collect contributions and distribute benefits as prescribed by law. This leads
to general opposition to state-run social policy.27 Similarly, we would expect many predictors
from the existing literature – demographic features, risk, and income – to continue to hold where
contract enforcement is weak, albeit with overall support for social policy declining as with mis-
appropriation or free-riding. What distinguishes contract-enforcement as an institutional failure
is that private control of social policy, a viable option where misappropriation or free-riding are
issues, is not viable where there is weak contract enforcement.
3.5 Predictions Given Contract Enforcement Failure
For the most part, predictions given contract enforcement failures are similar to those for misappro-
priation. Actors prefer social policies that are more redistributive in such settings, since simpler
policies cut down on the opportunities for other actors to renege on contracts and abscond with
funds. Similarly, actors should oppose social policies designed to cover life-cycle risk, since the
long time horizons of such policies also provide opportunities for malfeasance.
27As with misappropriation and free-riding, the consequences of this can be captured formally through the dead-
weight cost term, ω.
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Over the control dimension, however, preferences are a bit different. Without the state to
enforce contracts between private parties, agents can engage in a variety of unauthorized behaviors
ranging from outright theft to using funds as a cheap source of capital for risky investments.28
Since no one can trust anyone else in the absence of contract enforcement, actors will have strong
preferences for controlling social policy as directly as possible, eliminating the possibility that
a third party can abscond with funds. In these settings, corporatist solutions may represent a
reasonable (if second-best) solution, since they give a wide range of actors a seat at the table and
provide them checks on the misuse of funds. Alternatively, actors may prefer a multi-pillar system,
in which the state controls one pillar and private actors another. Such systems potentially provide
a hedge against weak contract enforcement by allowing actors to spread the risk of defection in the
absence of certainty over the ability to hold politicians and private actors to account.
As with misappropriation, not all suffer from weak contract enforcement. Political connections
grant some actors a comparative advantage in rallying the state to assist them during contract
disputes. By relying on officials to whom they have connections – whether via ties to specific
politicians, party membership, or direct control of office – to interfere for them in disputes, such
“well-connected” firms largely evade the costs of poor institutional quality that others pay and
insure their contracts are honored when others are not (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya, 2010).29
Empirically, work on the advantages of political connections in the developing world highlights
the fact that firms (and by extension individuals) who are well-connected to ruling groups can
often secure protection for their property rights, even where other actors cannot (Gehlbach, 2008,
Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012, 2011, Haber, 2007, Magaloni, 2008). Since they know that their
contracts will be enforced, such actors are more likely to favor delegation of social policy to third
parties than otherwise similar actors lacking connections.
Taken together, this discussion suggests the following predictions given weak contract enforce-
ment:
Hypothesis 6. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that the average member of the
28I provide some concrete examples of both of these fears in the next chapter, which reviews Russian pension
reforms.
29This is not to say that such connections are not themselves costly. Often firms must engage in costly exchange
relations with officials, trading resources, rents, votes, and other political favors for protection (Frye et al., 2014,
Gehlbach, 2008, Hellman, 1998).
61
populace or firm supports social policies that are less redistributive, cover life-cycle risks, or vest
control in third parties – either the state or private actors – decreases.
Hypothesis 7. As institutional quality decreases, the probability that politically well-connected
actors support social policies that are less redistributive, cover life-cycle risks, and vest control in
the state increases.
4 Conclusion
This chapter set out to establish the theoretical framework for the remainder of the dissertation. I
began the chapter by laying out three elements of social policy – redistribution, risk, and control
– which have been the focus of much of the existing research on preferences for social policy.
I then went on to discuss the class and cross-class cleavages that form along these social policy
dimensions according to existing work. Using these predictions as a starting point, I then presented
four pathologies of poor institutions that could alter expectations about support for social policy:
misappropriation, macro-economic risk, free-riding, and weak contract enforcement. For each, I
presented a brief discussion of the logic and a set of predictions about how they alter preference
cleavages over social policy. The goal is to provide a complete set of predictions for support for
social policy over redistribution, risk, and control for later testing.
The remainder of the dissertation is then dedicated to empirical tests of the predictions gener-
ated in this chapter. Because my theory generates a large body of predictions at different units of
analysis (the populace and the firm), however, it is impractical to test each separate prediction. In-
stead, each chapter tests a specific facet of the overall argument using the units of analysis allowed
for by the data. Although some of the predictions raised in this chapter remain untested, cumula-
tively the more narrow tests that are provided should at least provide confidence in the importance
of institutional quality for social policy preferences. Table 1.2 summarizes both the predictions
made by my theory and where in the dissertation I test these predictions.
To provide an overview of the contributions of each chapter to bolstering my argument, in the
next chapter, I make use of survey data collected from 28 post-communist countries. The chapter
takes as the unit of analysis individual members of the populace selected for the survey and tests
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predictions about the preferences of actors with characteristics associated with tax evasion over
redistribution and control that should hold under free-riding. It also tests whether institutions have
a ceteris paribus effect on preferences. Chapter 3 examines the discourse of social policy reform
in a setting with poor institutional quality – Russia. It tests predictions about the logic actors use
when discussing social policy reforms in settings with poor institutions generated by each of the
four institutional failures presented in this chapter. Here the unit of analysis is the set of public
statements made by legislature, individuals, and businesses in legislative debates, the popular press,
and the business press.
Chapter 4 provides a test of misappropriation and free-riding using survey data on Russian
firms, which are the primary unit of analysis. It specifically tests predictions about firms that can
evade taxes, and thus free-ride, and those that have political connections over control. Due to data
limitations, I can only test predictions for settings with poor quality institutions, however. This
chapter also provides a test of whether my theory can be applied to explain firm preferences, un-
like the more individual oriented tests of earlier chapters. Finally, chapter 5 uses a simple survey
experiment to examine the pathologies of poor institutions presented in this chapter. The exper-
iment was embedded in a public opinion survey and attempts prime respondents with data about
different pathologies of poor institutions. This provides some insights into the unconditional effect
of institutions on preferences.
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Table 1.1: Variables and their Operationalization in Existing Work
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Figure 1.1: Social Policy Preferences under Good Institutions
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Figure 1.2: Social Policy Preferences Under Poor Institutions
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Chapter 2
Individual Preferences in Post-communist
Countries
In the previous chapter, I developed a comprehensive theory that generates a number of predictions
about the link between the preferences of individuals and firms for social policy and institutional
quality. In this chapter, I test one set of observable implications of my theory using individual
members of the populace as the unit of analysis. Recall that the free-rider pathology outlined in
the previous chapter suggests that poor institutions increase the probability that some actors can
free-ride on social policy. For the average actor, unable to evade taxes, the free-riding increases
dead-weight costs of redistribution and state control. This should decrease support for these types
of policies. For those able to evade taxes, however, the worse institutional quality, the easier it is
to get away with tax evasion and free-ride on vulnerable social policy. This increases support for
such social policies.
In this chapter, I provide a cross-national test of these predictions using data from the 2007
Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) to assess how institutions shape the preferences of individuals in
28 post-communist states. To preview the chapter, I take advantage of well-studied correlates of
the ability to evade taxes in the post-communist states to focus on individuals with characteristics
that make them less visible to the state. Drawing on chapter 1, I argue that where institutions are
weak, the ability of such individuals to evade taxes increases. If my theory is correct, this should
result in higher support for government controlled, redistributive social policy for this group. To
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the extent the chapter can show that preferences shift as the ease of tax evasion increases, it also
shows that institutional quality is a potentially valuable explanation for cross-national variation in
preferences, at least for some groups.
My focus on free-riding in this chapter is motivated primarily by data constraints. Most cross-
national, macro-level measures of institutional quality are highly correlated with each other, despite
ostensibly measuring different aspects of poor institutions (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, Treisman,
2007, Trier and Jackman, 2008). This complicates interpretation and makes it difficult to dis-
tinguish between different pathologies of poor institutions using only these measures. By taking
advantage of the presence of survey questions about characteristics associated tax evasion, how-
ever, I can take advantage of a unique prediction of the free-rider pathology and distinguish it from
the others.
In addition to providing support for my theory, this chapter offers a few broader contribu-
tions to the literature on preferences for social policy. First, it is among the first of a growing
set of studies to examine preferences for social policy in the post-communist states, specifically,
and the developed world, more broadly.1 At the minimum, this chapter provides new evidence
on the generality of many existing theories of individual level preferences. Second, in providing
a cross-national test of aspects of my framework, this chapter helps to both highlight the impor-
tance of institutional quality in cross-national research and its generality. Finally, this chapter
joins a growing trend in work on social policy preferences towards examining the intersection
between macro-level factors and individual preferences for social policy. Evidence suggests that
macro-level factors – including inequality and welfare state design (Finseraas, 2008a, Meltzer and
Richards, 1981, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001), ethnicity (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Alesina et
al., 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004), and trade openness (Cameron, 1978, Garrett and Mitchell,
2001, Mares, 2005a, Rodrik, 1998, 1997) – condition preferences for social policy. It also suggests
that where such conditions vary more markedly – as in the developing world – preferences might
1The most prominent studies of the post-communist states are Alesina and Fuchs-Shundeln (2007) and Pop-Eleches
and Tucker (2014). Haggard and Kaufman (2008) focus on macro-level determinants of social policy formation and
reform in the region, but also discuss the implications of their historical institutionalist theory of social policy formation
and reform for individual level preferences in the region. For prominent recent examples of work on the developing
world, c.f. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara
(2004), Berens (2012), Carnes and Mares (2014a, 2013), Cramar and Kaufman (2011), Ravallion and Loshkin (2000),
Wegner and Pellicer (2011).
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look quite different, both in the aggregate and within otherwise similar groups in different country
settings.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the observable implica-
tions of my theory that this chapter seeks to test. Section 2 introduces the dataset, measures, and
empirical strategy used in this chapter. Section 3 presents the main empirical results of the chapter
and section 4 concludes.
1 Free-riders’ Preferences and Institutions
In this chapter, I make use of a question from the 2007 Life in Transition Survey that asks respon-
dents about the degree to which the state should be involved in closing the income gap between the
rich and the poor.2 I present the precise wording and discuss the relative merits of the instrument
below. What is important to note at the outset, however, is that the instrument is clearly aimed at
capturing two aspects of social policy: control and redistribution. As a consequence, this chapter
will focus narrowly on testing implications specific to these elements of the welfare state.
Before outlining the hypotheses tested here, it is worth mentioning that I also take the op-
portunity to test existing theories of individual-level preferences for social policy. Rather than
summarize these here, I instead refer interested readers to chapter 1 for a summary of the most
prominent existing theories in this literature, how these theories have been operationalized, and
their robustness in recent empirical work. As there is very little work testing micro-level prefer-
ences for social policy in the post-communist countries, this exercise is important for establishing
intuition about the region and the potential comparability of results to other settings.3
With respect to an institutional theory of social policy preferences, Chapter 1 emphasized that
there are winners, as well as losers, from social policy in poor institutional settings. In this chap-
ter, my main focus is on one particular group of potential winners that emerge under rampant
free-riding: those with characteristics associated with tax evasion and low visibility to authori-
2It is worth noting here that the 2007 survey is the only time a direct question about social policy preferences was
asked on a LiTS survey. I discuss this more below.
3Alesina and Fuchs-Shundeln (2007), Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) are the only such studies of which I am
aware.
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ties.4 Tax evasion is possible everywhere, but work building off of Becker (1968)’s economics-
of-crime approach shows that it is more likely where the probability of successful enforcement is
low (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan, 2014). Poor insti-
tutional environments create conditions that lower the probability of enforcement, since in these
settings officials often lack the capacity, resources, and will to ensure full tax compliance (Easter,
2002, Mares, 2005a). More importantly, weak institutions also make it less likely that officials
will be punished for this lack of effort, giving them strong incentives to only enforce tax law in
cases where effort is low-cost or rents available (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan, 2014,
Gehlbach, 2008). Thus, we would expect an interactive relationship between micro- (individual
characteristics) and macro- (enforcement) concerns. The weaker institutions and state capacity, the
more attractive it is to evade taxes and the easier it is to do so successfully. By using the opportuni-
ties afforded by poor institutions to decrease their personal social policy costs, free-riders increase
their net gains from such programs. Consequently, social policy becomes more attractive for this
group.
The abstract prediction that tax evaders are more supportive of social policy in settings with
weak institutions maps onto more specific predictions over various sub-components of social pol-
icy. We would expect that tax evaders favor configurations of social policy that ease free-riding
and maximize their benefits from it, so long as the resulting dead-weight costs do not completely
swamp benefits. Empirically, even where the welfare state is a leaky bucket unable to collect the
full amount of contributions owed to it, many still receive social policy benefits (Kaufman and
Kaliberda, 1996). Where there is a tight link between contributions and benefits, free-riding does
not provide much gain. Although little is contributed (due to evasion) the benefits are likewise
small. Where social policy redistributes more, however, free-riders benefit even with small con-
tributions. This suggests that as institutions weaken, those able to benefit from free-riding should
support more redistribution. Expectations that benefits will be forthcoming even with non-payment
are likely stronger in the post-communist states than in other samples, due to their long history of
benefits provision and paternalism (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).
Free riders also benefit from state control, as they can rely on weak institutions to sap the incentives
4I discuss this group and the specific markers that characterize them in greater detail in section 2.2 of this chapter,
where I discuss how I operationalize the ability to evade taxes.
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of the state to police tax evasion. Although the state might like to enforce more tax compliance,
tax evaders are well aware that weak institutions mean that the low ranking officials in charge of
implementing tax law are unlikely to do so. Where control is in private hands, however, other
actors are much more likely to police and constrain free-riding.
In addition to testing the free-rider pathology, I also look more carefully at whether institutions
matter ceteris paribus to the preferences of individuals. That is, do individuals support social pol-
icy more or less in settings where institutions are weaker? Weak institutions open up the possibility
of misappropriation, free-riding, and weak contract enforcement. As chapter 1 discussed in detail,
these pathologies of poor institutions increase dead-weight costs, particularly for redistributive so-
cial policy. This makes social policies with a high degree of redistribution ripe for abuse and should
decrease support for redistribution ceteris paribus as institutional quality deteriorates. Similarly,
state control should receive less support when institutional quality is weak, since misappropriation
and free-riding are most likely when the state controls social policy and outside groups have less
ability to monitor or sanction deviations from the legal requirements of social policy McNollgast
(1987), Weingast and Moran (1983).
There are important caveats to expectations that support for social policy declines in institu-
tional quality, however. First, as argued in chapter 1, the extent to which support for social policy
declines with institutional quality depends on the distribution of dead-weight costs. Within the con-
text of national programs, where many millions of individuals participate in social policy, the costs
of misappropriation and free-riding may be sufficiently disbursed across the population that we
may not notice an empirical effect. The distribution of costs has not received attention in existing
models that include dead-weight costs, potentially making predictions based on them problematic.5
Secondly, because most social policies require long-term commitments (i.e. contributions today
result in benefits tomorrow), the actual state of institutions may be less important than beliefs about
their trajectory. Unfortunately, the LiTS data has no instruments enabling me to test for this effect.
Finally, specifically for control, where weak contract enforcement is the norm, individual actors
are likely to oppose all forms of third party control, not just the state’s. Unfortunately, this chapter
cannot directly test this proposition due to limitations in the dependent variable.
5C.f. (Becker, 1985, 1983, Mares, 2005a).
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The macro-economic risk pathology, by contrast, offers a competing, and mutually exclusive
prediction. As institutional quality decreases, the ability of the state to engage in rent-seeking and
opportunistic policy reversals increases (North, 1990, North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009). The
ability to alter policy at a whim can be expected to increase economic volatility (Henisz, 2000,
Mobarak, 2005, Nooruddin, 2003, Quinn and Woolley, 2001, Rodrik, 2000b, 1999), which in turn
puts individuals at greater risk and heightens preferences for insurance in the form of social policy
(Barlevy, 2004, Pallage and Robe, 2003, Wolfers, 2003). If this pathology is operative, then we
would expect individual support for redistribution to increase as institutional quality decreases.
And since the state is not necessarily expected to directly interfere with or abuse social policy
under this pathology, we would expect there to be no difference in preferences over state control
in settings with poor institutions and those with good ones.
2 Data Sources and Methodology
In this chapter, I make use of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) of 29,000 respondents con-
ducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development across 29 transition countries
in 2006.6 In keeping with the focus of this dissertation on the post-communist world, I exclude
Turkey from my analytical sample. While dropping Turkey may entail some loss of external va-
lidity, doing so creates a sample in which all countries experienced state socialism, thus helping
to somewhat mitigate causal issues related to historical legacies.7 To form the sample, households
were randomly selected in a two stage process. Within households, the nominal head of household
was asked questions about wellbeing, assets, and economic satisfaction. Afterwards, a randomly
selected household member over the age of 18 was asked to give responses to additional questions.
In the analysis below, I take the respondent who answered questions at this second stage as the unit
of analysis.8
6LiTS 2006 covers Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikstan,
Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
7For a further development of this argument, c.f. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014). In unreported robustness checks,
I include Turkey in the main analyses presented in the next section. Results remain robust to this permutation.
8Results are also robust to using the characteristics of the household’s breadwinner. For more information on the
methodology of the survey, including information on PSU selection, selection of respondents from selected house-
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In order to measure attitudes towards state-controlled, redistributive social programs, I make
use of the following question from LiTS 2006:





Responses are summarized in figure 2.1. This question clearly taps the control and redistribution
dimensions of social policy, as it references a leveling effect between the rich and the poor as well
as the state’s role in it. Moreover, LiTS is the only survey of which I am aware that taps welfare
state preferences in all the post-communist countries and this is the 2006 survey is the only version
with a direct question on social policy preferences.9 Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind the
limitations of the question. First, the wording of the question and responses make it difficult to
disentangle control and redistribution. Respondents who oppose social policy may oppose social
policy in general, but not care about the state’s role, or may support social policy and be skeptical
of the state.
Second, the dependent variable does not capture trade-offs between an increasing role of gov-
ernment programs in narrowing the inequality gap and the increasing costs of such programs. As
Kenworthy and McCall (2008) point out, respondents might feel differently about redistribution if
they believe they are likely to bear the tax burden to fund it. My framework predicts that variation
in preferences for redistribution follow from heterogeneity in subjects’ expectations about the net
costs and benefits, however. Consequently, the omission of cost considerations is less problem-
atic, since individuals will only consider their contributions and net losses from poor institutions
holds, and interviewing techniques, see EBRD (2007), Synovate (2006).
9Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) use an alternative, in which they construct an index using the dependent variable
discussed here and questions about whether spending for specific groups should be increased. I forgo this approach,
as the index lumps together several questions about the priority of spending without clearly delineating between social
policy dimensions. Most individual components are either not about social policy (public goods provision in numerous
areas) or have little to do with the specific social policy dimensions here (attitudes towards poverty and inequality).
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Figure 2.1: Preferences for a State Policy (LiTS)
in cases where this is truly important to them. If anything omitting cost considerations from the
question should flatten responses and introduce bias against finding a result. Finally, the lack of
specificity in the question as to how redistribution will occur and who receives it means that re-
spondents could have very different programs in mind when formulating answers to the question.
As a consequence, results based on this instrument may mask a great deal of heterogeneity in ac-
tual attitudes towards specific programs. Unfortunately, there is no principled way to separate out
these effects using this data.
Figure 2.1 summarizes responses to the survey instrument across countries. Looking at the
sample as a whole, it is interesting that the overwhelming majority of respondents – 68.72% –
believe in strong state involvement in redistribution, whereas 26.67% believe in moderate state in-
volvement. Only 4.61% of respondents believe the state should not redistribute at all. Interestingly,
there does not appear to be a large difference in responses related to institutional quality. Figure 2.2
presents a scatter plot with preferences for social policy along one axis and two measures that cap-
ture different aspects of institutional quality along the other. The first is the World Bank’s Rule
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of Law measure, which captures confidence in the law and the extent to which actors abide by it,
while the second is the Freedom House democracy index, which captures accountability. I discuss
these in more depth in the next section. For now, it is worth noting that there seems to be no clear
relationship between support for social policy and these measures.
Figure 2.2: Support for Social Policy and Institutional Quality
2.1 Measuring Institutions
Recall that in this dissertation, institutions are quite broadly defined as humanly devised constraints
on human interactions (North, 1981). The free-rider pathology suggests that tax evasion is enabled
by weak constraints on low ranking officials, who take advantage of weak supervision and pun-
ishment (i.e. low state capacity) under poor institutions to avoid expending effort going after tax
evaders. Here, officials only exert effort to enforce tax laws with respect to individuals and busi-
nesses who are visible to the state and easy to audit. Conceptually, this means that the measure of
institutional quality used to test the theory should capture the extent to which lower level officials
are bound to implement policy as written. Therefore, in my analysis I focus primarily on measures
that reflect the quality and consistency of policy implementation and the ability of the state to police
tax evasion. This being said, cross-national measures of institutional quality are highly correlated
in ways that make it difficult to be sure that they accurately capture the conceptual weaknesses in
institutional quality they are meant to.10 As a consequence, it is sometimes difficult to evaluate
10For thorough discussions of the usefulness of these measures, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Trier and Jackman
(2008).
81
how institutional quality shapes preferences for social policy. Nonetheless, this cross-national test
provides a good first-cut test of whether the pathologies suggested in chapter 1 shape support for
social policy.
To capture the concept of interest – the extent to which institutions bind officials and constrain
them to enforce tax policy – I make use of two primary measures. The first is the government
effectiveness sub-component of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators project Kaufmann
et al. (2010). This index was constructed using a weighted aggregation of measures of the quality
of public and civil services, their degree of independence from political pressure, the quality of
policy implementation, and the state’s ability to credibly commit to policy. Conceptually, this
measure neatly encapsulates the inconsistent tax policy enforcement that enables tax evaders to
avoid making social policy contributions and enables free-riding. The second is a related measure
from the World Governance Indicators project – the rule of law index – that captures confidence
in the law and the extent to which actors abide by it. Again, conceptually this measure reflects
the extent to which actors believe policy in general – and by extension tax policy – will actually
be enforced, informing beliefs about how easy tax evasion should be to get away with. Whereas
the government effectiveness indicator focuses on the government and bureaucracy as enablers of
evasion, however, the rule of law indicator focuses on the social propensity to cheat or break the
law more broadly. Both are important, albeit different, aspects of institutional quality.
I supplement the Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law indices with a more objective
measure of the ability to evade taxes: a direct estimate of the size of the informal economy. Devel-
oped by Schneider, et al. (2010), this measure defines the informal economy as all business activity
not reported to the government relative to GDP Schneider, et al. (2010). This measure was devel-
oped for 151 countries and makes use of data on government size, labor market characteristics,
and government effectiveness (from the World Bank) to fit a MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple
Causes) model that predicts the share of the informal sector in the total economy.11 While not a
direct measure of institutional quality, per se, it nevertheless provides a measure of the extent to
which the government fails to control tax evasion and monitor economic activity, which is key to
11See Schneider, et al. (2010) for details on the procedure and a discussion of its limitations relative to other tech-
niques. I select the 151 country measure, despite its lower quality, in order to preserve the maximum number of
countries in my estimation. Selecting the higher quality 120 country measure would result in losing 6 countries,
bringing my sample down to 20 second-level units.
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predictions under the free-riding pathology. It follows that the larger the informal economy, the
more likely it is that tax evaders believe they will be able to get away with free-riding on social
policy. For ease of interpretation, I rescale the variable so that it measures the size of the formal
economy. Therefore higher values imply better institutions as with the other measures used in this
chapter.
Some studies have used the ratio of tax revenues in GDP as a proxy for the ability of states
to collect taxes (Musgrave, 1987). In this paper, I reject this approach for several reasons. First,
theoretically, decisions about tax revenue often have as much to do with policy priorities as actual
state capacity. According to the UN, average levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP in the US
and Japan were 10.18% and 17.53%, respectively, between 1994 and 2009, which contrasts with
an average of 33% for Greece. One would be hard pressed to say the latter had better tax collection
capacity than the former given recent events, but that is what tax revenue in GDP measures would
imply. Second, empirically, tax revenue as a share of GDP is poorly comparable across coun-
tries. Work on revenue mobilization has shown that decisions about the level of tax to GDP are
not exogenous, but depend greatly on institutional quality, economic structure, and demographics
(Musgrave, 1987, Prest, 1979). These factors place limits on taxation that must be accounted for
in order to create a comparable measure (Le et al., 2008).
Tax capacity, defined as the ratio of actual tax revenue in GDP to potential tax revenue in GDP,
is one attempt to overcome problems with tax revenue in GDP as a proxy for tax collection.12
Again, however, this measures suffers from the fact that as a ratio of actual tax revenues to predicted
ones, tax capacity is a political choice, not just one dependent on state capacity. This results in
strange values of the measure from the standpoint of measuring state capacity. For example, Le et
al. (2012)’s version of the measure rates the US (0.77), China (0.48), and Japan (0.47) lower than
Argentina (0.95), Russia (0.81), and Ukraine (0.96). In addition, potential values are calculated (in
part) based on institutional quality, which means that the measure expects less of countries with
poor institutions by construction. Consequently, it seriously underestimates how weak constraints
enable abuse and is unsuitable for studies chiefly concerned with such constraints.
In addition to my three preferred measures, I also examine a related element of institutional
12Le et al. (2012) is the most recent and complete dataset generated using this technique. For prior attempts, c.f.
Bird et al. (2004), Le et al. (2008), Lotz and Morss (1967), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997).
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quality: accountability. Although political accountability at the highest levels need not constrain
tax officials or insure that they expend costly effort to insure tax compliance, it has been shown to
be an effective check on the behavior of lower level officials. To measure accountability, I also use
additional measures of institutional quality that capture political accountability at the highest levels
– Polity IV, Freedom House Nations in Transit, and the World Bank’s Voice and Authority measure
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Haber, 2007, Qian, 2003, Rodrik,
2000a). From the Polity IV measure, I make use of the Xconst measure, which assesses formal
constraints on the executive by other parts of the government (Marshal et al., 2013). The Freedom
House measure instead emphasizes civil liberties and political rights, taking a broader approach
to democracy along Schumpterian lines (Freedom House, 2012, Schumpeter, 1943). The Voice
and Authority index similarly focuses on the ability of citizens to select their leaders, freedom of
expression, association, and media, and the extent to which formal structures and institutions bind
government officials (Kaufman et al., 2006). Intuitively, while even highly accountable officials at
the highest levels may not be able to control lower level bureaucrats or abstain from opportunistic
manipulation of social policy, they should nonetheless be more likely to behave properly than
weakly accountable politicians (Beazer, 2012, McNollgast, 1987, Weingast and Moran, 1983).
Finally, I also include the control of corruption sub-component of the World Governance Indi-
cators measure in my analysis. This measure captures the use of public power for private gain. Al-
though the link between corruption and preferences for social policy flows most intuitively through
political connections (i.e. misappropriation), rather than the possibility of free-riding, it is still re-
lated to both accountability and the degree to which officials can commit to policy enforcement
and tax collection.
My analysis carries a number of limitations. First, as I discuss in more detail below, due to
the small number of countries it is difficult to include a large number of country level variables in
the model. Attempting to include multiple measures in the regression and induce a “horse race” to
see which lose significance, aside from being atheoretical, would create identification problems.
Second, the high degree of correlation between the various measures and indices complicates the
ability to separate out the effects of each cleanly. Significance could be due to strong correlations
rather than any causal effect. Finally, the relatively small number of country level observations
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(25–27 depending on the measure of institutions) creates a strong bias against finding any direct,
unconditional effect of institutional quality on preferences for social policy. While multi-level
modeling produces relatively unbiased and consistent estimates of individual and cross-level ef-
fects in cases where the number of second level units is low, estimates of the second level unit ef-
fects themselves are likely to have strongly biased standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller,
2008, Gelman and Hill, 2007, Leoni, 2009). Consequently, we are unlikely to find direct evidence
of a direct effect of institutions here, although we should be able to detect conditional ones (i.e.
macro- micro-level variable interactions).
In order to construct these measures, I make use of values averaged from 2000 to 2005.13
Data from Polity IV is unavailable for Bosnia, and the Schneider, et al. (2010) index excludes
Bosnia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. In order to insure greater comparability across measures, I exclude
Bosnia from my analysis entirely, but only exclude Uzbekistan and Serbia in specifications with
the Schneider index.14
2.2 Measuring the Ability to Evade Taxes
In order to proxy for individual’s ability to evade taxes, I draw on extensive work on tax evasion
and informality in order to construct proxies for individual’s ability to evade taxes.15 Theoretically,
characteristics associated with tax evasion in the literature are thought to increase auditing costs
for the state. Faced with increasingly high auditing costs for particular groups, the state – partic-
ularly in settings where institutional quality and state capacity are weak – prefers to ignore such
groups, focusing revenue collection on the easily monitored (Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008). In
this chapter, I draw on three characteristics commonly associated with the ability to evade taxes.
The first characteristic that I exploit is self-employed status. Theoretically the self-employed
are uniquely positioned to evade taxes, because the small scale of their activity and tendency to-
wards cash transactions (at least on the part of the smallest firms) make it difficult to monitor their
13I also attempt using 2005 values and across the entire post-communist period as robustness checks. Results remain
qualitatively similar.
14Including Bosnia in specifications for Freedom House and the various World Governance Indicators measures
does not substantially alter the results.
15For a useful review of this literature, c.f. Alm (2012).
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activity closely (Slemrod, 2007, Torrini, 2005). The inability to closely monitor the self-employed,
in turn, creates opportunities for them to hide income and profits from the authorities, effectively
avoiding the tax enforcement apparatus. Such individuals are also more likely to be able to avoid
signing formal employment contracts, further insulating them from taxes.16 Empirical work has
provided ample evidence for this relationship, documenting the ability of self-employed individu-
als to evade taxes even in countries understood to have high levels of institutional quality (Engstrom
and Holmlund, 2009, Feldman, 2007, Johansson, 2005, Kleven et al., 2011, Pissarides and Weber,
1989) as well as in the post-communist countries (Gorodnichenko et al., 2009, Slonimczyk, 2012)
and developing countries more broadly (Pietrobelli et al., 2004). At the same time, at least in
Eastern Europe, the self-employed are also particularly likely to have benefited from the transition
away from the planned economy, as they were able to take advantage of liberalization to profit from
filling niches never envisioned by the plan (Earle and Sakova, 2000). Consequently, in addition to
being better at hiding income, the self-employed in the post-communist bloc are also likely to be
high income, making taxes (and social policy) unattractive.
To measure self-employed status, I make use of a dummy variable equal to one if individuals
reported that they have been self-employed at any time during the last year.17 All told 8.2% of
LiTS respondents reported that they were entrepreneurs or self employed. Table 2.1 provides some
summary statistics on the self-employed and the general populace. On the whole, this group tends
to be younger, male, better educated, and (on average) in a higher income decile than the rest of
the population. They tend to be most concentrated in the retail and agriculture sectors, and tend to
be service workers (i.e. shop owners) or involved in crafts and related trades. As expected, these
are precisely the sorts of individuals one would expect to be able to hide income or avoid payrolls.
Second, I also make use of the well-documented relationships between particular sectors and
the ability to evade taxes. Straightforwardly, sectors with relatively high asset mobility, high
turnover, and a propensity towards cash transactions are more likely to be able to evade payroll
16It is important to note that countries vary widely in their coverage of the self-employed and in how this coverage
is financed. While some countries exclude the self-employed completely, others include them. Tax arrangements also
vary, although there is a tendency towards use of income and payroll taxes. This obviously has important implications
for the relationship of the self-employed to the welfare state and ability to free-ride on it. In my main specifications
below, I control for variation in coverage to account for this.
17For each occupation, respondents were asked “In this job did/do you work?” with response categories “1) For
wages (worked for an employer)”, “2) As self employed or for a company you partly or fully own”, or “3) As an
independent farmer”. Respondents were coded as self-employed if they responded with the second category.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Groups Likely to Evade Taxes
Full Sample Self-Employed Evasive Sectors Evasive occupation
Age 46.5 41.54 38.37 41.64
(17.7) (12.24) (11.6) (11.8)
Percentage Male 42 61 59 43
Education Secondary Vocational (Post-secondary) Vocational (Post-secondary) Higher Education
Income Decile 5.49 6.59 6.51 7.31
(2.87) (2.84) (2.67) (2.48)
Self-employed 8.2 – 42 16.8
Sector (Modal) Unemployed/Retired Retail – Education
Sector (2nd) Agriculture Agriculture – Retail
Occupation (Modal) Professionals Service Workers Service Workers –
Occupation (2nd) Service workers Craft and related trades Craft and related trades –
Means are given for age and income decile, median for education, percentage males for gender, and the top 2 modal categories for sector and occupation.
and other taxes (Fiorio and D’amuri, 2005, Gimpelson and Zudina, 2012, Yakovlev, 2001). Impor-
tantly, though, one would only expect this relationship for firms below a certain size, as the larger
firms grow the easier they are to monitor, particularly in settings with weak institutions (Easter,
2002, Gehlbach, 2008). To capture this, I introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals
who report working in either the construction or retail sectors and who work in firms with less
than 16 employees.18 All together, this group represents approximately 6% of all respondents. As
Table 2.1 indicates, individuals in this group tend to be younger than both the average member of
the population and the self-employed. Those in evasive sectors are more likely to be male and (on
average) in a higher income decile than the broader populace, although these levels are comparable
with the self-employed. This is in part, because 42% of respondents in this category report being
self-employed and, like the self-employed, the majority of respondents in these sectors tend to be
service workers or be involved in crafts and related trades. I refer to this group as the evasive sector
in my analysis below.
Finally, I also make use of a measure based on individuals’ occupations. Empirical work on tax
evasion has shown that in addition to the self-employed and workers in retail, workers in industries
with relatively weak paper trails for inputs and outputs are also likely to be able to engage in tax
evasion, since compliance monitoring for such groups is particularly difficult (Kleven et al., 2011).
In particular, empirical work has highlighted relatively skilled, high income occupational groups
such as engineers, doctors, financial services agents, accountants, lawyers, and business owners
18The only instrument for firm size asks employees to estimate whether their employer has 1-15 employees, 16 -
100 employees, or more than 100 employees. I select the smallest category, as this group can most easily evade taxes.
All results reported in the following section are robust to including those with employers in the 16 – 100 employee
range. These estimates are available upon request.
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as being particularly likely to hide income (Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura, 2012). In the post-
communist settings, such groups have strong incentives to hide income, as wage decompression for
these groups, along with deregulation and the opportunity to open private practices, insured these
groups high incomes (Brainerd, 1998, Milanovic, 1999, Svejnar, 1999). Moreover, in countries
with poor enforcement or loopholes in payroll or income taxation, such workers were particularly
well-positioned to bargain for “black cash”, annuities, or other wage structures that minimized
their tax contributions (Yakovlev, 2001), facilitating free-riding on social policy. Making use of a
survey question that asks individuals to place themselves into occupational categories for each of
their jobs, I create a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent currently works in a high
income, low paperwork occupation or as a manager or businesses owner: occupations that lend
themselves to evasion.19 For simplicity, I refer to this group as professionals for the remainder of
this chapter.
Approximately 11% of respondents are professionals. As with those in evasive sectors and
the self-employed, this group tends to be younger than average, although the percentage of males
in this group (43%) is comparable to that of the populace as a whole. Interestingly, the average
income decile for this group is much higher than the population average or those of the self-
employed and those involved in evasive sectors. Only 16.8% of this group work as self-employed
and the modal sector is education, with the next largest concentration of this group being in retail.20
2.3 Modeling Strategy
As a first step, I replicate the design of many existing studies of preferences for social policy in
order to establish some basic intuitions about who supports social policy in the post-communist
19The occupational categories for this group roughly correspond to groups 1 and 2 in the Standard Occupational
Classification 2000 and include professionals such as engineers, mathematicians, architects, computing professionals,
medical doctors, dentists, pharmacists, lawyers, accountants, authors, and similar occupations, as well as managers
and firm owners. Note that in the specifications below, results are robust to the exclusion of the first group – managers
and business owners – as well as controlling for self-employment. More information on these categories and the
validity of occupational self-reporting as compared to alternative ways of assigning respondents to occupations can be
found in Denisova et al. (2009).
20While it may seem odd that the majority of this group are involved in education, evidence indicates that they
are not normal public school teachers. Many of the individuals involved in education are in the private sector and in
higher income deciles, although there is a large block of low-income, public sector education workers in the category.
Unfortunately, due to the design of the LiTS survey it is difficult to back out specifics.
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countries. The goal of this first test is to examine many of the major findings from previous work
detailed in Table 1.1. I do this by estimating a simple, logit model with clustered standard errors
and the latent form:
Yic = α + β1Xi + β2Zi + δc + ε(ic) (2.1)
Where Yi is a binary variable based on the instrument on preferences for a state role in social policy
introduced in section 2. The variable takes on a value of 1 if individuals support a strong state-role
in closing the gap between the rich and the poor (e.g. a more redistributive, state-run system) and 0
otherwise.21 Xi is a vector of individual-level variables of interest for individual i discussed below,
Zi is a vector of control variables for individual i, δ is a vector of country specific fixed effects for
each country c, and ε is the error term.
The vector X contains individual level variables that proxy for the class and risk-based theo-
ries discussed in chapter 1 and summarized in table 1.1. In line with existing work, my main proxy
for class-based theories is household individual income. As proxies for risk-based theories (and to
capture different facets of risk), I then include measures of current unemployment, and individuals’
perceptions of their own health. I also include measures of human capital as another way of getting
at risk related to skill profile. I assign a dummy variable equal to one if individuals have worked as
skilled professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.). This particular group faced heavy wage compression
and marginalization under the planned economy, but had skills uniquely suited to rapidly liberal-
izing economies during the transition. As a consequence, this group drove wage decompression
during transition and was in high demand (Brainerd, 1998, Earle and Sakova, 2000, Milanovic,
1999, Svejnar, 1999). One would therefore expect such individuals to have more portable skills,
and therefore less risk, than others. Although this conception differs from the way risk models such
as (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) conceive of skills, it is the only available measure. As noted above,
21I recode in this way, because of ambiguity in interpreting the answers of those who favor a moderate state role.
Due to the fact that the survey instrument taps both control and redistribution dimensions, moderate responses may
reflect preferences for less redistributive social policy, but support for state involvement if redistributive programs
are inevitable. It may also reflect preferences for redistributive programs that are tempered by qualms about the
state. The logic of those who oppose state involvement is likely similar, albeit more extreme. Consequently, the
differences between these two categories are less theoretically interesting than comparison to those who favor strong
state involvement: who are likely in favor of both redistribution and state involvement in it. Robustness checks using
ordered probit models nonetheless produce similar results.
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however, this variable may also be proxying for ability to evade taxes in settings with weak insti-
tutions. LiTS also includes extensive questions about individuals’ life history during the transition
period, creating the possibility of using measures of revealed risk. Individuals who have suffered
individual economic hardship the past are likely at risk in the future. Using available instruments,
I include variables capturing the number of years during the transition period in which individuals
faced cuts in their food consumption or wages, had to sell assets, and the number of years the
individual was unemployed during the transition.
Finally, I also include an extensive set of control variables. These include age, gender, where
the respondent is located (rural, urban, or metropolitan), household size, and minority status. Un-
fortunately, LiTS includes no traditional measure of ideological bias (i.e. party affiliation): an
important control variable. In order to control for the possibility that individuals are ideologically
biased, I include a measure of the respondents’ opinion on the fairness of re-privatization. Previous
work has argued both that reprivatization is a critical component of economic reform (Megginson,
2005), and has also used opinions towards it as a gage for pro-market sentiments (c.f. Berinsky
and Tucker (2006), Denisova et al. (2009)). To the extent that attitudes towards re-privatization
reflect pro- or anti-market bias, using this attitude as a control allows us to account for ideology.
In a similar vein, I also include a question about the respondent’s preferences for planned versus
market economies. Finally, I also include a more problematic, variable that measures preferences
for redistribution more directly. The variable mirrors the dependent variable, but omits reference
to the state’s role. Consequently, it can be interpreted as a clean measure of preferences for re-
distribution. Although the similarity of this measure to the dependent variable poses the risk of
effectively having the same variable on both the left and right hand sides of the equation, it is one
of the only available ideological instruments. Including both of these variables increases confi-
dence that results reflect bias against the state playing a role in redistribution, rather than against
redistribution in general.
The second part of my analysis focuses on testing my theory of preferences for social pol-
icy under weak institutions. In order to estimate this relationship, I make use of a Multi-level
Hierarchical (MLH) logit model. Multi-level models have advantages over rival estimation tech-
niques for examining cross-level interactions (individual x region interactions), because they allow
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one to estimate the direct effects of both the macro-level variables of interest and their interactions,
while also providing some defense against omitted variables in the form of fixed or random effects.
These specifications also allow for the introduction of other macro-level variables of interest. Fi-
nally, an MLH approach makes fewer assumptions about the correlation of the error terms across
macro-level units (Gelman and Hill, 2007, Stenbergen and Jones, 2002).22.
My specification takes the form:
Yic = α0 + γ1institutionsc + β1evasioni + ρ1evasioni ∗ institutionsc + γ2Zc + β2Xi + ξ1c + ηc + εi (2.2)
Institutions and evasion are the proxies for institutional quality and the ability to evade taxes dis-
cussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 (respectively), Xi is a vector of individual-level control variables for
individual i, and Zc is a vector of country level control variables for country c. The parameters ξ1c,
ηc, and εi represent a random slopes on the individual measure of evasion needed for the cross-level
interaction to be identified properly, country specific varying intercepts, and the individual level
error term, respectively. Following Gelman and Hill (2007) this equation can be thought of and
interpreted as a standard regression, albeit one with six sets of predictors and three error terms.23
With respect to individual controls, I include all of the variables included in the purely individual-
level regression. Of the variables indicating ideological bias, I only include the measure of support
for reprivatization in my main specifications. As country level controls, I include two key country
level variables, a country average of GDP per capita for the five years prior to the survey (2000
– 2005) and an index of the generosity of social policy.24 The latter is an update of the index
of social policy (pensions, healthcare, unemployment, and disability insurance) first introduced
by Mares (2005a) and captures both the scope of social policy coverage and the degree to which
contributions and benefits are linked in each country in the year the LiTS survey was conducted
(2006).25 By controlling for pre-existing social policy (both the scope and the generosity of cov-
22For an interesting discussion and simulation results illustrating the superiority of MLH models to traditional
analytical techniques in survey settings where macro-level variation is of interest, see Leoni (2009)
23For more on the logic behind the formulation of the model, see Gelman and Hill (2007)
24The small number of countries in the sample suggests caution in including a larger number of macro-level controls,
therefore I do not do so in my preferred specifications. Nonetheless, in section 3.3 I test the robustness of my results
against a wide array of additional country-level variables.
25Details on the construction of the index are presented in Appendix 5.
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erage), it is possible to partially separate out attitudes towards state control of social policy from
attitudes towards the adequacy of existing social policy programs, as well as to control for policy
variation that may prima facia complicate free-riding.
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth noting that the design outlined here potentially suffers
from various causal inference problems. First, preferences for social policy and institutional quality
may be co-determined by unobservable economic and political variables that have been omitted
from the specification. One such cause could relate to historical factors, whether Communist era or
pre-Communist (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). Second, institutional quality may be endogenous
to expectations about tax evasion, with authorities constructing institutions based on expectations
about the ease of tax collection (Gehlbach, 2008). Finally, preferences for social policy could
well be endogenous to institutions, if elites construct the latter in order to contain demand for
redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Boix, 2003)
With respect to omitted variables, I use the sample itself to help control for the effects of
the most problematic – historical and institutional legacies on preferences (Alesina and Fuchs-
Shundeln, 2007, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). Since all of countries in the sample experienced
long spells under Communism, recent historical and institutional legacies are more comparable
across this sample than any other, although some variation remains related to exposure to Com-
munism. Nonetheless, in the robustness section that follows my main results, I offer additional
attempts to control for some omitted variables that might co-determine institutions and prefer-
ences: inequality, resource rents, economic liberalization an reform, and variation within the post-
communist countries in the effects of Communist legacies. Dealing with reverse causality is tricker,
however, since the need to use multi-level models precludes instrumental variable strategies. In-
stead of dealing with this directly in this chapter, I refer concerned readers to chapter 3, which
provides evidence on the arguments used by actors during social policy debates. To the extent
that actors really do consider how institutional quality shapes welfare state outcomes, it provides
reassurance that – at least for contemporary preferences – the institutions are driving preferences.
While identifying a direct effect of institutional quality may be difficult due to endogeneity
and omitted variable concerns, the conditional hypothesis advanced in this chapter – that individ-
uals able to engage in tax evasion are more likely to oppose social policy in settings with good
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institutions – faces fewer problems. Here, I argue that identification can be achieved so long as we
assume that these causal inference problems effect both types of responses (those able to evade and
general members of the populace) in the same ways within a given country. If this is the case, then
one can interpret my main specification (2.2) as an estimate of differences-in-differences between
those who can evade taxes, on the one hand, and the populace at large, on the other, across settings
with good and bad institutions (c.f. Denisova et al. (2009)). This estimate should be unbiased, so
long as the assumption holds, and should give greater confidence in estimates of the cross-level
effect.
3 Results
3.1 Pooled Individual Level Results
Table 2.2 explores the individual level determinants of support for social policy in the post-communist
countries. Model 2.2.1 unsurprisingly provides strong support for class-based models of prefer-
ences for social policy. The clearest proxy – income decile – is a negative, significant predictor
of support for a strong state role in redistributive social policy, as we would expect given exist-
ing work.26 Education, which is sometimes also used as a proxy for income, is negative and not
significant at conventional levels in this specification. The non-result on this variable is unsur-
prising, however, since education for most individuals in the sample would have occurred under
Communist rule, where the skills taught would not necessarily correspond to highly sought (and
renumerated) skills on the labor market.27
Risk stories also receive fairly strong support in model 2.2.1. The measures of current risk
– unemployment and poor self-assessment of one’s health – are both significant and positive pre-
dictors of support for social policy.28 With respect to variables associated with human capital,
which are sometimes proxies for risk, the story is mixed. As noted, education does not take on
26For a summary of the results of previous studies, please refer to chapter 2.2. For the results of existing studies
with respect to specific variables, see Table 1.1.
27For a deeper discussion and justification of this point, c.f. Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009).
28Although, see Iversen and Soskice (2001) and (Rehm, 2009) for discussions of the problems with using actual
unemployment as an appropriate measure of risk.
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a significant sign in Table 2.2, even though it has been more or less robust in previous studies.29
The professional dummy variable, however, is both negative and significant, indicating individuals
with strong human capital and highly sought after skills oppose state-led social policy. This can
be taken as supportive of risk-based theories of social policy preferences, given the labor market
demand for such individuals in post-communist economies.
Several control variables were also significant at conventional levels. Age has a positive rela-
tionship with support for social policy in all models of Table 2.2, indicating that the older one is,
the more supportive of a strong state role in social policy. This result may partially be a function
of the strong correlation with this variable and exposure to Communist legacies (Pop-Eleches and
Tucker, 2014). Women are also more likely to support social policy than men in this sample. These
results are in line with previous work on social policy in other settings, as noted in Table 1.1. Other
control variables – pensioners, household size, minority, and residency (urban versus rural) – were
not significant predictors of support for social policy. With the exception of the pensioner dummy,
these results are unsurprising from the standpoint of previous empirical results. The pensioner
dummy is likely insignificant mostly do to strong multi-collinearity with age, however, which is
the primary criteria pension eligibility in this country sample.
Models 2.2.2 – 2.2.4 introduce various measures designed to control for the political ideology
of respondents. All three proxy measures – opposition to re-privatization, opposition to the market
economy, and support for redistribution (without references to the state) – for ideology are positive
and significant, indicating that individuals with more “leftist” or anti-market ideologies are more
likely to support state-led social policy. The results of Model 2.2.1 prove robust to the addition of
these variables.
Finally, Model 2.2.5 introduces three proxy variables for hardships that individuals might have
faced in the previous ten years, a test of the risk theory consistent with explanations focusing on
past experience of material deprivation. The more years during the transition period that individ-
uals had to make cuts in food consumption, the more likely they were to support state-led social
policy, a result which holds at conventional levels of statistical significance. Interestingly, how-
ever, the number of years individuals faced wage cuts was not significant at conventional levels,
29See table 1.1 for a summary.
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although it is a positive predictor of support for social policy. This may have to do with the fact
that the vast majority of individuals are coded as not having faced any wage cuts in the original
dataset (i.e. coded as 0 rather than missing), which seems implausible given the experience of
the transition. Similarly, individuals who did not earn wages in many years were also more likely
to support social policy, although the result is not significant at conventional levels. Again, these
results suffer from the same issue as the wage cuts variable. Finally, hardship as measured by asset
sales was also not a significant predictor of support for social policy and its sign unexpectedly
negative. As before, responses for this variable seem implausibly low given the transition. While
there is little support for the risk theory using measures of material deprivation in this sample, this
is likely due to problems with the survey instrument or the data, rather than the theory itself.
Cross-national Variation
Before turning to the multi-level models, it is worth asking if multi-level modeling provides any
additional analytical benefit. Existing work largely pools data for computational and analytical
convenience. In theory, this ignores the fact that variables may have quite different effects in
different countries and may be suppressing important cross-national variation in group preferences.
In practice, this may not matter. Given the results of the previous subsection seem to largely adhere
to results from previous work, multi-level modeling add little.
To see whether multi-level modeling is beneficial, I rerun the benchmark model (2.2.1) from
the previous section as a multi-level model and introduce random slopes (one at a time) for some
of the key variables of interest. Suppose we have a variable of interest X and data from a set
of countries j. With a multi-level model, the sum of the co-efficient for X and its random slope
components Xj can be interpreted as the estimate we would recover if we were to estimate our
model only using data from j (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Consequently, we can use multi-level
models to understand variation across countries in the effect of a given individual level variable
of interest. By graphing the resulting random slopes (and 95% confidence intervals), we can get
a clearer sense of how much cross-national variation the pooled estimates are masking by not
accounting for variation in the effect of X (due to interactions, for example).
I focus on six variables of interest. First, I check whether class-based models might result in
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variation in preferences for social policy by looking at random slopes for the income decile vari-
able. I then check the risk theory by examining the random slope on the unemployment variable.
I then introduce other major, significant variables from Table 2.2 – health assessments and the
professional dummy – to test whether they vary across countries. I also introduce a variable for
self-employment, which will be important in the next section as I assess whether free-riding op-
portunities shape preferences. Finally, because the non-result on pensioners above was anomalous,
I also check for cross-national variation in this variable. Again, the pooled regression may mask
cross-national variation.
Figure 2.3 presents the dispersion of random, country specific slopes for each of these vari-
ables. The blue line represents the pooled estimate (β), while the dashed lines represent its confi-
dence interval. Point estimates for country specific slopes are marked, along with their confidence
intervals. Two things are of interest. First, if a substantial number of country specific estimates
fall outside of the confidence interval for β, this implies cross-national variation. Second, if the
country specific estimates fall outside of the confidence interval of the pooled effect and estimates
have different signs across countries this is preliminary evidence of a cross-level interaction.
(a) Income Decile (b) Unemployed (c) Health (higher is less healthy)
(d) Professionals (e) Self-employment (f) Pensioners
Figure 2.3: Random Slopes of Co-efficients for Predictors of Support for Redistribution
Figure 2.3a indicates that the effect of income (and therefore class-based theories) is fairly
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homogenous across countries, with most of the random slopes falling squarely within the confi-
dence interval of the pooled estimate. Similarly, the control variable health (Figure 2.3c) suggests
relatively little cross-national variation. Figure 2.3 suggests significant cross-national variation in
the other variables, however. The effect of unemployment (Figure 2.3b), being a professional,
self-employment, and being a pensioner all vary based on country. Also of note is the fact that
for all of these variables, there are sharp differences not only in the magnitude of the co-efficients
(indicating that the effect of the variable is stronger in some countries than in others), but also
in the sign (indicating that similar individuals have opposite preferences in different countries).
Taken together, this suggests that country-level factors may interact with individual-level ones to
condition social policy preferences.
In order to ascertain whether the multi-level models are actually providing more analytical
leverage than the traditional logit model, I also conducted a set of likelihood ratio tests to com-
pare the multi-level models with more traditional ones (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).30 Results of
these tests soundly reject the null hypothesis in all cases: the multi-level models are superior to
the traditional ones. It is important to note, however, that the likelihood ratio tests I use here are
conservative, because generalized models for multi-level applications with multiple random com-
ponents (as is the case here) have yet to be developed. This means that the reported significance
level for this test is an upper bound to the actual results of the test (in a world where a generalized
model exists). Rejection of this null therefore implies rejection based on the actual level.31
3.2 Cross-level Interaction Results
Table 2.3 introduces the first of the three main tests of this chapter by examining the relationship
between self-employment, institutional quality, and preferences over redistribution and state con-
trol. Individual level results are omitted for parsimony, with the exception of the main individual
30Note that this technique is somewhat controversial. Gelman and Hill (2007) for example claim that model compar-
ison between different multi-level models and between multi-level models and traditional ones are poorly understood.
Although some attempt to use existing techniques to make these comparisons, they argue this is inappropriate. Instead,
they advocate the use of multi-level models anytime one has hierarchical data due to its efficiency and unbiasedness
in most applications.
31For more on this issue specifically, see the Stata help file on the likelihood ratio test as applied to multi-level
models, “j mixedlr”.
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level variable of interest – the self-employment dummy. Results for these variables remain roughly
the same as in table 2.2. and are available upon request. All macro-level variables in this and the
remaining specifications have been centered on their mean values for ease of interpretation.32 Of
note at the individual level, the self-employment dummy variable is negative and significant, indi-
cating that the self-employed oppose social policy. At the purely country level, Table 2.3 indicates
that for the most part the direct effects of the macro-level variables are positive, supporting the
notion that fears of mismanagement and/or waste in poor institutional settings serve as a drag on
support for redistributive social policy. Interestingly, however, none of the institutional measures
are significant predictors of attitudes towards state-led redistribution among individuals at conven-
tional levels. This is a bit surprising, but may simply be due to the extremely small number of
country level observations in the sample.
Turning to the cross-level interaction of interest, table 2.3 provides some evidence for that free-
riding shapes preferences. As expected, the interaction between the institutional quality measures
and the self-employment dummy is negative in all of the models in table 2.3. Further, the inter-
actions which include the measure of government effectiveness, rule of law, the Freedom House
measure of democracy, the Voice and Authority index, and control of corruption are significant
at the 95% confidence level, while the degree of formal activity,33 is significant at the 90% level.
The negative signs on the co-efficients suggest that as institutional quality increases, support for
social policy amongst the self-employed decreases, creating a preference cleavages between them
and the general populace. This finding is consistent with the main hypothesis being tested in this
chapter: individuals who are particularly well-positioned to free ride on social policy are more
likely to support a weak link between contributions and benefits in settings with poor institutions,
where free-riding is easier to get away with. Conversely, they are less likely to support such social
policy in settings with good institutions, where it is harder.
An important thing to note, however is that while the interaction between the self-employment
dummy and the institutional measures that best get at state capacity and the ease of tax evasion
32Standardizing individual variables to the “grand mean” (the mean value of the entire sample) gives the results
the interpretation that a unit increase in the macro-level variable influences the probability that an individual with
characteristics equal to the sample mean will prefer a strong state role in redistribution by a percentage equal to the
co-efficient (Gelman and Hill, 2007).
33Recall the original (Schneider, et al., 2010) measure was rescaled.
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– measures of policy enforcement (Government Effectiveness index), the extent to which actors
abide by the law (Rule of Law), and the size of the formal economy (Schneider Estimate) – is
significant, so too are the interactions with measures of weak institutional quality that reflect other
pathologies of poor institutions. Indeed, only the interaction between self-employment and the
Polity IV measure of constraints on the executive fails to reach significance at conventional levels.34
Although these measures are extremely highly correlated, the fact that all of these are significant
implies that there may be more than one aspect of institutional quality at play here.
Figure 2.4 provides a sense of the substantive effects of being self-employed at different levels
of institutional quality. For each specification in table 2.3 I generate a set of predicted probabili-
ties of support (and 95% confidence intervals) for the median self-employed individual across the
range of institutional quality.35 To insure comparability across measures, the institutional variables
have been rescaled into percentiles of the country sample: countries with the weakest institutions
in the sample are located at the 1st percentile and those with the best are at the 99th. Across all
measures, support for a strong state role in redistributive programs for the median self-employed
individual universally declines as institutional quality improves across all measures. The largest
decline occurs with the informality index, with movement from the 1st to the 99th percentile re-
sulting in a 35% decline in support for a strong state role in social policy. The shortest declines
occur with the government effectiveness and freedom house scores, where support for a strong
state role in social policy declines by about 15%. This finding is consistent with the expectations
of the free-rider hypothesis. Such effects are substantively very large, with even shorter transitions
(such as between the 50th and 75th percentile) generating substantively large effects between 6%
and 10%. By contrast Rehm (2009)’s micro-level study estimates effects along the magnitude of
3% to 6% effects for income and occupational unemployment along similar ranges.
Figure 2.4 also provides predicted probabilities for the median non-self employed individual
for comparison. As a general rule, support for social policy for a median, non self-employed
individual is mostly flat across the voice and authority index. It improves slightly as the government
34This results should not be too surprising. Corruption and lack of constraints at the highest levels of government
do not necessarily trickle down to the actual experiences of citizens (Treisman, 2007). As individuals are more likely
worried about local bureaucrats than the presidential administration, measures that get at how institutions constrain
more general governmental malfeasance are likely to have more explanatory power.
35Predicted probabilities are generated using a quasi-Bayesian approach.
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effectiveness and freedom house measures increase, although this increase is within the 95 percent
confidence interval. For the other institutional quality measures, however, support for social policy
among the non-self-employed declines along with the quality of institutions. The steepest decline
occurs with the index of informal activity, where the preferences of individuals decline by about
20% as one moves from the 1st to the 99th percentile. The shortest decline is with the Rule of Law
measure, where support declines by about 15% as one moves from the 1st to the 99th percentile.
While interesting, it is important to read these results cautiously, as the main effects of institutions
were not significant in our main specification. This finding is interesting, because it suggests
weak support for the macro-economic risk pathology, which suggests that support for social policy
decreases as institutions improve due to lessening macro-economic volatility.
The key takeaway from figure 2.4, is that in all specifications the self-employed and non self-
employed have similar preferences when institutions are weak. By most measures, these two
groups are statistically indistinguishable for countries below the 25th percentile of institutional
quality.36 Afterwards, self-employed individuals are less likely to support a strong state role in
social policy than the non-self-employed. More importantly, the 95% confidence intervals for the
estimated probabilities of support for state-run social policy do not overlap, suggesting that the
cleavage is significant at conventional levels. Critically, the magnitude of the cleavage increases
as institutional quality increases. This finding is consistent with my theories predictions given
free-riding: the self-employed only support redistributive, state-controlled social policy in settings
where they can free-ride and will oppose it otherwise.
While not strictly part of the hypotheses being tested in this chapter, the fact that self-employed
and non self-employed individuals have similar preferences at the lowest levels of institutional
quality is interesting. The most straightforward explanation has to do with how poor institutions
change the utility function of self-employed individuals by enabling tax evasion. Recall that the
self-employed typically have higher than average income in the post-communist states, so where
tax evasion is not possible, they bear a heavier taxation burden (and oppose the welfare state).
36The Voice and Authority index and the Freedom House measure are exceptions. With the Voice and Authority
index the self-employed are statistically more likely to support a strong state role in social policy below the 6th
percentile and are indistinguishable between the 6th percentile and the 35th percentile. With the Freedom House
measure, the probability of support for a strong state role in social policy between the self-employed and the non
self-employed is indistinguishable below the 20th percentile.
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If free-riding matters, support for social policy at lower level stems from the ability of the self-
employed (and other groups like them) to evade taxes. For support for social policy among the
self-employed to be similar to the rest of the populace, therefore, they would need to be evading
enough to put them at or below the tax rate of the general populace.
Empirically, this is not particularly far fetched. Consider the case of Russia, which is in the
bottom 25th percentile along all of the measures of institutional quality used in this chapter – the
point at which divergences in support for social policy amongst the self-employed and non self-
employed begin to emerge. Evidence from Russia suggests that evasion is easy and widespread
for the self-employed and others in the informal sector (Gimpelson and Zudina, 2012). Using
data from a survey of 10,000 Russians, Slonimczyk (2012) for example finds that only 60% of
informal sector entrepreneurs (i.e. business owners) claim to remit social taxes to authorities,
versus 95% for formally registered entrepreneurs. For those who do not own businesses, but engage
in self-employed activity, this figure falls to around 6%. Thus, evasion rates are quite large in poor
institutional settings and may go a long way towards explaining why support rates for the self-
employed and non self-employed are similar at low levels of institutional quality. As institutional
quality improves, however, evasion ceases to be an option and the self-employed likely pay rates
more similar to other wealthy individuals, thus making them less supportive.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 test the conditional effect of two additional measures of the ability to evade
taxes – working in a sector associated with tax evasion and professional occupation – on support for
a strong state role in social policy. The main effect of being in an evasive sector is not significant
at conventional levels in any of the specifications in Table 2.4, although the sign is negative as
expected. This may be due to the extremely small number of such individuals in the sample (6%)
or due to the imprecise nature of the measure. By contrast, the dummy variable for professionals
is significant and negative, as expected, in Table 2.5.
With respect to the interactions of interest, in both cases, the results mirror those from Ta-
ble 2.3. The interaction between working in a sector associated with tax evasion and the measures
of institutional quality are negative and significant in all cases except for the Polity IV measure of
constraints on the executive. Similarly, the main effect of the professional dummy is both negative
and significant at conventional levels in in Table 2.5, as expected. In both cases, the results sug-
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gest that as institutional quality improves, support for social policy among professionals declines,
consistent with my theories predictions under free-riding.
Finally, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the substantive effects of the various models in tables 2.4
and 2.5. As with figure 2.4, figure 2.6 indicates that the preferences of professionals and the me-
dian individual are statistically indistinguishable at low levels of institutional quality. Their pref-
erences diverge as institutional quality improves, however, with the preferences of professionals
declining more steeply. A similar pattern holds for individuals associated with sectors with facility
in evading taxes (table 2.5), although the results are worth discussing in more depth because they
are a bit different from those of the other two measures. At levels of institutional quality below
the 25th percentile for most measures of institutions, the median individual in an evasive sectors
appears much more likely to support social policy than her counterpart in the general populace.
The confidence intervals for predictions of support for social policy for these groups overlap for
most measures between the 25th and 62nd percentile, after which the general populace is most
supportive of social policy. this contrasts with self-employed and professionals, whose support for
social policy is indistinguishable from that of the general populace at low levels of institutional
quality and diverge as institutional quality decreases. Likely, this may have to do with the fact that
this group is a mix of self-employed (42%) and low wage service sector workers. Regardless, these
tests provide additional evidence in support of the free-rider hypothesis.
3.3 Robustness checks
In order to guard against specification problems and alternative explanations for the results in the
previous section, I ran a variety of robustness checks.37 I began by checking whether results were
robust to other methodologies often used in the literature – traditional OLS and logit models with
cluster-corrected errors and multi-level OLS, yielding results that are qualitatively similar to those
reported in the previous section. I then checked the robustness of the MLH results presented
above to various individual level specification problems. First, individuals’ preferences could be
a function of the characteristics of the head of household (the primary breadwinner) rather than
their own. I substituted the characteristics of the head of household (income, employment, etc.)
37Results of these tests are not presented here but are available upon request.
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and recoded the three proxies for ease of tax evasion according to data on the head of household.
Results continue to hold, indicating that preferences are formed based not only on the individual’s
situation, but on that of their broader household. Second, I introduced specifications with the two
alternative measures of ideology – support for planned economies and support for redistribution
(without references to the state) – discussed in section 2.3. Third, I also checked whether the main
results are robust to the inclusion of hardship measures, indicating how badly individuals fared
during the economic collapse that followed the political collapse of Communism. Finally, because
the retired make up a very large proportion of the survey sample and can be expected to have
preferences quite different than that of the rest of the population, I also reran my specifications
omitting those over the age of 65. None of these permutations substantially alters the results.38
Moving to macro-level specification errors and alternative explanations, I then introduced a
number of additional country-level variables into my main specifications. Inequality, rentier state
dynamics, and government spending are all additional variables suggested by the literature (Berens,
2012, Ross, 2001, Wilensky, 1975). I checked the robustness of the main results using the GINI
index, a measure of resource rents as a percentage of GDP, and government expenditures as a per-
centage GDP to proxy for these additional variables.39 Results can be found in the appendix in
tables 2.7 – 2.9. None of these additions alters the main results much, although the interaction
between the Polity IV executive constraints and evasive sectors does become negative and signifi-
cant. In unreported specifications, I also check whether non-linearities between the main variables
of interest at the individual level and these additional macro-level results could be driving the
relationship.40 Again, results are robust to all of these permutations.
Similarly, a more rapid pace of economic reform (and expectations on return on human capital
and investment) may be responsible for diverging attitudes across the sample, rather than insti-
tutions per se. This is especially of concern in the post-communist setting, where transitions to
the market economy were accompanied by simultaneous reforms of political and market institu-
tions that were deeply intertwined (Frye, 2010, Gehlbach, 2008). To account for this possibility,
I also introduced several variables created by the EBRD to evaluate the pace of economic reform
38Results available upon request.
39All data obtained from the World Bank.
40These specifications are available upon request.
103
in the transition economies into my main specifications (EBRD, 2012). The EBRD’s indices of
economic reform include measures of the extent of large and small-scale privatization, the extent
to which the government has passed and enforces anti-monopoly legislation and has lowered bar-
riers to business entry, and price liberalization. Results are presented in appendix tables 2.10 –
2.12. Of the newly introduced variables, only the variable measuring anti-monopoly reform is
significant at conventional levels, with the result holding true for all specifications and all proxies
for ease of tax evasion. The greater reform in competition policy and the lower the barriers to
entry, the weaker support for social policy. Even after accounting for the reform process, results
again remain largely the same as the base specifications reported above, although the interaction
between self-employment and the measure of formality now fails to reach conventional levels of
significance.
In unreported regressions I also explored whether the construction of macro-level variables
made a difference in the results. Use of 2006 values (the year before the survey was conducted) of
the institutional variables or averages taken over the full post-communist period make little differ-
ence, although the Schneider, et al. (2010) measure drops slightly below conventional significance
levels in all specifications when these permutations are used.41
Turning to alternative interpretations of my results, the most important is that the institutional
legacies of Communism are actually driving variation in preferences. At the macro-level, the lega-
cies of communism had profound effects on the socio-economic structures of the post-communist
states, the institutions adopted, and subsequent reform (Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008). At the
micro-level, communist indoctrination might also play a role, inculcating Communist values such
as class solidarity and preferences for a strong social safety net (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).
Both dynamics might actually explain my results, since institutional quality is deeply related to the
historical legacy of Communism. To rule out this interpretation, I take two steps. First, following
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014), I introduce a variable into my main specifications for each individ-
ual that measures the number of years they lived under Communist rule.42 Second, I also include
a dummy variable equal to one if the individual was a member of the Communist party, because
Communist party membership is also an important channel of socialization. As in Pop-Eleches and
41These specifications are also available upon request.
42For comparability I use Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014)’s historical data.
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Tucker (2014), including these variables together results in only the Communist party membership
variable being significant. Crucially, however, including these variables does not strongly alter the
main results (see tables 2.13 – 2.15).
Finally, I also examine whether the effects of a characteristic associated with tax evasion are
persistent and whether effects are similar for those with these characteristics at different points
in the post-communist period. That is, are the preferences of the self-employed shortly after the
fall of Communism similar to those who were not self-employed until later on in the transition
and do these effects persist even after a change in occupation or retirement.43 To examine this, I
recoded the main independent variables of interest to create three categories – those who belonged
to each group (self-employed, evasive sectors, or evasive occupations) at any point since the fall of
communism, those who only belonged during the first five years of the transition, and those who
belonged during the most recent five years. In the absence of the ability to focus on the preferences
of people who did not grow up under communism (they are too young to be included), the experi-
ence of those whose professional experience is more highly divorced from the communist period
might give some additional leverage on the effect of Communist legacies. If communist legacies
are operative and driving the effect, we would expect that those whose professional experience is
more recent would show some difference in preferences from those whose professional life was
mostly spent under Communism. That is, we would expect the magnitude of the main effect to
be larger for those whose characteristics associated with tax evasion are less divorced from the
Communist experience.
Interestingly, when these variables are substituted for the skill variables in our main regres-
sions, the results remain largely the same.44 The effect of being self-employed, professional, or
in an evasive sector is roughly similar for those who worked in these occupations during the first
few years of transition, at any point during the post-transition period, and for those who worked in
these occupations during the last five years. They are also roughly similar to results in my main
specifications, which look only at those who currently belong to one of the groups with character-
istics associated with tax evasion. While far from ideal, this test gives us some confidence that the
43In a sense, this is also a test of Iversen and Soskice (2001)’s assumptions that people with specific skills’ prefer-
ences stay the same, even when they are employed in a sector that doesn’t make use of their skills.
44For parsimony I do not report these results here, but they are available upon request.
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observed effects do not reflect differentials in the extent to which communist legacies are shaping
preferences amongst different cohorts.
It instead suggests that individuals’ preferences are guided by opportunities afforded to them
by the market economy.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided three important pieces of empirical evidence important to understanding
social policy preferences. First, for the most part, support for social policy among citizens of the
post-communist states largely follow patterns observed elsewhere. Income and factors associated
with risk are the most important predictors of support for social policy in pooled regressions. Sec-
ond, despite the fact that existing work applies rather well to social policy preferences in the post-
communist states, there is still much variation to be explained. In particular, current models largely
ignore substantial levels of cross-national variation in the magnitude and signs of co-efficients for
several important determinants of social policy. This suggests that these individual level factors
might be conditional on macro-level differences between countries.
The final contribution, and the most critical for this dissertation, is to provide evidence con-
sistent with my theory’s predictions under the free-rider pathology presented in chapter 1. I focus
on the observable implications of my theory for the preferences of individuals with characteristics
associated with tax evasion: the self-employed, professionals, and those in sectors associated with
tax evasion. I find that as institutional quality declines and tax evasion becomes easier to get away
with, individuals with these characteristics become more supportive of social policy that is more
redistributive and rooted in state control. This matches predictions over these dimensions made in
chapter 1. Interestingly, to the extent that the self-employed are generally small business owners,
this result may also imply that firms capable of evading taxes are also more supportive of certain
types of social policy when institutions are poor.45 At the same time, there is little evidence that
institutions shape preferences for social policy for the average person, although this may be due to
the small number of countries.
45I discuss this possibility further, and provide and empirical test, in chapter 4.
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Substantively, the results indicate that those with characteristics associated with tax evasion
support social policy at about the same rate as the general populace when institutions are poor. As
institutions improve, however, a preference cleavage opens up and those with characteristics asso-
ciated with evasion become significantly less supportive than the general populace. This dynamic
likely has much to do with the fact that these individuals tend to be wealthier on average, meaning
that as tax evasion becomes more difficult their tax burden increases sharply. It is also worth noting
that the extent to which institutions shape preferences is on par with, and in some cases larger, than
the magnitude of other important effects such as income.
Having shown that at least one part of my theory seems to be useful in explaining cross-national
variation in support for social policy, in the next chapter I explore the logic of my theory and its
real world implications. I present an illustrative case study of an important period of social policy
reform in a setting with weak institutions: Russia in the early 2000’s. If my theory is correct, then
concerns about the implications of the various pathologies of poor institutions – misappropriation,
macro-economic risk, free-riding, and contract enforcement – for social policy should be prevalent
in the discourse surrounding the reform. I test this proposition by reviewing the legislative debates
surrounding the reform. I then perform content analysis on media coverage of the reforms and
statements made by businesses, unions, and non-governmental organizations during the reform
debates. In doing so, I also help to illustrate the logic of each of these four pathologies of poor
institutions using actors’ own words.
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Figure 2.4: Simulated Probability of Support for a Strong State Role in Social Policy for the Self-
employed
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Figure 2.5: Simulated Probability of Support for a Strong State Role in Social Policy for Those
Working in Sectors Associated with Evasion
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Figure 2.6: Simulated Probability of Support for a Strong State Role in Social Policy for Profes-
sionals
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Table 2.2: Preferences for State-led Role in Redistribution – Individual Level Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.108***
1 = Male (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039)
Education -0.028 -0.026 -0.018 -0.022 -0.036*
Higher = More Education (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021)
Household Size 0.024 0.018 0.030 0.016 -0.009
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034)
Income Decile -0.027*** -0.024** -0.023** -0.028*** -0.028**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Unemployed 0.086** 0.080** 0.081* 0.081** 0.121**
1 = yes (0.041) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041) (0.052)
nwpensioner 0.049 0.037 0.041 0.017 0.016
1 = yes (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.081)
Health Assessment 0.139*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.127***
Lower = More Healthy (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
Minority 0.031 0.022 0.025 0.047 0.063
1 = yes (0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) (0.073)
Urban Resident -0.065 -0.078 -0.064 -0.067 -0.060
1 = yes (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118)
Rural Resident -0.024 -0.042 -0.026 -0.022 0.024
1 = yes (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.117)
Professional -0.223*** -0.202*** -0.211*** -0.224*** -0.193***
1 = yes (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.071) (0.068)
Re-privatization 0.524***
Higher = More Anti-market (0.043)
Plan 0.138***
Higher = More Anti-market (0.035)
Redistribution 0.403***
Higher = More Anti-market (0.041)
Sum yrs. wages earned 0.002
(0.006)
Sum yrs. assets sold -0.020
(0.018)
Sum yrs. food cut 0.021***
(0.006)
Sum yrs. wages cut 0.015
(0.012)
Constant 0.649*** 0.541*** 0.549*** -0.715*** 0.611***
(0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.217) (0.165)
Observations 25,958 25,803 25,924 25,946 18,814
Pseudo-R2 0.0734 0.0831 0.0752 0.0996 0.0751
Log Likelihood -15180 -14936 -15130 -14744 -11144
Cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: Preferences for Social Policy and Institutional Quality – Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Self-employed -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.268*** -0.227** -0.245*** -0.236*** -0.236***
1 = yes (0.087) (0.087) (0.100) (0.100) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087)
Log GDP -0.062 0.013 0.030 -0.024 -0.055 -0.056 0.067
(0.230) (0.212) (0.150) (0.128) (0.175) (0.202) (0.223)
Social Policy Index -0.008 -0.005 0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(See below) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Government Effectiveness 0.040
(Higher = Better) (0.341)
Gov. Effect. x Self-employed -0.235**
(0.092)
Rule of Law -0.090
(Higher = Better) (0.313)
RoL x Self-employed -0.234**
(0.092)
Formality (S. Index) -0.015
(Higher = More Formality) (0.013)
Formality x Self-employed -0.013*
(0.008)
Executive Constraints -0.021
(Higher = Better) (0.065)
Exec. Constr. x Self-employed -0.030
(0.046)
Freedom House (inverted) 0.011
(Higher = Better) (0.105)
FH x Self-employed -0.103**
(0.050)
Voice and Authority 0.025
(Higher = Better) (0.234)
VoA x Self-employed -0.235**
(0.092)
Control of Corruption -0.203
(Higher = Better) (0.367)
CoC x Self-employed -0.234**
(0.092)
Constant 0.609 0.514 0.112 0.524 0.216 0.594 0.523
(0.734) (0.754) (0.749) (0.735) (0.753) (0.714) (0.716)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 25 25 23 25 24 25 25
Observations 24,803 24,803 22,805 24,803 23,805 24,803 24,803
chi2 770.9 771.0 743.9 759.7 754.5 770.9 771.2
Log Likelihood -14433 -14433 -13297 -14435 -13964 -14433 -14432
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Preferences for Social Policy and Institutional Quality – Evading Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Evasive Sector -0.039 -0.044 -0.026 -0.036 -0.019 -0.039 -0.040
(0.062) (0.063) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Log GDP -0.072 -0.004 0.023 -0.038 -0.064 -0.065 0.045
(0.228) (0.212) (0.149) (0.127) (0.174) (0.201) (0.223)
Social Policy Index -0.008 -0.005 0.008 -0.006 0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Government Effectiveness 0.039
(Higher = Better) (0.339)
Gov. Effect. x Evasive Sector -0.241***
(0.084)
Rule of Law -0.082
(Higher = Better) (0.313)
RoL x Evasive Sector -0.226***
(0.083)
Formality (S. Index) -0.015
(0.013)
Formality x Evasive Sector -0.014**
(0.006)
Executive Constraints -0.018
(Higher = Better) (0.065)
Exec. Constr. x Evasive Sector -0.074**
(0.029)
Freedom House (inverted) 0.009
(Higher = Better) (0.104)
FH x Evasive Sector -0.083**
(0.034)
Voice and Authority 0.021
(Higher = Better) (0.232)
VoA x Evasive Sector -0.171***
(0.065)
Control of Corruption -0.183
(Higher = Better) (0.367)
CoC x Evasive Sector -0.258***
(0.095)
Constant 0.632 0.431 0.142 0.558 0.245 0.621 0.444
(0.728) (0.753) (0.746) (0.730) (0.748) (0.709) (0.715)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 25 25 23 25 24 25 25
Observations 24,803 24,803 22,805 24,803 23,805 24,803 24,803
chi2 793.8 785.4 776.8 791.2 777.6 791.7 785.2
Log Likelihood -14444 -14448 -13305 -14444 -13976 -14444 -14448
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Preferences for Social Policy and Institutional Quality – Professionals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Professional -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.223*** -0.190** -0.204*** -0.195*** -0.195***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.083) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074)
Log GDP -0.055 0.019 0.034 -0.021 -0.047 -0.050 0.067
(0.228) (0.210) (0.149) (0.127) (0.174) (0.200) (0.221)
Social Policy Index -0.009 -0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.002 -0.009 -0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Government Effectiveness 0.033
(Higher = Better) (0.338)
Gov. Effect. x Professional -0.222***
(0.074)
Rule of Law -0.095
(Higher = Better) (0.310)
RoL x Professional -0.221***
(0.074)
Formality (S. Index) -0.015
(0.013)
Formality x Professional -0.016**
(0.006)
Executive Constraints -0.023
(Higher = Better) (0.064)
Exec. Constr. x Professional -0.028
(0.037)
Freedom House (inverted) 0.007
(Higher = Better) (0.104)
FH x Professional -0.097**
(0.040)
Voice and Authority 0.020
(Higher = Better) (0.232)
VoA x Professional -0.222***
(0.074)
Control of Corruption -0.196
(Higher = Better) (0.363)
CoC x Professional -0.221***
(0.074)
Constant 0.636 0.541 0.162 0.556 0.260 0.624 0.556
(0.727) (0.747) (0.747) (0.726) (0.747) (0.707) (0.710)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,803 24,803 22,805 24,803 23,805 24,803 24,803
Number of groups 25 25 23 25 24 25 25
chi2 737.3 737.3 717.5 717.5 717.8 737.3 737.5
Log Likelihood -14427 -14427 -13289 -14431 -13959 -14427 -14427
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Variable Name Variable Description Mean Std. Min. Max N
Dependent Variable
Preferences for a
State Role in Re-
distribution
Do you think the state should be involved in the following: reducing the gap
between the rich and the poor? (1) Not involved (2) Moderately involved or (3)
Strongly involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor.
2.65 0.564 1 3 28991
Demographic Controls
Age Respondent age 46.516 17.722 17 97 29000
Household size Number of Reported Household members not counting the respondent. 1.022 0.803 0 5.5 29002
Gender (1) Male (0) Female 0.415 0.493 0 1 29002
Minority status Do you consider yourself as a member of an ethnic minority in this country? (0)
No (1) Yes
0.107 0.308 0 1 28976
Self-reported
Health
How would you assess your health? (1) very good; (2) good; (3) medium; (4)
bad; (5) very bad.
1.721 0.996 0 4 28998
Economic and Ideological Controls
Respondent edu-
cation
What is the highest degree you obtained? (1) no degree/education (2) com-
pulsory school education (3) secondary education (4) professional; vocational
school/training (5) higher professional degree (University) (6) Post Graduate De-
gree
1.435 1.05 0 3 28995
Consumption
Decile
Country specific consumption deciles constructed by EBRD. Underlying con-
sumption variable was calculated using annualized consumption expenditure per
(equalized) household member; with children under 14 entering with a weight of
0.3.
5.499 2.873 1 10 29002
Wage earning
years
In the past 15 years or so our country has undergone many major changes. Peo-
ples lives have been affected in different ways. I would like to inquire how tran-
sition has affected your work trajectory and your life in general: Years worke for
wages (for an employer) 1989-2006
6.823 6.895 0 18 29008
Retired For respondents who report they are not working: What is the main reason you
are not looking for a job: Retired and no working? (0) No (1) Yes
0.236 0.425 0 1 29002
Unemployed For individuals who report not having worked in the last 7 days: Even though
you did not work during the past 7 days, do you have a job which you will return
to? (0) Yes (1) No
0.461 0.499 0 1 29007
Attitudes towards
reprivation
In your opinion, what should be done with most privatised companies? (0) Left in
the hands of the current owners with no change or Left in the hands of the current
owners provided they pay what they are worth (1) Re Nationalise and kept in
state hands or Re Nationalise and then re-privatise again using more transparent
processes
0.466 0.499 0 1 28797
Evasion
Self-employed In this job (current job) do you work: As self employed or for a company you
partly or fully own? (0) No (1) Yes
0.082 0.275 0 1 29002
Low-visibility
sector
In what industry did/do you do this job (current job)? (0) non-retail and con-
struction industry (1) retail or construction





Dummy variable equal to one if respondent is working as a legislator; senior gov-
ernment official; enterprise manager; director/chief executive; business owner;
physicist; engineer; mathematician; architect; computing professional; medical
doctor; dentist; pharmacist; teacher; lawyer; accountant; author; professional;
religious or similar profession.




Index which aggregates various surveys, reports, and indices in order to mea-
sure the quality of public and civil services, their degree of independence from
political pressure, the quality of policy implementation, and the state’s ability to
credibly commit to policy (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
-0.121 0.694 -1.47 1.038 26003
Rule of Law Index which aggregates various surveys, reports, and indices in order to mea-
sure confidence in social rules and the degree to which actors abide by them.
Particularly focuses on the quality of contract enforcement, judicial and law en-
forcement bodies, and likelihood of crime (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
-0.308 0.707 -1.31 0.858 26003
Formality Inverse of Schneider, et al. (2010) Index. Index constructed using MIMIC
method to estimate size of unreported economic activity. See paper for further
details.
60.79 12.48 31.65 80.91 24002
Polity IV index Extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of chief ex-
ecutives, whether individuals or collectives. Variable coded by research teams
according to pre-established criteria (Marshal et al., 2013).
5.167 2.092 -0.47 7 26006
Freedom House Index of democracy created from expert ratings which takes into consideration
political and electoral processes; the degree of social pluralism and participation;
government functioning; and civil liberties: freedom of expression and associ-
ation; Rule of Law; and other individual rights. Raw Freedom House scores
range from 1-7; with lower numbers corresponding to more democratic regimes;
however scores have been inverted in this paper such that higher values indicate
more democratic regimes (Freedom House, 2012).
3.774 1.762 0 5.786 25003
Voice and Au-
thority
Index which aggregates various surveys, reports, and indices in order to measure
participation and the degree to which basic freedoms such as freedom of expres-
sion; association; and media are present. Higher values indicate more prevalent
(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
-0.024 0.889 -1.84 1.23 26003
Control of Cor-
ruption
Index which aggregates various surveys, reports, and indices in order to measure
the use of public power for private gain and which encapsulates petty and grand
corruption, as well as state capture (Kaufmann et al., 2010).




Please see appendix of this chapter 28.86 5.005 16 36 25002
GDP per Capita Average real GDP per capita in US dollars: 2000 – 2005 (EBRD 2009)
Inequality Average of available Gini-coefficient of inequality from 2000 – 2005. (WDI
2005)
32.904 3.873 25.5 41.717 25003
Expenditures Average government expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 2000 – 2005
(EBRD 2009)
Resource Rents Average resource rents as a percentage of GDP from 2000 – 2005. (World Bank
Global Series)
9.366 18.03 0.156 166.2 26004
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5 Appendix: Social Policy Index
The social policy index is an updated version of the measure introduced in Mares (2005a), which
makes use of country legislation to code the scope of social policy coverage and the degree to
which contributions and benefits are linked. Following Mares (2005a), I focus on four types of
social policies: old-age insurance, health-care insurance, work-related disability insurance, and
unemployment insurance based on data supplies by Social Security Administration (2006). Intu-
itively, the index starts by assigning each country a score of 10, indicating social policy with no
contribution-benefit link an full, universal coverage. Points are then deducted for each major oc-
cupational group that is excluded from social policy and based on the extent to which individuals
are discriminated against based on actuarial criteria. The more discrimination, the tighter contri-
butions and benefits are linked and the less redistribution across occupational groups and segments
of the populace. Variation in contributions, benefits, or retirement age by occupational type are all
regarded as discriminatory and lower scores accordingly, although income based discrimination
does not result in a reduced score.46 With respect to the major occupational groups, I follow Mares
(2005a) in focusing on a) agricultural workers b) the self-employed, and c) workers in small firms.
Finally, it is important to note that many post-communist countries have multi-tiered pension sys-
tems that combine a universal, flat rate pension with contributory systems. For these systems, I
provide an average of the coded value of each pillar.
The specific criteria for assigning each social policy type a value on the index is:
10 – Universalistic, solidaristic social policy for which all country residents are eligible.
9 – Compulsory contributory insurance that covers all employed persons and all major occu-
pational groups. Social policy is subsidized by the state and there is no discrimination in social
policy benefits aside from income.
8.5 – As a 9, but without state subsidies.
8 – Compulsory contributory insurance that covers all employed persons, but one major occu-
pational group is excluded. Social policy is subsidized by the state and there is no discrimination
46Results above are robust to alternative definitions of discrimination that focus solely on contributions and benefits,
ignoring early retirement and other such considerations.
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in social policy benefits aside from income.
7.5 – As an 8, but without state subsidies.
7 – Compulsory contributory insurance that covers all employed persons, but two or more
major occupational group are excluded. Social policy is subsidized by the state and there is no
discrimination in social policy benefits aside from income.
6.5 – As a 7, but without state subsidies.
6 – Compulsory contributory insurance that covers all employed persons, but two or more ma-
jor occupational group are excluded. Social policy must be subsidized. Risk-based discrimination
in social policy benefits, contributions or retirement age exist.
5.5 – As a 6, but without state subsidies.
5 – Privately managed social policy which covers at least 50% of the economically active
population. No state subsidies are offered.
4 – Provident fund.
3 – Employer liability.
2 – Means-tested social assistance.
1 – Purely voluntary insurance or special systems, but only for narrow occupational groups.
0 – No social policy.
6 Appendix B: Additional Robustness Checks
The following section presents the additional robustness checks discussed in section 3.3.
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Table 2.7: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Alternative Macro-variables – Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Self-employed -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.268*** -0.241** -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.243***
(0.090) (0.091) (0.100) (0.104) (0.094) (0.090) (0.090)
Resource Rents (%GDP) -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Government Expenditures (% GDP) -0.030 -0.030 -0.025 -0.033* -0.031* -0.031* -0.031
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Inequality (GINI) 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.031 0.022 0.022 0.023
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Log GDP 0.067 0.089 0.111 0.229 0.097 0.059 0.129
(0.235) (0.218) (0.197) (0.147) (0.190) (0.210) (0.218)
Social Policy Index 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.030 0.009 0.009 0.010
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness 0.144
(0.337)
Gov. Effect. x Self-employed -0.232**
(0.094)
Rule of Law 0.114
(0.320)
RoL x Self-employed -0.232**
(0.094)
Formality (S. Index) -0.001
(0.016)




Exec. Constr. x Self-employed -0.036
(0.047)
Freedom House (inverted) 0.048
(0.121)
FH x Self-employed -0.103**
(0.050)
Voice and Authority 0.145
(0.254)
VoA x Self-employed -0.233**
(0.094)
Control of Corruption 0.040
(0.372)
CoC x Self-employed -0.232**
(0.094)
Constant 2.219 2.260 1.877 1.872 2.225 2.237 2.213
(1.480) (1.494) (1.658) (1.427) (1.482) (1.477) (1.505)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 23 24 24 24 24
Observations 23,805 23,805 22,805 23,805 23,805 23,805 23,805
chi2 763.8 763.8 747.4 756.4 760.5 764.0 763.6
Log Likelihood -13961 -13961 -13295 -13962 -13961 -13961 -13961
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Alternative Macro-variables – Evasive Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Evasive Sector -0.017 -0.021 -0.025 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Resource Rents (% GDP) 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Government Expenditures (% GDP) -0.028 -0.029 -0.025 -0.031* -0.029 -0.029 -0.030
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Inequality (GINI) 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.034 0.024 0.025 0.025
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Log GDP 0.046 0.070 0.106 0.207 0.078 0.040 0.101
(0.234) (0.216) (0.196) (0.147) (0.189) (0.209) (0.217)
Social Policy Index 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.028 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness 0.154
(0.334)
Gov. Effect x Evasive Sector -0.253***
(0.084)
Rule of Law 0.119
(0.318)
RoL x Evasive Sector -0.247***
(0.083)
Formality (S. Index) -0.002
(0.016)








FH x Evasive Sector -0.083**
(0.034)
Voice and Authority 0.147
(0.252)
VoA x Evasive Sector -0.174***
(0.065)
Control of Corruption 0.074
(0.371)
CoC x Evasive Sector -0.270***
(0.094)
Constant 2.138 2.173 1.894 1.790 2.142 2.156 2.095
(1.469) (1.483) (1.651) (1.420) (1.472) (1.467) (1.497)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 23 24 24 24 24
Observations 23,805 23,805 22,805 23,805 23,805 23,805 23,805
chi2 788.0 787.8 780.2 786.4 783.7 786.0 780.5
log Liklihood -13972 -13972 -13304 -13972 -13973 -13973 -13976
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Table 2.9: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Alternative Macro-variables – Professionals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Professional -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.222*** -0.202** -0.204*** -0.202*** -0.202***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.084) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075)
Resource Rents (%GDP) 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Government Expenditures (% GDP) -0.029 -0.029 -0.025 -0.032* -0.029 -0.029 -0.029
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Inequality (GINI) 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.031 0.022 0.022 0.022
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Log GDP 0.065 0.088 0.120 0.223 0.095 0.056 0.122
(0.235) (0.218) (0.197) (0.147) (0.190) (0.210) (0.218)
Social Policy Index 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.027 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness 0.143
(0.336)
Gov. Effect. x Professional -0.219***
(0.075)
Rule of Law 0.111
(0.320)
RoL x Professional -0.219***
(0.075)
Formality (S. Index) -0.001
(0.016)




Exec. Constr. x Professional -0.033
(0.038)
Freedom House (inverted) 0.047
(0.120)
FH x Professional -0.097**
(0.040)
Voice and Authority 0.146
(0.253)
VoA x Professional -0.219***
(0.075)
Control of Corruption 0.051
(0.372)
CoC x Professional -0.219***
(0.075)
Constant 2.174 2.213 1.935 1.836 2.181 2.193 2.176
(1.477) (1.492) (1.658) (1.425) (1.479) (1.473) (1.502)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 23 24 24 24 24
Observations 23,805 23,805 22,805 23,805 23,805 23,805 23,805
chi2 730.6 730.5 720.9 714.2 723.6 730.8 730.3
Log Likelihood -13955 -13955 -13287 -13958 -13957 -13955 -13956
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Table 2.10: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Liberalization Measures – Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Self-employed -0.183** -0.183** -0.208** -0.167* -0.189** -0.183** -0.183**
(0.076) (0.076) (0.091) (0.089) (0.082) (0.076) (0.076)
Privatization: Large-scale -0.065 0.048 -0.116 0.078 0.081 0.069 0.045
(0.235) (0.232) (0.311) (0.239) (0.243) (0.237) (0.232)
Privatization: Small-scale -0.047 0.197 0.414 0.388 0.481 0.390 0.237
(0.422) (0.393) (0.403) (0.393) (0.375) (0.369) (0.382)
Competition Policy -1.491*** -1.412*** -0.958*** -1.109*** -1.049*** -1.248*** -1.420***
(0.354) (0.374) (0.331) (0.339) (0.367) (0.367) (0.379)
Price Liberalization 0.719** 0.573 0.945 0.534 0.429 0.422 0.654*
(0.353) (0.349) (0.669) (0.401) (0.374) (0.364) (0.366)
Log GDP 0.066 0.231 0.378** 0.345** 0.314* 0.296* 0.221
(0.200) (0.166) (0.152) (0.146) (0.161) (0.167) (0.170)
Social Policy Index 0.031 0.033* 0.042** 0.039* 0.041** 0.039** 0.041**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Government Effectiveness 0.899*
(0.471)
Gov. Effect. x Self-employed -0.195**
(0.078)
Rule of Law 0.485
(0.363)
RoL x Self-employed -0.194**
(0.078)
Formality (S. Index) -0.011
(0.010)




Exec. Constr. x Self-employed -0.013
(0.040)
Freedom House (inverted) -0.006
(0.116)
FH x Self-employed -0.082*
(0.043)
Voice and Authority 0.166
(0.267)
VoA x Self-employed -0.194**
(0.078)
Control of Corruption 0.511
(0.387)
CoC x Self-employed -0.194**
(0.078)
Constant -0.424 -0.481 -0.834 -0.680 -0.795 -0.696 -0.728
(0.557) (0.578) (0.594) (0.588) (0.600) (0.582) (0.566)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,804 23,804 21,806 23,804 22,806 23,804 23,804
chi2 722.8 719.0 685.1 704.6 696.7 716.4 719.0
Log Likelihood -13808 -13809 -12676 -13812 -13342 -13809 -13809
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Liberalization Measures – Evading Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Evasive Sector -0.046 -0.050 -0.035 -0.041 -0.022 -0.044 -0.045
(0.064) (0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065)
Privatization: Large-scale -0.042 0.079 -0.108 0.105 0.105 0.091 0.076
(0.235) (0.235) (0.309) (0.239) (0.243) (0.237) (0.235)
Privatization: Small-scale -0.062 0.164 0.376 0.368 0.460 0.372 0.205
(0.422) (0.399) (0.401) (0.392) (0.375) (0.369) (0.388)
Competition Policy -1.496*** -1.418*** -0.959*** -1.118*** -1.054*** -1.253*** -1.427***
(0.355) (0.380) (0.329) (0.339) (0.367) (0.368) (0.385)
Price Liberalization 0.675* 0.545 0.959 0.490 0.390 0.382 0.627*
(0.353) (0.353) (0.665) (0.400) (0.373) (0.363) (0.371)
Social Policy Index 0.030 0.033* 0.041** 0.038* 0.041** 0.039** 0.041**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Government Effectiveness 0.907*
(0.471)
Gov. Effect. x Evasive Sector -0.213**
(0.087)
Rule of Law 0.499
(0.368)
RoL x Evasive Sector -0.197**
(0.088)
Formality (S. Index) -0.010
(0.010)




Exec. Constr. x Evasive Sector -0.066**
(0.029)
Freedom House (inverted) -0.004
(0.116)
FH x Evasive Sector -0.072**
(0.035)
Voice and Authority 0.172
(0.267)
VoA x Evasive Sector -0.151**
(0.067)
Control of Corruption 0.526
(0.393)
CoC x Evasive Sector -0.229**
(0.098)
Constant -0.410 -0.583 -0.806 -0.659 -0.781 -0.682 -0.833
(0.558) (0.585) (0.591) (0.587) (0.600) (0.582) (0.573)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,804 23,804 21,806 23,804 22,806 23,804 23,804
chi2 729.2 715.7 703.1 721.5 705.1 722.1 716.0
Log Likelihood -13813 -13818 -12678 -13815 -13347 -13815 -13818
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Liberalization Measures – Professionals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Professional -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.223*** -0.181** -0.201** -0.193*** -0.193***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.080) (0.082) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074)
Privatization: Large-scale -0.036 0.075 -0.100 0.108 0.110 0.096 0.072
(0.240) (0.235) (0.316) (0.242) (0.247) (0.241) (0.236)
Privatization: Small-scale -0.068 0.169 0.355 0.338 0.442 0.359 0.210
(0.431) (0.400) (0.410) (0.398) (0.381) (0.375) (0.389)
Competition Policy -1.470*** -1.394*** -0.949*** -1.090*** -1.036*** -1.235*** -1.400***
(0.362) (0.381) (0.337) (0.344) (0.374) (0.373) (0.386)
Price Liberalization 0.668* 0.526 0.945 0.498 0.388 0.375 0.605
(0.360) (0.354) (0.680) (0.406) (0.380) (0.369) (0.372)
Log GDP 0.077 0.237 0.383** 0.350** 0.321** 0.300* 0.228
(0.205) (0.168) (0.155) (0.148) (0.163) (0.169) (0.174)
Social Policy Index 0.029 0.031 0.040* 0.037* 0.039* 0.038* 0.039**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Government Effectiveness 0.881*
(0.481)
Gov. Effect. x Professional -0.206***
(0.074)
Rule of Law 0.479
(0.370)
RoL x Professional -0.206***
(0.074)
Formality (S. Index) -0.010
(0.010)




Exec. Constr. x Professional -0.019
(0.036)
Freedom House (inverted) -0.008
(0.118)
FH x Professional -0.088**
(0.040)
Voice and Authority 0.169
(0.271)
VoA x Professional -0.205***
(0.074)
Control of Corruption 0.501
(0.394)
CoC x Professional -0.206***
(0.074)
Constant -0.392 -0.447 -0.771 -0.635 -0.749 -0.661 -0.691
(0.569) (0.588) (0.605) (0.596) (0.611) (0.591) (0.576)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,804 23,804 21,806 23,804 22,806 23,804 23,804
chi2 681.2 677.8 649.6 657.0 653.2 675.3 677.8
Log Likelihood -13798 -13799 -12664 -13803 -13333 -13800 -13799
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Communist Legacies – Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Self-employed -0.262*** -0.261*** -0.306*** -0.264*** -0.273*** -0.262*** -0.262***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.101) (0.097) (0.090) (0.090)
Exposure to Communism -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Communist Party Membership 0.144** 0.144** 0.146** 0.144** 0.123* 0.145** 0.144**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Log GDP 0.205 0.214 0.058 -0.009 0.093 0.138 0.195
(0.248) (0.215) (0.138) (0.122) (0.179) (0.211) (0.216)
Social Policy Index 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness -0.436
(0.386)
Gov. Effect. x Self-employed -0.205**
(0.098)
Rule of Law -0.461
(0.329)
RoL x Self-employed -0.205**
(0.098)
Formality (S. Index) -0.022*
(0.012)








FH x Self-employed -0.082
(0.054)
Voice and Authority -0.263
(0.256)
VoA x Self-employed -0.204**
(0.098)
Control of Corruption -0.467
(0.361)
CoC x Self-employed -0.205**
(0.098)
Constant 0.166 0.023 -0.140 0.281 -0.020 0.329 0.264
(0.707) (0.720) (0.691) (0.703) (0.709) (0.677) (0.674)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,766 23,766 21,772 23,766 22,772 23,766 23,766
chi2 747.3 748.0 725.0 737.8 731.8 747.1 747.7
log Likelihood -13742 -13741 -12605 -13744 -13273 -13742 -13742
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Communist Legacies – Evading Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Evasive Sector -0.019 -0.025 -0.005 -0.019 0.005 -0.018 -0.022
(0.064) (0.065) (0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066)
Exposure to Communism -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Communist Party Membership 0.146** 0.144** 0.147** 0.146** 0.125* 0.147** 0.144**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Social Policy Index 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.003
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness -0.419
(0.385)
Gov. Effect. x Evasive Sector -0.258***
(0.088)
Rule of Law -0.446
(0.330)
RoL x Evasive Sector -0.238***
(0.087)
Formality (S. Index) -0.021*
(0.012)




Exec. Constr. x Evasive Sector -0.076**
(0.031)
Freedom House (inverted) -0.113
(0.113)
FH x Evasive Sector -0.090**
(0.037)
Voice and Authority -0.258
(0.256)
VoA x Evasive Sector -0.184***
(0.070)
Control of Corruption -0.440
(0.363)
CoC x Evasive Sector -0.266***
(0.099)
Constant 0.204 -0.044 -0.099 0.323 0.016 0.364 0.199
(0.705) (0.721) (0.693) (0.701) (0.707) (0.675) (0.676)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,766 23,766 21,772 23,766 22,772 23,766 23,766
chi2 775.3 768.1 759.9 771.0 759.8 772.4 767.2
Log Likelihood -13750 -13754 -12611 -13751 -13282 -13751 -13754
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.15: Social Policy, Institutional Quality, and Communist Legacies – Professionals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Professional -0.166** -0.166** -0.204** -0.177** -0.178** -0.166** -0.166**
(0.074) (0.074) (0.080) (0.085) (0.079) (0.074) (0.074)
Exposure to Communism -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Communist Party Membership 0.140** 0.140** 0.142** 0.140** 0.119* 0.141** 0.141**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Log GDP 0.196 0.209 0.059 -0.008 0.091 0.132 0.185
(0.248) (0.214) (0.139) (0.122) (0.178) (0.210) (0.216)
Social Policy Index 0.005 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.009 -0.000 0.002
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Government Effectiveness -0.414
(0.385)
Gov. Effect. x Professional -0.251***
(0.076)
Rule of Law -0.445
(0.328)
RoL x Professional -0.251***
(0.076)
Formality (S. Index) -0.021*
(0.012)




Exec. Constr. x Professional -0.028
(0.038)
Freedom House (inverted) -0.111
(0.113)
FH x Professional -0.111***
(0.042)
Voice and Authority -0.249
(0.256)
VoA x Professional -0.251***
(0.076)
Control of Corruption -0.441
(0.361)
CoC x Professional -0.251***
(0.076)
Constant 0.222 0.080 -0.066 0.333 0.042 0.377 0.317
(0.706) (0.718) (0.698) (0.700) (0.709) (0.675) (0.673)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country varying slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-employment varying slope Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 24 24 22 24 23 24 24
Observations 23,766 23,766 21,772 23,766 22,772 23,766 23,766
chi2 730.1 730.8 708.0 704.1 709.9 730.0 730.4
Log Likelihood -13735 -13735 -12596 -13739 -13267 -13735 -13735
Individual controls are those discussed in section 2.3.
Standard errors in parentheses. Freedom House and Formality inverted from original variables. See text.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
The Institutional Logic of Pension Reform
Debates
Chapter 1 suggested four pathologies that emerge in settings with week institutions and which
can shape preferences for social policy: misappropriation, macro-economic risk, free-riding, and
contract enforcement. The previous chapter provided evidence consistent with one of these – free-
riding – using a cross-national survey of the 28 post-communist countries. This chapter builds upon
these results with a qualitative test of another part of the argument. If my theory is correct, then
concerns associated with each of the four mechanisms should pervade public debates about the
welfare state in countries with poor institutions. I test this proposition using a qualitative analysis
of the 2001 Russian Pension Reforms from the passage of the central pension reform to enactment
of its enabling legislation (2000 – 2003). My analysis combines a qualitative case study that draws
on legislative debates with more rigorous, systematic content analysis of a dataset of individual
comments (from individual firms and citizens, business associations, NGO’s), letters-to-the-editor,
and editorials drawn from over 350 Russian newspapers. I also provide a sense of the importance
of institutional quality concerns relative to other factors – demographics, risk distribution, etc. –
common in reform discussions (c.f. Kato (2003), Mares (2005b), Pierson (2001a)).
I select Russia, and in particular its 2001 pension reform, for this analysis for several reasons.
First, Russia in 2001 was reasonably representative of large developing countries, albeit with the
deep legacy of the Communist period characteristic of the post-communist states. Despite its rela-
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tive wealth and a high level of development during the Communist period, the economic collapse
following the break-up of the Soviet Union crushed living standards and severely disrupted the
ability of the government to fulfill state functions and provide basic services (Remington, 2011,
Roland, 2000). In economic terms, the collapse moved Russia closer to developing world coun-
tries, while the severe degradation of state capacity limited the ability of the government to cush-
ion the blow. Between 1990 and 2006, government expenditures as a share of GDP, informality
amongst firms (the share of firms reporting revenue for tax purposes) and inequality (GINI) were
roughly similar to developing world averages, while Russian GDP per capita was actually quite a
bit lower. Although the vaunted Soviet welfare state continued to exist de jure during the transi-
tion, the system largely collapsed due to declining revenues and increasing demographic pressures
(see section 2.1). Thus, although Russians likely had greater expectations of their welfare state
than would be common in the developing world due to the legacies of the Communist period, the
reality for much of the 90’s was not much better than the limited welfare states present elsewhere.
Second, at the time of the reform, Russia had unambiguously bad institutions: according to
World Bank data, it was ranked 79th out of 91 countries for corruption and was in the bottom 25th
percentile of countries for the strength of rule of law and government efficacy (Kaufmann et al.,
2010). Second, pension reforms in particular provide a conducive environment for understanding
how preferences are shaped by institutional quality. As chapter 1 noted, because benefits are
delayed into the future but contributions must be made today, the potential costs of bad institutions
loom more starkly over such reforms. Also critical is the certainty of old-age as a risk: pension
reforms therefore matter to almost everybody. Consequently, one would expect debates to be both
intense and encompassing a large proportion of society. If institutional quality does not come up
in debates about such policies, then it is unlikely to ever factor into social policy debates.
Finally, the 2001 Pension Reforms constituted a moment in which many different welfare
state dimensions were on the table for discussion and reform. The failure of successive Russian
governments to reform the legacy Soviet welfare state was a major threat to the solvency of the
Russian welfare state. These problems were exacerbated by rampant tax evasion, successive eco-
nomic crises, and looming demographic shifts (Chandler, 2004, Cook, 2007, Orlov-Karba, 2005).
Although many of these issues were not unique to the Russian context, the extent to which policy
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makers were willing to countenance wholesale reform was (Pierson, 2001a). This de novo char-
acter of Russia’s 2001 Pension Reform makes it an ideal case in which to examine how concerns
about institutional quality shape preferences, since so much was on the table simultaneously and
looming systemic crisis made the status quo untenable.
In the next section, I begin by discussing expectations about the types of arguments we should
see if different pathologies of poor institutions – misappropriation, macro-economic risk, free-
riding, and weak contract enforcement – are integral to social policy debates. Section 2 then
briefly lays out the historical context of the 2001 Pension Reform and the history of its passage.
This section also covers the legislative debates surrounding it. Section 3 introduces the citation
dataset and presents the findings of the content analysis, focusing on the identity of actors who
participated in public debates about the pension reform and the rationale behind their positions.
Section 4 concludes.
1 Social Policy Discourse and Poor Institutions
The argument laid out in chapter 1 provided a simple theory of support for social policy where
institutions are poor. Weak institutions create costs that are widely dispersed across society, while
at the same time creating opportunities that specific types of actors can exploit. My argument
identified four pathologies of poor institutions – misappropriation, macro-economic volatility, free-
riding, and contract enforcement – that might plausibly shape support for social policy where
institutional quality is poor. These pathologies, and my argument more generally, generate some
testable observable implications for public discourse in weak institutional settings. Put simply,
if institutional quality actually matters to individuals, firms, and governments, then they should
consider the impact of institutional quality on proposed reforms and should say so during reform
debates.
Before turning to predictions, it is worth noting that many different aspects of the welfare
state were on the table during the 2001 reforms of Russia’s pension system and the legislation
created to enable it. As I discuss below, the two most important dimensions of the reform were
redistribution and control. Recall that the redistribution dimension refers to the extent to which
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individuals’ contributions to the welfare state are reflected in later benefits. Control refers to who
will collect, administer, and distribute social policy funds (Mares, 2003a). As chapter 1 noted,
institutional quality shapes preferences over both of these dimensions by influencing how and
when actors are able to monitor the social policy system, the revenues that keep it running, and
the benefits it distributes. Weak monitoring capacity makes it harder to be sure that everything is
running according to the law and one’s expected benefits (net costs) match reality. The precise
logic linking these dimensions, institutional quality, and preferences for social policy depends on
which pathologies of poor institutions actors are concerned about.
First, consider the threat of misappropriation. Recall that under this pathology, poorly ac-
countable officials are free to renege de facto on social policy commitments by turning funds to
unintended uses. Concretely, they can raid centralized social policy funds for resources in order to
line their own pockets, provide rents to the well-connected in exchange for favors, or simply fund
other policy priorities (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011, Gehlbach, 2008, Olson, 2000). If this pathology
is operative, then we would expect public discourse to focus on whether government officials are
trustworthy stewards of public funds and to emphasize the ease with which social policy funds can
be turned to other uses. Discourse should also focus heavily on the ease with which officials can
abscond with funds (whether as rents or as seed funds for other policy priorities). Key issues in the
debate should include whether and how citizens are able to monitor social policy funds, the degree
of discretion officials have over investments and expenditures, and how tightly individuals’ contri-
butions are linked to their eventual benefits. Along the redistribution dimension, we would expect
particular attention to be paid to the transparency of benefits formulas, with particular emphasis on
policies that promote clear expectations about how contributions today result in benefits tomorrow.
The clearer formula are, the more easily misappropriation can be detected by examining actual
benefits and the easier it is to push back against abuse.
The second pathology involves the effect of institutional quality on overall levels of risk in
the economy. Recall that poor institutions are often associated with increased macro-economic
volatility (Henisz, 2000, Mobarak, 2005, Nooruddin, 2003, Rodrik, 2000b), which in turn increases
the risks faced by individuals. Where general levels of risk are greater, individuals are more likely
to support social policies (Rehm, 2009, Rehm et al., 2012). Likewise, experience with past bouts
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of high volatility also increase appetite for social policy as a hedge (Giuliano and Spilimbergo,
2014, Margalit, 2013). While neither of these would effect the redistribution or control dimensions
directly, they should shape public discourse by increasing the prominence of arguments about the
extent to which social policy acts as a safety net for those most vulnerable to macro-economic
swings. Such arguments are common in debates about social policy everywhere, however (Mares,
2005a, Pierson, 2001a). What uniquely signals institutional quality as a concern is the extent to
which actors look at the government as a contributor to macro-economic volatility. Along the
control dimension, this should manifest itself in concerns about how the government is storing and
investing social policy funds, as well as the overall impact of these investments on macro-economic
volatility. Along the redistribution dimension, it should manifest itself in discussion over whether
social policy funds should be invested and whether the government can be trusted to avoid policies
that adversely affect investments.
The third pathology is free-riding. Recall that where institutions are poor, the inability to mon-
itor, or sanction, bureaucrats properly means that actors can never be certain that officials will exert
effort to undertake costly actions, such as tax collection, market regulation, inspections, investi-
gations, accounting and record keeping, etc. An inability to commit to properly collecting taxes
is a particular problem for social policy. On the one hand, fewer contributions will find their way
to social policy funds: decreasing expected benefits for most.1 On the other hand, for those able
to evade taxes, the costs of social policy are lower and they are able to evade contributions while
reaping benefits. If free-riding is a concern, then we would expect public discourse to focus on the
implications of reforms for tax evasion and the extent to which evaders can be persuaded/coerced
to pay their taxes. Along the redistribution dimension, we would expect heavy emphasis on policy
designs that more tightly link contributions and benefits, making it more difficult for free-riders
to derive disproportionate benefits. Along the control dimension, we would expect public debates
to emphasize oversight of contributions by non-government actors who can more easily police
free-riding.
The final pathology of poor institutions is weak contract enforcement. Recall that if officials
1Mares (2005a) alone amongst contemporary studies of preferences for social policy explicitly addresses this point,
although she is ambiguous as to whether the problem of poor institutions stems from issues with tax collection capacity,
rent-seeking, or general state capacity failures.
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are unable to commit to reining in rent-seeking and proper policy enforcement, the state may also
be unable to fulfill its function as the final arbiter of contract enforcement and property rights pro-
tection between private actors. This means that not only is the state no longer a credible partner for
agreements but other actors are also untrustworthy. Without third party state enforcement, private
actors cannot rely on each other to honor contracts (North, 1981, North, Wallis, and Weingast,
2009, North and Weingast, 1989). We would expect this pathology to manifest itself in public
discourse through a heavier emphasis on the credibility of actors – the government, private firms,
unions, etc. – as managers of social policy. Along the control dimension, we would expect actors
to highlight the untrustworthiness of others (the state, other firms, other unions, etc.) and push
for either direct control or corporatist arrangements. Along the redistribution dimension, actors
should emphasize systems that increase transparency, clearly spell out how today’s contributions
result in payouts tomorrow, and allow actors to more easily observe when others violate social
policy commitments.
2 The 2001 Russian Pension Reforms
Before turning to the content analysis, it is useful to discuss the state of the Russian welfare state,
in general, and of the pension system, more specifically, immediately after the transition, In this
section, I first briefly discuss the the challenges faced by Russian social policy in the 1990’s, with
a particular emphasis on the pension system. I then provide a brief history of the passage of the
2001 pension reform and its enabling legislation that focuses on the discourse for and against the
various proposals. The goal of this section is twofold. First, it provides context and background for
both this chapter and for the empirical tests of the following two, which use survey data to assess
support for social policies. Second, it also helps to delineate whether institutional logic featured
in legislative debates about pension reform and to set the stage for a broader discussion of the
discourse of reform in the next section.
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2.1 The Status Quo Ante: The Russian Pension System of the 1990’s
During its first post-Soviet decade, the Russian Federation largely operated under the same wel-
fare state system that had served it during the Communist period: a universal defined benefits,
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) plan for pensions and universal, public provision of health-care. Pension
benefits were tied to occupation and the number of years served in the work force, but the state
also provided a minimal social pension for those unable to meet minimum eligibility criteria. Ad-
ditional benefits and privileges were extended to special categories of citizens, such as World War
II veterans, the disabled, and Communist Party officials. Healthcare was also provided on a uni-
versal basis, using a combination of clinics run by individual firms and larger state-run hospitals.
Financing was provided primarily by Soviet enterprises, who earmarked part of their wage bills
to send to the central treasury. Administration of social policy benefits, both record keeping and
benefits distribution, was typically the province of labor, although labor’s strong ties to both man-
agement gave labor control a very different character than in Western European systems (Ashwin
and Clarke, 2003, Chandler, 2004, Remington, 2011).
The collapse of the Soviet Union had a highly negative effect on the welfare state. The mas-
sive economic shock of the early 1990s placed enormous fiscal strains on the government at the
same time it dried up revenue streams from firms. By the mid 1990’s, it was clear that both the
health and pension systems, which were designed for a full-employment command economy, were
completely unsustainable. Sharp declines in wages and widespread unemployment undermined the
ability of the state to finance social policy at previous levels at the same time that it put pressure
on the system to provide for the suddenly expanded ranks of the poor (Dobronogov and Mayhew,
2000, Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Jensen, 2003, Williamson, Howling, and Maroto, 2006). De-
mographic trends further weighed heavily on the welfare state, particularly the pension system,
due to both a declining population (itself due to low birth rates and increases in male mortality
in the 90’s) and general aging (Chawla, Betcherman, and Banerji, 2007, Hauner, 2008). All this
combined to create greater demand for social policy than had previously been the case, straining
budgets.
At the same time, additional financial pressure came from the revenue side. Drastic declines
in profits at both state-owned and formerly state-owned firms, the traditional financiers of the
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state, sapped potential revenues and weakened the tax base (Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008). These
problems were exacerbated by the government’s inability to collect taxes properly. On the one
hand, many individuals responded to unemployment and new market opportunities by entering
the shadow economy, causing massive revenue shortfalls. On the other hand, many employers
in the formal sector responded to high payroll taxes and new competitive pressures with tax eva-
sion. Even the largest firms hid both production and wages from the government, often allowing
official and unofficial activity to operate side by side on the shop floor (Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodruff, 2000, Ovtcharova and Popova, 2001). Such evasion normally occurred through collu-
sive arrangements between firms and workers. The latter would receive a slight wage premia or
avoid being laid off, in exchange for agreeing to allow the firms to under-report wages or pay them
using elaborate evasion schemes (Dmitriev and Maleva, 1997, Treisman, 1999, Yakovlev, 2001).
Evasion was so rampant that Cook (2007) estimates that between a third and half of all work-
ers avoided making contributions to the social funds during the 1990s. Poor institutional oversight
exacerbated these problems, as employers were often illegally shielded from formal taxation by
regional authorities willing to look the other way for political support and rents (Cook, 2007,
Gehlbach, 2008, Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). The result was a revenue shortfall, largely at-
tributable to payroll and income tax evasion, that contributed to a budget deficit of nearly 1.1% of
GDP (Denisova, Gorban, and Yudaeva, 1999, Jensen, 2001, Jones-Luong and Weinthal, 2004).
Although some reforms were passed in the 1990’s to attempt to shore up benefits in the face of
rampant inflation and evasion, for the most part changes were parametric (Cook, 2007, Degtyarev,
1999). The only major elements of reform undertaken prior to 2001 were the establishment of a
separate, independent pension fund (The Pension Fund of the Russian Federation - PFRF), along
with extrabudgetary funds to manage medical, unemployment, and disability programs. Each fund
was responsible for collecting contributions from employers, as well as dispersing funds, although
in practice many of their expenditures (particularly in the face of deficits) were reimbursed from
the central budget. As a consequence, efforts to resolve the budget crisis fell particularly heavily
on the Pension Fund, which was forced to constantly scramble for ways of avoid default. For its
part, the government coped by allowing the PFRF to incur massive pension arrears and attempting
to push responsibility for funding social spending (and reimbursing the Pension fund) to regional
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authorities, who faced similar budget crises (Cook, 2007, Jensen, 2003, Zubarevich, 2009). Cou-
pled with rampant inflation, these actions badly eroded pensioners’ living standards and created
widespread poverty among the elderly (Commander, Tolstopiatenko, and Yemtsov, 1999, Rem-
ington, 2011). As a consequence, the replacement rate of pensions through much of the 90’s, for
example, was between 30 and 40% of average lifetime wages for most workers, which by 1999
was only about 60 to 70% of the subsistence minimum (Williamson, Howling, and Maroto, 2006).
The health-care system disintegrated, falling well below the level of care seen in the Soviet system
by nearly any metric (Twigg, 1998).
The creation of the extrabudgetary funds, while cleaning up the government’s balance sheet
somewhat, therefore did little to solve underlying problems facing the Russian welfare state in the
1990’s. Indeed, in some cases the funds made the problem worse. The creation of the extrabud-
getary funds meant that firms, in effect, had to pay (and fill out paperwork for) four separate taxes
– one to each fund (Aslund, 2007, Chandler, 2004). This created even more perverse incentives
for firms to avoid paying taxes and to move as much activity as possible into the informal sec-
tor. Further, although labor unions continued to retain representation on the governing board of
the PFRF, the number of labor representatives dwindled, putting the collection of contributions,
oversight of funds, and responsibility for distribution largely in the government’s hands by the
end of the 1990’s (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003). Other off budgetary funds were in roughly similar
states, although unions retained nearly full control of the funds that managed unemployment and
disability insurance.
By the late 1990’s, the government was keenly aware that something had to be done, par-
ticularly with respect to pensions. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s government put out a draft
conception of pension reform that specifically highlighted revenue collection and deficiencies in
the pension system organization as the primary culprits for the system’s dire straits (“Konsept-
siia reformy sistemy pensionnovo obsespecheniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta
23/08/1995, 5-6). Revenue collection, in particular, was seen as a twofold problem. First, the
reform concept highlighted the importance of cutting down on the ability of individuals and firms
to hide wages and avoid making contributions to the system. Second, it also highlighted issues
with fiscal federalism and the organization of the funds. As noted above, during the 1990’s, re-
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gional pension offices had a great deal of discretion and would often negotiate deals with regional
enterprises to enable them to sidestep pension debts in exchange for partial payments or, in some
notable cases, political favors (Chandler, 2004, Gehlbach, 2008). While good for individual re-
gional bureaucracies (and their relationships with regional executives), such arrangements starved
federal institutions of funds, severely degraded service provision, and often resulted in compe-
tition between different taxation authorities (Gaider, 2003, Shleifer and Treisman, 2000) At the
time, the government’s proposed solution was to move to a three pillar system with a notionally
defined component tightly linking contributions and benefits and a third pillar to encourage private,
employer based pensions (Cashu, 2001, Chandler, 2004).
2.2 The Path to Reform
After the 1995 reform conception, the topic of pension reform languished until early 1997, when
President Boris Yeltsin ordered the government to begin preparing a reform package as part of his
yearly address. The package was meant in part to meet World Bank criteria for a large social pro-
tection loan and was therefore heavily influenced by the bank’s advocacy of three pillar, privatized
systems (Cashu, 2001, Degtyarev, 1999). Drafted by a team of experts led by Mikhail Dmitriev at
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) in consultation with various outside
think tanks, the original plan called for a three tier pension system run entirely by the PFRF. The
plan’s three pillars consisted of a hybrid combination of notional defined contributions and accu-
mulative accounts, a need based social pension for those below a set contribution threshold, and a
set of voluntary contributions (Maleva and Sinyavskaya, 2005, Sokhey, 2010). More radical steps,
such as the privatized pillar advocated by liberals within the Ministry of Labor and Social Develop-
ment (MLSD), were rejected both internally by the Collegium of the MLSD and by Chernomyrdin
and PFRF when presented to the cabinet early on in the process (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
31 October 1997; Segodnya, 30 October 1997).2
Even with privatization off the table, however, the final package was controversial within the
government. While the MEDT and Ministry of Finance (MoF) supported a three pillar system
incorporating defined contributions and enhanced government control of the PFRF, the PFRF, sup-
2The outlines of this version of the reform can be found in Dmitriev and Maleva (1997).
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ported by key figures in the MLSD, instead pushed for full discretion over accumulated accounts.
The resulting reform proposal represented a compromise between the positions of MEDT and the
PFRF, creating a system of notional contributions overseen primarily by the PFRF (Cook, 2006).
Markedly, the resulting reform was a strong contrast to the proposals of trade unions and oppo-
sition figures, who preferred mostly parametric reforms to the existing system that preserved its
solidaristic nature and union oversight. The concept also ignored demands by employer associa-
tions, who were pushing to break the monopoly of the PFRF over pensions, allow pension funds
in individual accounts to be invested in the market, and allow non-state pension funds to take an
active role in the mandatory pillars of the pension system (Cook, 2007, Sokhey, 2010, Ulyanova,
2001). According to key participants interviewed by Cashu (2001), at this stage the government
was aware of these positions, but choose to ignore them.
Unfortunately, the 1998 reform concept went nowhere, as the events of the 1998 financial
crisis derailed the government’s plans for pension reform. It is important, however, because it
served as a template when pension reform was taken up again by President Putin in the wake of
the 2000 presidential elections. Putin’s concern with pensions was signaled even before the formal
start of the reform. Shortly after being appointed as acting President in 1999, Putin established
the Center for Strategic Problems, headed by German Gref, and charged it with developing a
comprehensive economic reform program. The resulting “Gref Program” served as a template
for economic reform during the early days of Putin’s presidency, and included measures aimed at
reforming the banking sector, deregulating small businesses, enacting privatization, acceding to
international trade organizations (particularly WTO accession), reigning in regional bureaucracies,
and reforming the judiciary. It also contained the outlines of a new pension reform plan (Aslund,
2007).
With respect to social policy reforms, viewed as a critical step to achieve the program’s goal
of sustained growth, the “Gref Program” focused heavily on both the revenue side of social policy
– the collection of contributions – and the distribution side – the design of the welfare state itself
(Chandler, 2004, Cook, 2007). On the revenue side, the government planned to create a Unified
Social Tax, which would simplify collections by removing responsibility for collecting contribu-
tions from the regional branches of the extrabudgetary funds and place it in the hands of the the
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federal treasury (which was responsible for all other federal taxes). The treasury would then pass
revenue to the extra-budgetary funds for distribution. Tax evasion would be discouraged through
the introduction of a regressive system that would lower the tax burden substantially, increasing the
attractiveness of legalizing pay in order to avoid criminal penalties (Aslund, 2007, Cashu, 2001).
On the distribution side, the Gref program largely followed the outlines of the earlier program
developed by Dmitriev, which advocated a three pillar system. Privatization, while advocated by
business associations at this time, was not initially on the policy menu, although it appeared later
(Aslund, 2007, Sokhey, 2010).
2.3 The Unified Social Tax
The Putin government’s first step was the reform of the Russian tax system, which was introduced
in June 2000 (one month after taking office). The broader tax reform shifted the tax system from
progressive to regressive taxation of individual income and corporate profits, as well as a signif-
icantly lowered tax burdens (Aslund, 2007). With respect to the payroll tax, the chief innovation
was introduction of a Unified Social Tax (UST), which would combine employers’ contributions to
the four social policy funds into one lump payment. Responsibility for collection of contributions
was to be removed from the funds and vested in the treasury, which would disburse revenue to the
funds. At the same time, the government proposed lowering payroll taxes from 39.9% to 36.4%
and introducing a regressive component that would tax wages above 280,000 rubles at a 10% rate
(Social Security Administration, 2006). Given that the average yearly wage in Russia was about
36,000 Rubles in 2000, only a small number of workers could take advantage of the regressive
component. Provisions were therefore made to allow firms to pay regressive rates based on the
average pay of employees, rather than calculating rates on a per-employee basis (Orlov-Karba,
2005).
Opposition by trade unions and the Communist party to altering payroll taxes was relatively
intense. Speaking to the federal Duma at the hearing to discuss the Unified Social Tax chapter of
the reforms, Mikhail Shmakov, the leader of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR)
– the successor to the Soviet era peak trade-union that claimed to represent all other unions in the
country – made two primary arguments against the reform. Philosophically, he argued that the
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new reforms essentially transformed contributions into taxes, bundling this revenue stream with
all others flowing through the federal treasury. The government could easily mix revenue streams
together and divert these funds from their intended purposes (Duma Transcript, 32 (480), 9 June
2000, p. 17). This argument is a classic example of misappropriation and is one that, as I discus
below, the unions leaned on heavily in the press (c.f. entry 1357, 1373, 1404, 1412, 1479, 1530,
1667, 1731, 1763). Among the Duma’s parties, the communists were the primary group opposed to
the ESN and used arguments that mirrored those of the trade unions (Duma Transcript, 32 (480),
9 June 2000, p. 17). Attempts to drop the Unified Social Tax from the overall tax reform and
amend it later failed, however, as the government was able to successfully argue that payroll tax
reform was too critical to be passed outside of the context of a broader tax reform. 3 Aside from
the Communist party, none of the other Duma factions seemed to seriously entertain splitting the
Unified Social Tax from the broader reform bill and nearly all the other deputies voted against the
Communist proposal to do so.
Another major attempt to alter the reform centered around the PFRF’s attempts to call into
question whether to include pensions. As numerous observers have noted, the PFRF played a
decisive role in Russian elections in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s by dint of its ability to set
pensions and pay them (or not) on time. The PFRF was widely regarded as an important pool
of resources during elections, particularly at the federal level. Consequently, as Cook (2007) has
argued, not only was the PFRF itself powerful enough to look to its own corporate interests, but
it had a strong incentive to defend its monopoly over pension contributions and distribution: re-
producing its power. With respect to the UST, this manifested in an argument floated by the PFRF
head – Mikhail Zurabov – that including pensions in the initial reform was risky, as it could dis-
rupt contribution collections and the distribution of benefits. Despite reported opposition from the
Ministry of Finance, the PFRF succeeded in convincing the government to delay the inclusion of
pension contributions into the UST until 2003 in its draft version of the bill (Segodnya, 7 June,
2000). The deputy Minister of Finance, Sergei Shatalin, was forced to present the final version of
the UST to the Duma and argue in favor of delaying inclusion of pensions in the UST. His lan-
guage mirrored Zurabov’s arguments about the desire to forestall disruptions in pension revenue
3C.f. remarks by Alexandr Zhukov of the pro-government United Russia party and head of the budget and finance
committee, Duma Transcript, 32 (480), 9 June 2000, pp. 38.
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and benefits (Duma Transcript, 32 (480), 9 June 2000,p. 20).
Outside observers, as well as the opposition in the Duma, recognized this move as an attempt
by the PFRF to retain its monopoly on pensions and access to important revenue collection powers,
however (Segodnya, 7 June, 2000; Cashu (2001)). As the leader of the (at the time) opposition
party Fatherland – All Russia (OVR), Yevgheny Primakov, noted in opposing an exception for
the PFRF, “The only factor that operates here is lobbying. Let’s call things as they really are”
(Yevgheny Primakov, Duma Transcript, 32 (480), 9 June 2000, p. 38). In the end, Primakov
proposed an amendment to roll back the government’s attempts to carve out an exception for
the Pension fund that received overwhelming support (even from the pro-Kremlin Unity party).
Additional amendments were mostly parametric changes to the mechanisms of the tax and the
UST chapter of the overall pension reform was passed overwhelmingly, with only the Communists
and their allies continuing to oppose it.
2.4 The Main Pension Reforms
Having secured the passage of the UST, the government turned to reforms of the pension system
in the late summer of 2000. Cashu (2001), drawing on accounts of government insiders, notes that
initial discussions about the reform were largely conducted privately within the government. Only
occasional public mention of the process emerged, mostly indicating the government was debating
Gref’s earlier proposals (c.f. Komersant 22 September, 2000; Vremya Novostei, 6 October, 2000).
Within the government, the main fault-line was between the MEDT and Ministry of Finance, on
the one hand, and the PFRF and the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development, on the other.
MEDT continued to push for the partial privatization of the pension system along the lines of
Dmitriev’s original suggestions from 1998, as well as to set the capitalized system outside of the
PFRF’s purview. The PFRF and the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development, for their part,
accepted the need for a capitalized system but resisted the inclusion of private pension funds. They
insisted that the PFRF alone should oversee and manage capitalized accounts. Additional points
of contention revolved around how the transition would be managed and to what extent current
contributions would be used to fund the PAYG component of the system versus accumulating in
the capitalized component (Cashu, 2001, Ulyanova, 2001).
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As a measure to help resolve the dispute, and ostensibly include other stakeholders in the
discussion, President Putin formed the National Council on Pension Reform (NCPR) to collect
comments and suggestions from unions, veterans’ and invalids’ groups, business associations, and
the various Duma factions (Cook, 2007, Karayasyov and Lublin, 2001). Unfortunately, the NCPR
was held behind closed doors and participants agreed not to release draft legislation until a final
reform was agreed upon (Rossiskaya Gazeta 29 March 2001, Chandler (2004)). Minutes were
never released at all and few of those involved broke the council’s resolution to avoid speaking
to the press at the time. Reports indicate that during the first meeting of the NCPR, the bulk of
the agenda revolved around the dispute within the government over the extent of PFRF control
and the length of transition, with the position of the PFRF receiving support from the bulk of
participants (Segodnya, 20 14 March 2001). Privatization did not really appear on the agenda at
this point, and Cashu (2001) – drawing on interviews of participants – argued that for the most part
the various government stakeholders coordinated on notionally defined accounts during the first
NCPR meeting.
The day after the first NCPR meeting, the government presented its first draft of the pension
reform to the Duma. While presented by Mikhail Dmitriev, now the deputy minister for the MEDT,
the draft, for the most part, largely followed the PFRF’s original proposal (Mikhail Dmitriev, Tran-
script, Duma Hearing on Pension Reform, 20 March 2001, pp. 13-25). Interestingly, at this stage
much of the debate focused on how the reforms would improve pension levels and whether they
could lead to progress in raising pensions past the official subsistence minimum. Communist party
deputies castigated the government for a proposal they claimed would alter the basis of pensions
but do nothing to solve the huge gap between average pensions and subsistence minimums (c.f.
remarks by Valery Saikin, Transcript, Duma Hearing on Pension Reform, 20 March 2001, pp. 3-
13). Others focused attention on matters more closely related to institutional quality. For example,
Valentina Savostianova, a deputy from the pro-Kremlin Russia’s Regions faction with extensive
experience in regional level pension administration, argued the PFRF was opaque in its spending
and that the UST had not fully solved revenue concerns (remarks by Valentina Savostianova, Tran-
script, Duma Hearing on Pension Reform, 20 March 2001, pp.27-28). Despite these arguments,
however, the government’s proposal passed the first reading, albeit with promises that some of the
Duma’s concerns would be addressed in the next draft.
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Push back on the PFRF sponsored program began in earnest at the second meeting of the
NCPR, in which a number of alternative proposals were floated by opposition parties and trade
unions. Many of the proposals were parametric, dealing with improving pension benefits for
existing pensioners. By contrast the leader of the Union of Right Forces’, Boris Nemtsov, re-
portedly focused explicitly on the control dimension. Drawing on a proposal developed by the
main employer’s association – the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entreprenurs (RSPP) – he
proposed increasing the capitalized component of pensions and allowing for private management
(www.strana.ru, 17 April 2001).
Unfortunately, the lack of transcripts make it impossible to know what the logic of the argu-
ment was. Tellingly, however, in laying out its own position publicly one month later, the RSPP
noted that:
All of these questions can be decided today. And they cannot and should not be de-
cided in accordance with the position of the Pension Fund. It is obvious that the Pen-
sion Fund is not interested in the competitive institutions which are the basis for an
effective comparison of state and private pension systems according to their adminis-
trative resources (in part related to their absolute size and in part to dynamic changes),
and according to the effective management of financial resources (RSPP 2001, quoted
in Sokhey (2010).
While not explicitly accusing the PFRF of mismanagement, the RSPP implicitly called into ques-
tion the effectiveness of a purely state organ to manage investments made on behalf of pensioners.
In keeping with fears among the business community (discussed below), the RSPP also made sure
to emphasize that the PFRF’s position would likely encourage large amounts of state debt – the
PFRF had announced it planned to invest mostly in government obligations – and could trigger a
crisis similar to what Russia experienced during the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Such arguments
centered on the effect of pension management on macro-economic volatility are precisely what one
would expect given institutionally induced macro-economic risk. Moreover, the RSPP emphasized
that the lack of competitive pressure on the PFRF would enable it to make investments according
to political – as opposed to market – calculations, further exacerbating the problem (RSPP 2001).
Presumably, Nemtsov drew on similar arguments during the NCPR session.
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Despite this opposition, reports after the fact indicated that the majority of the discussion in the
NCPR was dominated by government officials and the PFRF, who rejected feedback or ignored it
in subsequent sessions.4 Nearly all of the proposals brought up by outside groups were rejected and
absent from the final package of laws presented to Putin for submission to the Duma (c.f. Duma
Transcript, 112 (560), 13 July 2001; www.strana.ru, 17 April 2001; Izvestia, 18 April 2001; Chan-
dler (2004)). Consequently, the final draft presented to the Duma ended up largely mirroring the
original position of the PFRF. While a three pillar system with notional accounts would ostensibly
be introduced, the system would be fully managed by the PFRF, which would control both the
storage of funds and their disbursal. Crucially, however, controversial passages dictating specifics
about investment of notional accounts, the PFRF’s status, and professional schemes were omitted
to speed passage of the broad outlines (www.strana.ru, 9 July 2001). The four laws presented con-
tained indirect norms on investment and the PFRF that would enable the system to function as the
specifics were being debated (MP Oxana Dmitrieva, Duma Transcript, 112 (560), 13 July 2001, p.
41; Cashu (2001)).5
In presenting the bills to the Duma, Zurabov – the PFRF head – took care to emphasize that
the proposed system would solve numerous problems of concern to parties across the political
spectrum. In his remarks he was careful to note that eligibility for basic pensions would be ex-
tended to those with insufficient work experience to qualify under the existing system. He also
emphasized the strong linkages between contributions and benefits being introduced by notional
accounts. Coupled with the UST and the removal of wage restrictions on contributions, the new
system would discourage informality and tax evasion, leading to an increase in the PFRF’s rev-
enues that could be used to move current benefits closer to the subsistence minimum (Mikhail
Zurabov, Duma Transcript, 112 (560), 13 July 2001). As Chandler (2004) notes, by this point
few Duma deputies had major objections to the proposed broad-outlines of the pension legislation,
especially once controversial laws on the PFRF’s status and investment were removed. Zurabov
4In an interview with an expert attached to the Duma Committee on Social Policy, Cook (2007) was told, “Duma
deputies are in a minority on the Council; the tone of the discussion is set by the ministries and the Pension Fund”.
A member of an employers association invited to participate was even more critical, noting, “When we (employers)
would ask a question, the government representatives would promise that our concerns would be accounted for along
the process... Then during the subsequent meeting of the council the organizers would distribute the list of remarks
made during the previous meeting and their initiators. Usually, they would reject most suggestions citing their incom-
patibility with the concept of reform. It was the end of discussion.” (Quoted in Cashu (2001, 16)).
5These four were “On State Pension Provision”, “On Mandatory Pension Insurance”, and “On Labor Pensions”.
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also forestalled a large number of amendments by promising to include existing proposals into the
next draft of the law, so long as his version passed the first reading.
The only major attempts at altering the Government’s legislation at this stage came from Boris
Nemtsov, who packaged the suggestions made by the RSPP and himself at the NCPR into two
alternative bills. Nemtsov’s proposal was for the most part similar to the government’s bill but
pushed private management of pensions much more heavily. Whereas the government provided
for private pension funds in the third, voluntary pillar of the pension system, Nemtsov proposed
also providing individuals choices over who would manage their money – the state or private funds
– within the compulsory second pillar (Boris Nemtsov, Duma Transcript, 112 (560), 13 July 2001,
p. 10). Nemtsov’s proposal was defeated in subsequent voting, however, by a coalition of pro-
Kremlin parties, although it did manage to garner support from around 30% of the Duma (from
independent deputies, Nemtsov’s own Union of Rightist Forces, and the liberal Yabloko party).
In order to smooth over Nemtsov’s objections (and fulfill Zurabov’s promise to incorporate
amendments), the Duma created a special reconciliation commission to rewrite the Pension reform
bills before their presentation for a second reading. Although typically such commissions were
seen as a way for the Executive to push through its desired version of a bill, in this particular case
the government incorporated a large number of the Duma’s concerns, including new elements to
address problems with pension indexation, the life expectancy co-efficient, and the proportion of
contributions used to pay for the basic PAYG pension (Chandler, 2004, Huskey, 1999). Also in-
cluded in the new draft was a compromise between Nemtsov and Zurabov, in which the former
withdrew his alternative bills in exchange for inclusion of private pension funds as an alternative
to the PFRF in the second pillar. The PFRF was compensated by being allowed a monopoly on
pension contributions until 2004, ostensibly to allow time for the passage of enabling legislation,
which it was instructed to invest in government debts (www.strana.ru 8 October 2001). Accord-
ing to Cashu (2001)’s interviews, this particular part of the compromise was done at the explicit
instruction of Putin himself.
The government’s second draft drew on many of the compromises worked out in the reconcil-
iation commission. In particular, working pensioners were given the right to receive full pensions,
life expectancy co-efficients would gradually increase to reflect improving health, and better bene-
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fits for invalids over the age of 80 were provided. In addition, indexation rules for pensions, which
were previously indexed in an ad hoc fashion by legislative or executive decree, were clearly laid
out. Finally, and most importantly, Nemtsov’s proposal for a partially privatized second pillar was
adopted, ostensibly giving private pension funds the right (eventually) to manage part of individu-
als’ obligatory pension contributions (Duma Transcript, 132 (569), 28 November 2001, p. 15–17).
While legal mechanisms to formally allow private funds to receive contributions and invest them
were left out, the fact that they were conceptually included was a large victory for pro-business
forces, as it forestalled de jure monopoly by the state (via the PFRF).
Dissatisfied, elements of the opposition affiliated with labor attempted to make a number of
amendments to the bill. In particular, they sought to increase pension spending and to carve out
greater oversight powers for the Duma to use to monitor the PFRF. Again, concerns about ben-
efits provision and opacity dominated, just as one would expect where weak institutions enable
misappropriation. The government beat back both proposals, however. It refused to contemplate
more generous policy, claiming that there were too few resources to expand social policy, while at
the same time arguing that Duma oversight of the PFRF would be incompatible with the reform
concept (c.f. Mikhail Zurabov, Duma Transcript, 132 (569) 28 November 2001, p. 22). These
amendments failed to pass, although a number of amendments related to pension insurance con-
tributions were pushed through by the OVR, which by this point had begun actively working with
Putin’s Unity party to form a governing majority. The main package of pension laws was passed
by the Duma in this form a few days later and duly approved by the higher house of the Duma and
President Putin.
The laws passed by the end of 2001 were incomplete, however. None of them directly dealt
with how private companies would be allowed to invest accumulative accounts, how pension rev-
enues were to be managed, or how private funds would be regulated and audited. Thus, although
the RSPP and pro-business deputies had secured a role for the private sector in the pension system,
the role was nominal so long as enabling legislation was not passed. Indeed, the First Deputy
Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Mikhail Dmitriev, pointed out that the absence of
these laws left a ‘legal vacuum’ in the reforms (Duma Transcript, 21 December 2001, p. 49). As
I discuss in more depth below when reviewing the results of my content analysis of the Russian
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press during this period, business was particularly worried that the PFRF had incentives to simply
delay legislation as long as possible in order to retain control over pension funds. As one business
owner and member of the RSPP mentioned to me when discussing the delays in passing enabling
legislation, “Government bureaucrats go from one deadline to the next. After each set of legis-
lation they leave everything all over the floor until someone above tells them to pick it back up
again and fix it. Otherwise nothing gets done”.6 The prevailing sentiment was that absent outside
pressure, the government would move on to other priorities and the private pension funds would
never be allowed access to mandatory contributory funds. That the PFRF would benefit from the
government’s inattention made it even more suspicious.
Business did put some pressure on the government. In addition to vociferous complaints in
the press (discussed below), the RSPP, and particularly the private pension funds within its mem-
bership, also used allies in the Duma as a means of pressuring the government (Sokhey, 2010). In
particular, Nemtsov introduced a law on pension fund investments shortly before the government
brought the main three pension laws in the reform package up for a vote. The goal was to continue
to place pressure on the government not only to include the private sector in the mandatory second
pillar but to also insure that the government put into place the legal and regulatory mechanisms
necessary for the private pension funds to actually participate. The government was able to vote
down the bill under its policy of not allowing opposition parties to dictate the course of pension
reform, however (see Duma Transcript, 21 December 2001, Chandler (2004)).
Nonetheless, Nemtsov, along with other pro-business forces in the Duma, put enough pressure
on the government that it was forced to commit itself to explicitly incorporating private funds into
its future draft reforms on pension investment in order to successfully defeat the proposal. Al-
though it had previously felt that the indirect mentions of private funds in the existing block of
legislation passed in late November was sufficient, it committed to passing an additional law to di-
rectly deal with the non-government pension funds and investment norms (MP Alexandr Shokhin,
Duma Transcript, 21 December 2001, p. 59). These laws governing how and when pension funds
could be invested (by both private actors and the PFRF) were finally passed in summer of 2002
with relatively little additional fanfare (Duma Trancript, 19 June 2002). The government then fol-
6Authors interview BA20130716.
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lowed up by releasing official criteria (as part of its regulatory responsibility under the earlier 2001
laws) for non-government pension funds to participate in the second pillar and the licensing of
the management companies that would handle their day-to-day investments. Private pension funds
were finally able to begin accepting citizen applications in 2004.
Drawing together this discussion, several threads seem to comport with the expectations of my
institutional argument. Consistent with the free-riding pathology, discussions in the legislature and
among policy makers about the UST focused rather explicitly on the need to combat free-riding and
tax evasion. The legislative debates discussed above also provide some evidence in favor of both
the misappropriation and macro-economic risk perspectives. The opposition, in particular, was
extremely worried about the opacity of government organs and the difficulties faced in insuring
that they were collecting revenue fairly, spending funds properly, and investing in the best interests
of pensioners. These concerns manifested themselves in the fight to include a private component
in pension reforms. The only pathology that did not arise within the legislative debates was weak
contract enforcement.
This section provides some evidence that institutional quality concerns were on the mind of
both the government and opposition during pension reform debates. To what extent were these
elite concerns shared by business interests and the public at large, however? In the next section I
turn to discussions of the 2001 Pension Reform and its various components in the popular press to
attempt to answer this question.
3 Content Analysis of the 2001 Pension Reform Debate
To examine pension debates more broadly, I make use of an analytical corpus consisting of printed
articles about the UST, Russia’s 2001 pension reforms, and subsequent enabling legislation gath-
ered from Integrum, an online archive of Russian print, television, and Internet media. I restricted
my analysis to printed media from 352 newspapers, journals, and magazines identified by Inte-
grum as “federal” media from the period 2000-2003. Media in this category is defined in having
readership across multiple regions. I focus on federal media for two reasons. First, because re-
sponsibility for pensions is vested in the federal government, reforms have national significance.
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The national press is more likely to cover reform closely and to reflect cross-sectoral and cross-
regional cleavages in public opinion. Second, exploratory analysis suggested that regional media
almost exclusively focused on educating readers about the technical aspects of the reform. As the
goal of the content analysis is to identify the rationale behind support (or opposition) to the welfare
state, such technical articles were irrelevant.
My corpus includes articles on the UST because, as noted above, changes to the revenue side
of pensions was integral to the reform package. Similarly, the enabling legislation and regulation
passed after the main pension reform bills (2002 to 2003) were also integral to reform. As I
discuss in more depth below, private pension funds were genuinely uncertain as to whether they
would be able to participate in the second pillar – despite the nominal right to do so granted by
the main pension laws – up until these pieces of legislation allowed them to actually exercise this
right. While the 2001 reform primarily resolved debates about the redistribution dimension of
social policy by establishing a three pillar system, it did not fully resolve questions of control.
Lack of enabling legislation – or overly restrictive legislation – could have easily turned private
participation in the second pillar into a moot point (Orlov-Karba, 2005, Remington, 2011, Sokhey,
2010). As I show below, actors on both sides were cognizant of this and debates continued right
up until private funds began accepting contributions in January of 2004. As a consequence, these
debates must be included in any analysis of debates on the reform.
In order to identify relevant articles for inclusion in my corpus, I created a set of search terms
designed to exclude purely explanatory articles and instead return those with real arguments about
reform. My query focused on articles with “Pension” and “Reform” within two sentences of each
other. To refine the search and partially exclude explanatory texts, I included a list of titles likely to
be held by members of government, business leaders, business associations, and unions who were
likely to be quoted in articles about the reform (President, Director, Minister, Analyst, Advisor,
etc.). Searches for the Unified Social Tax used a similar procedure by searching for each of those
three words and various abbreviations for the tax, along with the list of individual titles used in the
pension reform search. Altogether both searches generated a total of 8,794 articles.7 Two coders
then systematically read through the search results, eliminating all articles that did not express an
7Of these, 6,107 articles related to the main pension reform and 2687 to the UST.
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opinion about the reform.8
As previously noted, the goal of this chapter is to illustrate how institutions play into debates
about welfare state reform. In order to maximize the analytical leverage provided by my corpus,
I take the unit of analysis to be individuals who are quoted or paraphrased in a given article. In
addition, pieces that directly express an opinion by the author (i.e. editorials) also received their
own entry. Individuals could have multiple entries, if they were quoted in numerous articles, while
each article could generate numerous entries if multiple individuals and/or the author expressed
opinions.9 As above, comments within articles that did not directly express opinions were elim-
inated and articles that did not express a direct opinion (despite quoting others who did) did not
receive an entry. This step generated a database of 1791 unique citations.10 The citations quoted
in the analysis below make use of unique ID numbers in the database, which is available online.11
Citations were then further coded according to the identity of the individual expressing opin-
ions. For individuals associated with businesses, individuals were coded by industry. State officials
were coded by branch of government. Business associations, think tanks, unions, and other non-
governmental organizations were given their own code. For cases where business organizations,
unions, or think tanks were clearly associated with a particular industry, these received a secondary
code corresponding to their sector. The last category was composed of editorials. Where an edito-
rial was printed in a newspaper with a clear industrial affiliation (for example in a trade journal),
a secondary code corresponding to this sector was also assigned.12 Figure 3.1 provides a broad
overview of the sectoral composition of the data. Business and state representatives, along with
pure editorials, made up about equal percentages of the sample (24% each for business and ed-
itorials and 27% for state officials). The state pension fund and regional extra-budgetary funds
8Articles of this type tended to fall into one of four categories: technical explanations of either of the reforms,
timetables of passage of particular aspects of the reform, general mention that particular parts of the reform were
being discussed by the government, or general discussions of the government’s legislative agenda. Regardless of
category, if no opinion on, or rationale for, the Pension Reform or UST was mentioned, the article was discarded.
Each coder worked on approximately half of the dataset, with an overlap of approximately 200 articles for quality
control purposes. Inter-coder reliability (i.e agreement in the elimination or retention of any particular article) was
slightly higher than 95%.
9Again, inter-coder reliability in identifying relevant citations was assessed for a subsample of 200 articles drawn
from those with relevant opinions. Inter-coder reliability was greater than 95%.
10Specifically there were 1345 citations about the pension reform and 446 about the Unified Social Tax.
11The database is published on israelmarques.com and is also available upon request.
12For trade magazine and other editorials, data on the industry represented was obtained from publication websites
and fact sheets on the history of each publication provided by Integrum.
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made up 8% of the sample and the remaining 16% were NGO’s of various types (mostly business
associations and unions).
Figure 3.1: Types of Citations on the 2001 Pension Reform
Figure 3.2: Composition of Business Citations on the 2001 Pension Reform by Sector
Looking at the sectoral composition of businesses and business associations that provided
opinions (figure 3.2), the modal sector was by far finance and banking, which made up 61.5%
of comments. The energy and extraction, medical services, and consulting sectors were the next
three most outspoken categories with 10.5%, 6.36%, and 5.05% of comments respectively. While
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lopsided, this composition is not wholly unexpected. In an informal survey of over 200 business
associations in the Moscow area conducted in 2011 to prepare for this dissertation, only about 5%
reported that they actively worked on social policy issues. Of those that did, the majority were
large multi-sector associations, which could not be assigned a sectoral code. This is consistent
with evidence from my interviews with various large, multi-sectoral business associations, who
report that they do most of the heavy lifting when it comes to dealing with the executive and
welfare state lobbying (Interviews BA-20131306, BA-20130108, BA-20131607). Generally, the
only single sector associations with a large interest in social policy tend to be the metallurgical
associations, extractive industries, and those representing the financial sectors. Even these groups
work through the large multi-sector associations were possible, though, and oftentimes set official
policy for these organizations in the absence of sustained interest from other members (Interviews
BA-20130509, BA BA-20130108, Sokhey (2010)).
To provide broad intuition about the corpus and supplement the content analysis below, I coded
two additional variables for each entry in the database. First, in order to assess trends in support
or opposition to the reform, two coders assigned each article a sentiment score based on whether
it was for or against the reforms. The sentiment score attempts to relate each entry to the baseline
government proposals for each law.13 Where entries discussed alternatives, I assumed that support
for these alternatives was implicit opposition to the baseline reform, while opposition to alternative
was implicit support of baseline reform.14 For the period from 2002-2003, after the main Pension
laws had been passed, sentiment was assigned based on implementation of the 3-pillar system or
progress in passing enabling legislation (as appropriate). Sentiment was measured on a 5-point
scale in terms of the whether the person being cited was negative (1), mostly negative (2), neutral
(3), positive (4), or mostly positive (5).15 Having assigned sentiment scores to the citations, I then
proceeded to code them according to the issues that actors mentioned in the citation. This coding
followed no a priori scheme, instead attempting to capture the rationale (or rationales) expressed
in each citation. This final categorization ended up dividing citations into eight basic clusters of
13I.e. the 3-pillar pension reform and a UST in which all contributions would be gathered by the Treasury
14For example, several firms went out of their way to strongly decry a government proposal in early 2001 to cut the
private sector out of the accumulative portion of pensions. In this and similar cases, sentiment is rated as positive and
in favor of the 3-pillar system.




3.1 The Broad Outlines of the Discussion
Figure 3.3 draws on the welfare state dimensions presented in Ch. 1 to provide a rough visualiza-
tion of the issues that were important during discussion about the main pension reform and the
UST.17 Looking at the reforms overall (both UST and the main pension reform), the most talked
about dimension of social policy was the control dimension, mentioned in 48.61% of citations. Dis-
cussions about risk (encompassing both direct discussion of risk types and the question of PAYG
versus contributory pensions) was the next largest category at 37.79% of the sample. Finally,
strictly distributive questions (i.e. the link between contributions and benefits) were discussed less
often, constituting 16.76% of the sample. Turning to some of the important sub-components of
the welfare state, several were prominent. The financing of the social policy system and the risks
and benefits of various proposals to overall revenues was an extremely popular topic, mentioned
in 31.05% of cases.18 Direct discussions of the costs and benefits of various reform proposals
were also extremely popular issues in the press, appearing in about 11% and 27% of the sample
respectively.
As one would expect, the relative degree to which issues were mentioned varied somewhat
between the UST and the main pension reforms. While who controlled social policy was a critical
point in both cases, the UST corpus was more likely to mention the costs and benefits associated
16The full categorization is as follows. State competence, which indicates that actors were concerned about the
ability of the state to distribute social policy effectively, properly collect taxes, and provide citizens and firms the
information needed to ensure their participation in the pension system. Trust in the state, which indicates concerns
about corruption, theft, or misappropriation of social policy funds by state agencies. Private sector competence,
which indicates concerns with the private sectors technical ability to manage risk, find investment vehicles, and meet
inflation adjusted profit targets. Trust in the private sector, which indicates concerns about corruption, theft, and
misappropriation of funds by private sector actors. Additional indicators were used to denote comments relating to
the quality of life of current or future pensioners, and the effects of pension reform on the macro-economy. A final
category indicated comments about the legal framework of the reforms, which primarily captured comments about the
legal basis allowing various pieces of the reform to operate.
17To generate it, I use an informal coding rule, which assigned database entries into non-mutually exclusive cate-
gories based on the following dimensions: control, redistribution (cost-benefit linkage), and risk. I also code citations
into sub-types of some of these dimensions, including costs, benefits, PAYG versus capitalization, and whether financ-
ing of social policy were mentioned.
18Note that this category encompasses both questions of distribution and PAYG versus contributory systems, which
is why the number is so high.
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Figure 3.3: Welfare State Dimensions and Discourse Around the 2001 Pension Reforms
with the welfare state. This is unsurprising given the arguments being floated by the labor unions
(mentioned above and discussed again below) that the UST would gut funding for certain aspects of
the welfare state. With respect to the main pension reform, the risk dimension was discussed much
more, since the main pension reforms had a lot of implications for the degree to which individuals
would be compensated for the relatively low life-expectancy in Russia. Finally, average sentiment
about the reform was not particularly high. The average sentiment score using my simple coding
scheme was approximately 2.51, indicating that on the whole those who discussed the Russian
Pension reforms in the media were mostly negative to neutral about the reforms. Although the
average is slightly higher for the period prior to the passage of the main reform package at the end
of 2001, it is not significantly so.
Although all actors tended to focus on similar aspects of the reform, there was a great deal of
heterogeneity between the ways in which business related to reform and the ways in which non-
business civil society groups (think tanks, labor unions, pensioner groups, etc.) and the press itself
did so. One aspect of this heterogeneity stems from general sentiment towards the reform in the
corpus. Although both business and non-business actors were negative towards both the UST and
main pension reforms, business sentiment was on average much closer to neutral (mean sentiment
score = 2.41) than non-business actors (mean sentiment score = 2.04).
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Differences between business and non-business actors also manifested in the language and
logic actors use to describe reform. Relying on a simple coding scheme to group articles by ma-
jor arguments presented in them suggests that business, on the one hand, tended to focus on the
trustworthiness of state actors (38.63%), the macro-economic implications of reform (32.78%),
and the state’s technical ability to enforce reforms (33.65%). Private firms also fixated a great deal
on the trustworthiness of other private firms (29.61%). The remarks from non-business groups,
on the other hand, tended to focus more on the trustworthiness of the state (43.27%), the state’s
technical ability to enforce the reforms (38.89%), and how the reform would effect current benefi-
ciaries (35.52%). In the next two sections, I elaborate on these summary statistics using concrete
examples from the corpus in order to provide intuition about how the arguments were made and
their implications for my argument about how institutional quality shapes preferences.
3.2 Business and the Discourse of Reform
As noted in the previous section, several major arguments dominated press statements made by
business and its representatives. From an institutional perspective, several stand out. First, firms
were very concerned about the trustworthiness of the state to actually carry out reforms, even those
that nominally became law. In businesses eyes, de jure reform and the de facto functioning of the
pension system need not be the same. The fear was that despite the creation of a private pillar
the state would effectively shut private funds out of the market and maintain the PFRF’s control
over funds. This would allow the government greater leeway in channeling pension investments to
favored causes, as it retained authority to direct the PFRF to prioritize certain classes of investment
instruments. Such concerns are potentially consistent with the misappropriation pathology, where
actors fear that de jure reforms will not match de facto operation of pension markets. As one Duma
deputy that served on the NCPR noted to the press “Naturally there are many that would like to get
their hands on this [pension] money” (Izvestia, “Investitsii v Zakone”, 19 October 2001).
The PFRF, for its part, did little to tamp down on firms’ fears. Zurabov famously, and quite
publicly, put other stakeholders on notice by proclaiming to the press that, “Pension money – it
is my business, and I am not going to allow anyone in my kindergarden ” (www.strana.ru, 14
November 2001 quoted in Cashu (2001, 11)). Such statements made clear the PFRF’s institutional
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interest in retaining its monopoly on funds, regardless of the letter of reform. Thus, firms were
interested in private pension investment funds, but were afraid that the PFRF would be able to use
its power and connections to seriously constrain the private markets and subvert reform efforts.
Throughout the reform process, these fear of the PFRF manifested in warnings about its mo-
nopolist instincts and the dangers of cutting out the private sector. Speaking during the run-up to
the main pension reform in 2001, an anonymous director of a major insurance company pessimisti-
cally noted that, “The PFRF just wants to prove that the NPFs (Non-government Pension Funds)
are not able to provide the same guarantees as the state, therefore this project will be revealing.
And, most likely, to end in failure” (entry 590). Andrei Stolyarov, director of the NPF Gazfund,
went a step further, not only arguing that the PFRF wanted to sabotage the private component of
the reform, but that:
The clear desire of the PFRF is to do without market structures. Mr. Zurabov (Mikhael
Zurabov, head of the PFRF) wants to gain control over the entire pension system.
This enables him to receive pensioners’ money, account for it, and to return it... If
this happens the PFRF will finance and control itself simultaneously, and the pension
market will remain a monopoly. (entry 544)
In other words, firms and business associations feared not only that the PFRF might acquire a
monopoly due to its inherent competitive advantages vis-a-vis private firms, but that it would go
so far as to actively preempt competition by securing even more favorable legislation.
Discussions of the monopoly potential of the PFRF were typically accompanied by veiled
accusations of misappropriation and mismanagement on the part of the PFRF and deep concerns
over the ability of the populace to monitor it. The chairman of the political committee of the
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), for example, noted that, “[The Deputy Minister
of Finance] Dimitriev says that there is a need to ensure full transparency in the pension system
and, in particular, the NPF market. But how can we discuss transparency when the PFRF itself -
is an extremely shadowy structure?” (Sergei Kalishnikov, entry 565). Implicit in this discussion
was the sense that in the absence of a viable alternative, citizens would be helpless to prevent the
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PFRF from effectively expropriating citizens by lying about their accounts or benefits.19 Nor was
this concern purely academic. One business association leader I interviewed gave me a concrete
example of the difficulty of auditing the PFRF. He told me that his association sued for contribution
records in 2005, which turned out to contain evidence of systematic mis-crediting of benefits (BA-
20130723). In contrast to most organizations, he was able to win the right to audit because the
association represented the self-employed and small business owners, meaning that it could claim
dual status as a labor union and business association. Pure labor unions and business associations
that sued at the same time were denied auditing rights due to lack of standing.
Others, particularly from the banking sector, expressed similar concerns, arguing that the gov-
ernment’s original proposals were designed in ways that facilitated a PFRF monopoly and created
what one NPF executive termed, “a farce played out in order to create the appearance of a liberal
pension system. In fact, it is even more monopolized” (Svetlana, Shamanova, General Director
NPF “Family”, entry 684). The fear on the part of many in the business world was that such a
virtual monopoly would effectively crowd out the private sector, especially medium-sized NPFs
without backing from major industrial groups. Others went further, arguing that allowing the gov-
ernment to control investment would lead it to engage in unwise overspending and the types of
financial rent seeking using public paper that led to a particularly bad experience during the 1998
financial crisis.20 I discuss this in more depth below.
Even after the passage of the main pension reforms, firms remained skeptical of the state’s
intentions. Accusations of misappropriation, monopolistic manipulation, and bad faith persisted
during the long process of passing enabling legislation and regulation for the reform. Firms pointed
to the slow roll out of enabling legislation for private participation in the second pillar and the
ways it directly benefited the PFRF and state-owned banks at the expense of private sector pension
funds. When the 2001 Pension Reform was passed, the private sector option was made opt-in. The
state-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB), as the management company for the PFRF, was set as the
default investment option and put in charge of funds while regulations to govern the private funds
were passed.21
19c.f. especially entry 902, 969, 1229, 1333.
20For a discussion of the history of the crisis, c.f. Shleifer and Treisman (2000). For examples of business represen-
tative citing these concerns, c.f. entries 619, 699, 1196.
21c.f. entry 751 and Chandler (2004), Orlov-Karba (2005), Sokhey (2010).
157
Business greatly feared that VEB’s position as the default option created incentives for the
state to delay reform implementation in order to keep control of funds within state-run entities.
Indeed, shortly after passage of the reform law, the general director of the NPF “Inteross-virtue”
accused that: “The document (the pension law) was punctuated with references to non-existent
laws. This means that access by non-governmental institutions to the reform has been blocked”
(Sergei Kabalkin, entry 622). As another NPF executive noted, delay in passing enabling legisla-
tion only made it more likely that NPFs would be permanently locked out of the market, arguing
that, “It makes no sense to wait for something. After three years the PFRF will turn into an un-
shakable, unnatural monopoly and there will be no space for the private sector” (Andrei Stolyarov,
vice-president Gazfund, entry 613). Delay was thus seen as a way of providing the PFRF and
VEB, as state institutions, an unfair leg-up in the competition for individual accounts. This in turn
would effectively keep money in governments hands.
Even after enabling legislation for the private pillar began to emerge, however, firms remained
vulnerable to hold up by government actors looking to profit. In an argument that hearkens back
to Hellman (1998)’s classic theory of weak institutions, hold-up, and reform, the chairman of the
NAPF’s political committee, Sergei Kalashnikov, noted in 2002 that:
A universal pension system that would be completely satisfy the demands of the popu-
lace and the interests of the government simply does not exist in this world. Therefore
the loud statements from those who take advantage of the fruits of the current pen-
sion reforms, that everyone is living comfortably and happily, to put it bluntly do not
correspond to reality. From the point of view of international experience, that which
took place in Russia, to put it bluntly, has never been tried... Therefore to begin reform
without a complete packet of interrelated pension laws is pure opportunism (entry
885).
Nor did the situation improve, as late as 2003 fundamental details of the reform were still missing,
such as the process by which citizens were to transfer funds from the PFRF to the NPF’s.22 This
22c.f. entry 276, 1323, 1324, Orlov-Karba (2005). Even the process of selecting management companies eligible
to work with funds from the funded pillar was delayed. When the government finally implemented it, firms had only
45 days to insure they met eligibility criteria (including extensive personnel requirements) and to apply, c.f. entry 271,
276, 847.
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forced the state to significantly push back its timetable for the official start of the private portion
of the capitalized system by several months (entry 347, 361). Taken together, some even went so
far as to argue that none of the basic prerequisites of the private pension system had been properly
implemented as late as 2003, two years after the private pillar was nominally enshrined into law.23
Perhaps the most discussed hold up cost for firms did not even involve legislation, but reg-
ulatory permission for private firms to advertise their services. As a consequence of widespread
consumer losses due to pyramid schemes in the early 1990’s, investment firms’ ability to advertise
was extremely restricted. Without permission from the PFRF, funds could not provide basic in-
formation on current or future profitability, thus making it difficult to convince individuals of their
value.24 Given that PFRF’s conflict of interest – as the default option to manage investments it prof-
ited from citizens lack of information about the reform and private NPF’s – the result was obvious.
Not only were the NPFs unable to advertise their rates of return, but the PFRF took every oppor-
tunity to delay providing necessary information, even going so far as to delay providing notices
informing the populace of their capitalized account balances.25 As late as 2007, surveys showed
that while 60% of citizens had heard of the reform, 56% did not understand it at all. More tellingly,
nearly 74% were unaware of which government officials could help them answer questions about
the reform and 77% reported having not received any official information at all.26
The consequences of this particular hold-up for NPF’s was rather stark. Many individual
firms were unable to provide their employees with sufficient information, thus suggesting that they
simply leave their funds in the PFRF’s care.27 The situation was so dire that by 2005, only 5%
of eligible workers had transfered their funds to the NPF system. Much of the blame for this can
be laid at feet of the PFRF, which was unwillingness to advertise even basic aspects of reform.
23The vice-president of one of the largest NPF’s, Gazfund, argued that cumulatively, “The part of pension reform,
which is connected to the introduction of the funded pillar, today has not occurred and the prerequisites for its imple-
mentation do not exist” (Andrei Stolyarov, entry1065).
24c.f. entry 1098, 1235, and Elena Myazina, “Kak Uvelichili Pensii: Chasit Upravlaushie Opredili VEB.” Vedemosti,
2 December, 2005. For a good English language discussion of this problem, c.f. Sokhey 2010.
25Polina Kruchkova, program director for the International Confederation of Public Consumers, noted “the more
organizations, no matter which ones – government or private – that advertise the pension reform the better. Especially
since the government, represented by the PFRF, so far has poorly explained reform, even though it was given funds
and gave tenders to many companies to provide information on it” (Entry 795). On the account balances, c.f. entry
930.
26Survey conducted by VTsIOM. Results and survey instruments available at: http :
//www.rospensia.ru/modules/php?name = pensia news&year = 2006&month = 10.
27For good examples of this dynamic at play and the logic behind it, c.f. entry 936, 940.
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The vice president of one of Russia’s largest investment companies, summarized the business
community’s sentiment about this, arguing that, “ In addition to purely technical questions relating
to pension notices there are also economic and political ones, namely the interests of the Pension
Fund. It is highly likely that the funds will remain where they are now, in the PFRF’s account with
Vnesheconombank” (Evgenii Gavrilyenkov, Troika Dialog, entry 346).
One investment company executive went so far as to accuse the state of deliberately deceiving
the public by failing to advertise the basics of pension policy.28 Igor Iurgens, Vice President of the
RSPP, offered a more sober, but no less direct assessment:
We are shocked at how the government has carried out pension reform. The transfer
of funds from the capitalized pension system to private management companies and
pension funds is under threat – the slowness of bureaucrats may lead to Russian citi-
zens not being able to choose management companies for the investment funds in their
capitalized accounts (entry 1061)
In all, the incident provoked a great deal of rage on the part of the financial sector, in particular, due
to the connection it saw between the government’s incentives to hold onto pension funds and the
massive hold-up costs the government could impose on firms by avoiding its advertising duties.29
Although ultimately businesses and the press figured out workarounds for advertising restctions
and picked up some of the slack, as evidenced by the large number of technical articles in my
corpus, knowledge of the reform was not widespread enough to insure buyin from the populace.
Recall that the misappropriation pathology suggests that individuals and firms worry about
dead-weight costs of social policy associated with government using social policy funds for un-
intended purposes. Hold up costs associated with the creation of the private pillar are one such
cost, since the government can keep money within state-owned entities for investment in govern-
ment priorities. In some cases, however, firms were even more direct about their belief that the
government wanted pension funds for nefarious purposes. Speaking specifically about the raft of
government agencies engaged in overseeing and developing regulation for the pension reform, the
28Maria Churaeva, Chairman of the Board of Directors for Pioglobal Asset Management, entry XXX.
29For more discussions related to this topic, c.f. entries 268, 314, 346, 349, 758, 795, 796, 810, 857, 939, 923, 942,
943, 948, 949, 982, 995, 1060, 1141, 1147, 1223, 1234, 1287, 1298, 1320, 1332.
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RSPP alluded to the possibility of corruption and misappropriation for private purposes, arguing,
“For 20 companies (authorized to work with the capitalized pillars) there are four [government]
offices and thousands of people. From where does this devilish desire to work come from? Per-
haps, from the fact that someone here sees large financial flows?” (Igor Yiorgenc, Vice President
and Executive Secretary RSPP, entry 354). In assessing the opinion of the financial sector on the
reforms as a whole, Anatoli Grigorenko, president of the investment company Allor-Invest, went
further:
Over the course of many years, funds urged the government to develop the securities
market (with regulations) in preparation for pension reform. But this was not done.
Therefore many private investment companies believe that the reforms were designed
in such a way that the winners were state structures. And above all- the Pension Fund
(of the Russian Federation (entry 916).
For businesses, the failures of the pension reform were partially the consequence of poor institu-
tions, which allowed the PFRF and its bureaucratic allies to hold up pension reform for their own
pecuniary benefit. Implicit in the argument was the notion that a stronger, more independent pri-
vate component to the pension system would prevent the corruption and misappropriation implicit
in such arrangements and significantly improved the health and efficacy of the pension system.30
Misappropriation is not the only pathology that manifested itself in the arguments of busi-
ness. Another narrative constructed by business that stood out for its institutionalist reasoning
involved arguments about the effect of the reforms on the macro-economy. The fear that funds
from pension investments held by government would be used to fuel irresponsible spending, in-
duce massive macro-economic volatility, and ultimately crash the economy was also quite acute
amongst the business community. These fears are consistent with fear of institutionally induced
macro-economic risk, at least in part. In chapter 1 I emphasized the fact that poor institutions in-
crease macro-economic volatility, which then shapes perspectives on risk and increases desire for
social policy. As I show below, however, in Russia fears of macro-economic volatility where not
directly linked to risk. Rather the fear was that social policy funds themselves would be used in
30For a perspective from the popular press that also exemplifies the argument, see also entry 900.
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ways that increased volatility and risk. Thus, in Russian pension debates, fears of macro-economic
risk were indelibly tied to fears of government misappropriation.
Initially, there were few fears of the effect of reform on the macro-economy and firms were
cautiously optimistic about the effect of reform on the economy. For many, the reform represented
enormous fiscal opportunities: both for their firms and the economy as a whole. Russia’s largest
business association, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), estimated that
within 6 years of adopting the reforms, they would generate financial resources of up to $25 billion
dollars, nearly half of the Russian stock market’s estimated capitalization at that time (Sokhey,
2010). As a member of the management committee of the RSPP, Oleg Evreemov, bluntly noted,
“This (the Pension Reform) is money that could work out quite well. It is a real source of invest-
ment in the economy. And each entrepreneur hopes, that he will be able to receive credit from such
funds.”31 Put another way, all firms stood to benefit from pension reform in ways that had little to
do with the effects of social policy on labor markets. For banks and financial firms, the move to
such a system would enable them to generate revenue from the management of heretofore unheard
of sums of money. For non-financial firms, as Evreemov’s statement above indicates, private man-
agement meant a bonanza of new capital flooding the market as private funds sought high returns
on investment. Even for those firms who would not benefit from a private pillar, however, the
tax savings (both from lower rates and simplification of procedures) provided indirect benefits.32
Implicit in the discussion is that such efforts would smooth out economic volatility and put Russia
on a high growth trajectory.
Firms were more circumspect in the press about these expectations, however. Istead they
emphasized the positive effects of a capitalized system under private control for Russia’s general
economic development and for the populace at large. The RSPP led this effort, writing in its
primary reform proposal that:
Putting these resources (pension contributions) in the financial market would of course
improve the conditions of the entire economy... adopting the model of pension reform
proposed by the Pension Fund would not only hurt the quality of pension provision for
31Lisa Golikova, “Now There are Almost No normal NPF’s”, Izvestia, entry 612
32C.f. entries 1368, 1384, 1428, 1437, 1641, 1669, 1734, and 1741.
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current and future pensioners, it would also hurt the growth of savings in the system...
and have negative consequences for the national economy.33
From an institutional perspective, two things stand out from the RSPP’s argument. First, implicit is
that investments in equities markets controlled by private actors were considered safe enough from
bureaucratic meddling and opportunism to potentially generate strong returns and lift the economy.
Once investments were made, they would be sacrosanct. Second, and more crucially, however,
such gains would only be possible under the RSPP’s proposed three pillar system. Government
control would result in less stability and lower growth, harming the economy greatly. By taking
pains to mention the negative impact that consolidating the PFRF’s monopoly on pensions would
have on existing and future beneficiaries, as well as the economy itself, the RSPP essentially argued
that only private control could result in investment that benefited the economy.
Nor was the RSPP alone in this argument. Many business representatives, particularly amongst
asset management companies, picked up on it. Fleshing out the macro-economic argument for
pension reform, they argued that the reform would strengthen the development of Russia’s equities
market directly, through the application of contributions, and indirectly, by increasing the financial
literacy of the population. The logic is quite simple, as one asset manager pointed out:
The [pension] reform will raise the investment culture of Russians. Every working cit-
izen will be forced to face the question of investing their funds. This will push people
towards the [asset] management companies and become a factor in the development
of different forms of investment.34
This development would, in turn, go hand in hand with a torrent of new capital flowing from those
newly interested in, and informed about, the pension system. As the President of the management
company “Troyka-Dialog”, Ruben Vardanian, explains:
The problem is that the citizenry is not prepared to invest their money over the long
term. In the West, the main sources of ‘long’ money are pension funds, which accumu-
33RSPP 2001, quoted in Sokhey (2010).
34Roman Shemendiok, AMC “Management-Center”, entry 422.
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late the investments of their citizens. In our case, it is necessary to carry out pension
reforms. Only then can there be long term investments.35
Again, implicit in this argument was the notion that Russian markets would be unable to develop
into the mature form common in the West without the private sector. The state simply would not
have the discipline to use money effectively. Others went further, arguing that a significant in-
crease in internal investment would serve as a signal to foreign investors, who would view internal
investment by the Russian population as a mark of a positive investment climate (c.f. entry 959).
Although mostly confined to widely read business-oriented publications (Russia’s equivalent of the
Wall Street Journal), such as Kommersant or Izvestia, such arguments nonetheless were repeated
in a wide range of more general interest (if less widely read) publications.36.
Non-financial firms also supported arguments about the development potential of the pension
reform. Although they were a bit more cautious in their formulations, such firms also implicitly
acknowledged that only private control could guaruntee the government would not misuse funds
and that invested pension funds would ultimately benefit pensioners. Nikolai Tsvetkov, President
of the natural resource firm “NIKoil”, for example argued that, “Within Russia there also appears
‘long money’. Liberal reforms, among them reforms of the pension system, will increase the future
growth of long-term financial instruments” (entry 881). Likewise, an editorial by the Russian
metallurgy sector’s leading business association appearing in a prominent trade journal, Eurasian
Metals, also focused on the investment potential inherent in pension reforms:
And yet another question that demands address - the investment of funds, accumulated
within occupational pension schemes. In the opinion of the members of AMROSS
(Russia’s largest metallurgical business association), this money, or at least a substan-
tial portion of it, should be invested in the modernization of the firms where the insured
workers work. Meanwhile, the government’s version of the law gives unconditional
preference to the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation before non-government pen-
sion funds, which flies in the face of this principle.37
35entry 986
36For common examples of this type of argument, c.f. entry 52, 277, 280, 413, 414, 419, 424, 426, 427, 428, 719,
742, 743, 753, 757, 851, 881, 959, 961, 973, 980, 1149, 1285, 1291
37entry 852
164
As in the case of the arguments made by the RSPP discussed earlier, here AMROSS is quick to
point out that the ability to invest in the modernization of the Russian economy is only possible
under a capitalized system with a significant private component. Government control would not
provide the same benefits.
Most comments from RSPP, AMROSS, and other large associations were somewhat ambigu-
ous in their rationale as to why private control would be more beneficial than state control, however.
This makes it hard to read these statements as supporting theory based on any particular pathology
of poor institutions, much less the macro-economic risk perspective. By contrast, a sizable minor-
ity of business comments had a more bluntly institutional logic for private control: the incentives
of the state were not well aligned with economic development and careful investment. The most
popular expressions of this fear was that the government would restrict its management company
to investments in government obligations, which it viewed as nearly risk free investments (Cashu,
2001, Chandler, 2004). Ostensibly, such restrictions could potentially generate safe, stable returns
for investors.
For business, however, such restrictions were potentially frightening for three reasons. First,
such moves would divert pension capital from being used to develop the Russian market. Second,
the firms feared the government would become addicted to debt as a means of meeting other eco-
nomic priorities. Firms well remembered that government debt was a key instrument used to raise
resources for one-off distributions to key constituencies in Yeltsin’s re-election campaign in 1996
(Shleifer and Treisman, 2000, Treisman, 1999). Many blamed this for Russia’s overexposure and
subsequent default during the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. While the government curtailed such
practices after 1998, a partner at one of the major management companies, Renaissance Capital,
succinctly expressed the fear that there was a, “massive, ineffective scheme for using pension fund
investments – government paper. If this technology is started up, it will be very difficult to give
up.” (entry 19).38 And, as I discuss below, this fear was not confined merely to businesses: labor
unions and editorial writers were even more worried that a lack of checks on government (whether
via the private component or union control) would allow the government to divert funds earmarked
for social policy at its discretion.39 This is consistent with the misappropriation pathology.
38Indeed, some outright accused the government of wanting to create slush funds, c.f. entry 1168, 1197.
39c.f. entries 1601, 1655, 1768, 1784, 1785, and 1794.
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Finally, business was also afraid that investment restricted to government paper would also
increase the risk of catastrophic market failure, which is an argument consistent with fear of insti-
tutionally induced macro-economic risk. Recalling 1998, an unsigned editorial in the trade journal
Industrial Weekly notes that “... 60% of this ‘astronomical’ sum [of pension investment money],
which according to government experts is around $3 - 5 billion might be ‘pumped’ into GKO’s
(government obligations), with obvious implications for the Russian debt market” (entry 982).
Oleg Evreemov, speaking on behalf of RSPP’s management committee also bluntly noted the pos-
sible economic fallout, “The PFRF may endlessly declare government guarantees, but everyone
remembers what happened with government paper in 1998” (Entry 612). Indeed, even the gen-
eral director of Sberbank’s (the main state owned bank) pension fund noted that regardless of the
maturation time of government obligations, it was almost always better for individuals to simply
withdraw and hold cash due to the possibility of government induced debt crises.40 The solution to
this danger, according to many, was to create a strong private pillar free of government interference
and with few restrictions on investment. This would guard both against the macro-economic risks
of wholesale government investment in its own obligations and the implicit fear that government
would be tempted to over issue debt for its own purposes.41 Again, all of these arguments point to
the fear that the government’s poor discipline would increase macro-economic risk.
Misappropriation and fear of macro-economic disaster were not the only motivating factors
in the business press, although they were the most prominent institutional arguments. Although
much less prevalent, free-rider problems were also discussed in the corpus after a fashion. The
business oriented journal Kommersant, for example, was generally supportive of the reform on the
grounds that it cut down on free-riding, although it also emphasized elements of the reform such as
decreased taxation burdens and simplification of record keeping.42 A larger proportion of business
commentary – accompanied by editorials in business oriented papers such as Russiskaya Biznes-
40Speaking of where to invest pension funds, and recalling the recent crisis, Galina Morozova notes,
As far as I’m concerned, it isn’t particularly important, if the the maturation period on GKO’s is ex-
tended to 2007 or even further. But give me all my money in cash now. I need to invest it over for a 5 –
10 year period, indeed we have a very long-term commitment. But if my investment period is 20 years,
I will live through four such crises.” (entry 175)
41For other model comments in this vein, c.f. entries 256, 526, 885, 922, 1020, 1068.
42See entry 1418, 1420, 1422, 1441, and 1452, 1641, 1652.
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gazeta – tended to be more concerned with lowering tax burdens than with tax non-compliance.
These arguments implicitly acknowledged that the free-rider problem existed, but tended to focus
on a lowering of the tax burden as a proper solution to the problem: firms would pay if only rates
were low enough!43 Alexander Panikin, the director of the firm Panintern, provides a particularly
blunt example, arguing that, “And now they combined them together (social policy contributions),
named them the Unified Social Tax, and lowered them to 35%. That is, they did not significantly
lower them and there will be no relief. Under these circumstances, employers still can’t pay em-
ployees a normal salary. These social taxes effect the cost of production and, if paid in full, raise it
significantly” (Moscovskii Komsomolets, 10/03/2001 entry 1556).44 For Panikin, tax evasion was
thus justified by the ineffectiveness of government and the resulting high taxes it needed to operate
the welfare state. Lowering taxes would cause the rationale for free-riding to evaporate.
It is worth nothing that, for the most part, the fixation of individual firm representatives in the
press on the tax burden rarely evolved into a broader discussion of the services being provided for
by these taxes. This is not the whole story, however. In interviews with several of Russia’s largest
employer associations, I was repeatedly told that particular types of firms – large partially state-
owned firms, profitable firms in traditionally single industry towns, and the metallurgy and resource
extraction industries – were extremely interested in social policy reform and a strengthening of the
pension system. Such firms were potentially willing to countenance increased taxes in exchange
for better service provision by the state.45 Since service provision was weak, however, these firms
were not particularly enthused about immediate increases in taxes in the absence of reform. For
the most part, these firms stayed out of debates in the press and my interlocutors suggested that
they focused most of their efforts on shaping the positions of business associations.
With respect to reform as a solution to free-riding, the business press also discussed how the
change to a regressive tax system called for in the UST would shape incentives for tax payments.
At the heart of the argument was the fact that the tax burden on firms with low mean salaries was
higher – as a proportion of the wage bill – than for those firms that paid high wages. Thus, firms
43See, entries 1415, 1470, 1579, 1590, 1593, 1633, 1643, 1645, 1648, 1672.
44See also entries 1557 and 1558.
45BA-20130613, BA-20130801, BA-20130716. I take this up in more detail in chapter 4, where I use a survey of
666 firms to show evidence that there are indeed firms willing to make trade-offs between higher taxation and better
social policies.
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with low wage employees would not really see any changes from the law and would have few
incentives to come back into tax compliance. An editorial in the journal Kompaniya, for example
argued that, “The Unified Social Tax only helps to legalize the pay of top managers... The tax tax
system suffers from large flaws, the most important of which is its ineffectiveness. True, now one
can count on the fact that making a career is more profitable. A good job not only leads to wealth,
but to honest living” (entry 1478). That is, only those with high salaries would have incentives to
come out of the shadows and pay taxes.
The newspaper Agricultural Life took an even blunter view of the problem of inequality, argu-
ing that
... the introduction of the Unified Social Tax made life easier for those with capital. But
for thousands and thousands of small, not very rich firms and facilities, where together
with their shadow pay people receive five or six thousand [rubles], the situation will
stay the same. There is no reason for honest and truthful book keeping. Everyone
realizes this is illegal, dangerous, and amoral... but in the envelope (illegal pay) there
is money for bread, chocolate for one’s daughter, and sausage” (entry 1673).46
In the eyes of the trade journal Agricultural Life and elements of the business press like it, the
regressive nature of the UST only encouraged individuals and firms to come to agreements that
would increase the pay of workers in exchange for their complicity in evading tax authorities.
Such arrangements were a continuation of similar practices before the reform (Yakovlev, 2001).
With respect to the main pension reforms, the problem of tax evasion and the ways in which the
reform might address were also a consistent theme. An editorial in the business journal Ekspert, for
example, argued that, “The introduction of the capitalized system should result in major advantages
– if only because it will for the first time create real stimulus for workers to exit the ‘gray zone’.
Workers will quickly demand that their pay be ‘white’, otherwise it will not effect the size of
their pensions” (Ekspert, editorial, entry 1160). More business-oriented journals like Izvestia also
called for reform, arguing, “the funded system stimulates ‘whitewashing’ income. Those who are
46For other examples of this type of argument, as well as the broader point that the regressive scale was at best
neutral and at worst downright dangerous for poorer workers, c.f. entries 1584, 1594, 1598, 1609, 1614, 1615, 1661,
1678, 1679, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1693, 1696, 1698, 1721, and 1767.
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currently saving for a comfortable old age, will inevitably increase the ‘white’ part of their pay, in
order to transfer more money to their personal account.” (Izvestia, editorial, entry 240).47 In both
of these cases, and others like them, we see precisely the sort of arguments suggested by Mares
(2005a) and more broadly by the free-rider pathology: reform is supported (or opposed) to the
extent to which it cuts down on informality as a dead-weight drag on individuals’ benefits.
Finally, there is also some evidence of that weak contract-enforcement was a concern in the
business press. Recall that under weak contract enforcement, individuals and firms cannot rely
on the government to enforce contracts between private parties. This makes it almost impossi-
ble for actors to trust that third parties will not abscond with any social policy funds under their
management. Firms were highly sensitive to attacks on their trustworthiness in the popular press
(reviewed below) and spent a significant amount of time defending themselves and their trustwor-
thiness. Businesses, especially within the financial sector, were quick to defend themselves against
charges of malfeasance (real and perceived).
One of the most popular tactics that firms took in the media was to appeal to state regulatory
oversight as a solution to fears about the private sector. Igor Goryonov, Chairman of the League
of NPFs, for example, argued that “Trust exists – true, not enough for us to fully participate in
pension reform. In order for tens of millions to believe in the prospects of the NPFs, it will
be necessary to legally guarantee their rights and create defensive mechanisms for their pension
savings” (entry 416). Similarly, Natalia Plugar, Assistant General Director of ”NIKoil”, argued
that, “..the business of NPFs will be monitored soon by many monitoring structures. Russians
can rest easy - there will be no new MMM pyramids [schemes]” (entry 922). Some in the sector
even went so far as to demand further regulation of the sector to protect pensioners.48 All of these
arguments were designed to counter perceptions of firms as untrustworthy and to suggest ways in
which the public could be reassured that contracts with private pension funds would be enforced
and credible.
47For other calls for reform on the grounds of wiping out informality in business journals, c.f. 196, 363, 395, 736,
1014, 1149.
48 Andrei, Podoynitzen, President of the National League of Management Companies, for example, “welcomed the
strengthening of controls over the dealings of management companies working on the pension reform from the side of
market regulators, like FKCB (Federal Commission on Equities). After all pension savings – this is social money, for
which management companies carry great responsibility” (entry 1022).
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Others in the business press took a more aggressive approach and addressed fears of trans-
parency by attacking the government as being even more prone to malfeasance and harder to
model. The non-government pension funds, for example, were quick to remind the public that,
“With NPFs you can find out at any time about your account balance and quickly, if there is some-
thing you don’t like, transfer money to a different NPF. There is no need to go to the local office
of the PFRF, which is unlikely to answer your questions quickly” (Sergei Sukhotin, Managing
Director NPF “Nevskiy Prospekt”, entry 512). Such statements worked to remind the populace
that the state was even less trustworthy to manage funds than business.49 For others in the sector,
defending their own trustworthiness and ridding themselves of the burden of the past was a simple
educational problem to be resolved. The general director of NIKoil management company, Anas-
tasia Zoteeva, noted that, “... this distrust of the population of financial institutions, was born as the
result of a series of crises... although the situation is changing for the better, it is necessary to note
the inadequate investment literacy of the people” (entry 224). Education was seen as a solution,
thus underpinning the widespread defense of NPFs’ reliability and trustworthiness in the press.50
Again, however, the fact that firms needed to defend their trustworthiness is consistent with the
predictions associated with weak contract-enforcement for public discourse.
Taken together, there is evidence that each of the four pathologies I proposed – misappro-
priation, macro-economic risk, free-riding, and contract enforcement – were key concerns in the
business press, although not always following the precise logic of chapter 1. Misappropriation
was by far the most prevalent of the institutional arguments in the business press and also the most
straightforward. Although initially blinded by pecuniary motives and a desire to spur economic de-
velopment, firms became increasingly concerned about the governments’ slow roll out of enabling
legislation to allow the capitalized pillar and the NPF system to fully take shape. In their eyes, the
government was abusing its control over the regulatory process in order to impose hold-up costs
on firms and to retain maximum control over pension contributions. While certainly not outright
expropriation of investments, the cumulative effect was to create opportunities for the government
to retain funds to invest in its own priorities or to provide cheap credit for the budget, a classic
example of Hellman (1998)’s argument about hold-up costs during reform.
49For good examples of similar sentiments from other firms, c.f. entries 509 and 511.
50For more examples of such arguments, c.f. 26, 224, 324, 350, 437, 451, 456,, 515, 820, 877, 948, 1023, 1167,
1247, 1263, 1279.
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Just as important as their own losses, firms were also concerned that these same dynamics
would allow the government to put pension funds to unintended uses, with little opportunity for
oversight and a great potential for a repeat of the 1998 financial crisis. Thus, there is a great
deal of evidence in support of the fact that misappropriation concerns were critical to businesses’
perceptions of reform, even though the reform itself offered business pecuniary benefits unrelated
to to labor markets.51
At the same time, businesses were also clearly concerned with the effect of the reform on
overall macro-economic development and market stability. The fear that the government would ir-
responsibly use funds in ways that increased volatility and could cause a financial crisis was acute,
although expressed less often than pure misappropriation concerns. The general concern here is
related to fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk; however it is slightly more nuanced.
Business did not desire social policy purely because a poor institutional environment encouraged
greater volatility and increased risk. Rather, business was concerned about whether providing so-
cial policies would increase the resources available to the government to misuse, generate massive
volatility, and ultimately crash the economy. Thus, the fear that lack of oversight would lead the
government to use pension funds in ways that could cause massive macro-economic instability was
indelibly linked to concerns about the ability of the government to engage in misappropriation.
Finally, firms were quick to discuss tax evasion and free-riding, but mostly used these concerns
as leverage to try to extract tax concessions from the government. For most firms, free-riding was
clearly incentivized by the pre-UST tax regime. Only reforms which substantially lowered the tax
burdens could alter these incentives and push firms into the formal economy. Social policy reform
that failed to meet businesses’ demands were likely to be starved for revenue funds. At the same
time, firms were typically not concerned about contract enforcement per se, but were extremely
sensitive to accusations of malfeasance by other actors. Not only did firms attempt to highlight
their trustworthiness, but some even went so far as to suggest the government regulate them further
in order to build the population’s confidence. Such suggestions come from an understanding of the
credibility problems that private sector firms face in settings with weak contract enforcement.
51For more arguments expressing the anger of business at the slow roll out of enabling legislation specifically, c.f.
212, 916, 918, 919. For more general arguments related to implementation failures, c.f. entries 1, 212, 271, 276, 541,
564, 590, 597, 622, 680, 702, 725, 820, 919,, 1065, 1323, 1324, 1333, 1335, 1341, 1345.
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While institutions were thus central to the discourse of social policy in the business press in
Russia, it is worth asking to what extent these concerns are shared in settings with higher quality
institutions. Perhaps the clearest analogue to the analysis of this chapter are studies by Swensen
(2002) and Mares (2003a) business support for the welfare state. Swensen’s analysis suggests that
in both Sweden and the US, the state was viewed as a key ally and guarantor of the welfare state by
firms. In Sweden, firms faced spiraling wage costs due to acute skilled labor shortages, which they
attempted to solve with intra-employer agreements and agreements with labor to compress wage
differentials. Universal social policy was a useful tool to achieve both ends. The state served the
crucial function of making the arrangement credible by ensuring that individual firms and unions
could not defect from the arrangement by putting upward pressure on wages, depriving competitors
of skilled labor, or avoiding contributions. In the US, by contrast, social security emerged as a
solution to a race-to-the-bottom in wages during the Great Depression, which threatened the ability
of large firms in skill intensive industries to retain skilled, loyal labor via generous private benefits.
Here the state again served a critical role in collecting contributions from all employers, which
put an implicit floor under wages and helped employers maintain commitments to workers while
remaining competitive. Again, the role of the state was as an implicit guarantor that prevented
defection.
The only mention of poor institutional quality in Swensen’s analysis is with respect to Swe-
den’s construction industry. There, the welfare state was to be desired as a means of imposing
labor costs on largely informal, fly-by-night operations that competed by undercutting established
firms’ prices. Here too, the state played an important role by punishing such firms for attempting
to compete by lowering labor costs too far. Implicitly, a similar calculus was being conducted by
American firms, although the skill intensive industries that supported social policy – heavy industry
and auto-manufacturing – tended to be less vulnerable to fly-by-night competitors.
Preferences over the extent of state control played a more central role in Mares (2003a)’ nar-
rative, although the nature of the discourse in Germany and France differed from the Russian case
presented here. Large employers in Germany and France objected to state control largely out of
fears that this would decrease their discretion over employees’ pay packets, making it harder to
reward skilled labor, provide incentives for its development, and instill labor discipline. Small
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employers, by contrast, preferred to minimize labor costs and therefore did not support any type
of social policy. That is, control by the state per se was never as large a problem for small firms
as the increase in wage costs that would accompany any new welfare state programs. Indeed, the
only objections to state control couched in the terms of fear of the state’s power came from mem-
bers of the Catholic Zentrum party, whose strong connections to Bavaria made them particularly
suspicious of any programs that centralized power and diminished that of the läander (81). Thus,
concerns over control of social policy were more closely related to concerns over the nature of
German federalism than to concerns about institutions.
Thus in both Swensen (2002) and Mares (2003a)’ accounts, the pathologies of poor institutions
central to Russian debates were barely mentioned at all. Far from being a source of potential danger
to the welfare state, Swensen (2002)’s account suggests it was largely viewed as an indispensable
guarantor of the system. For Mares (2003a) concerns about the state’s role in social policy had
more to do with economic concerns – the costs of the welfare state and employers’ discretion
over benefits – than anything else. Interestingly, these results largely track those of other studies
of welfare state programs, which suggest that the state helps actors to solve collective dilemma’s
with respect to the welfare state by ensuring the commitments between actors are credible.52 Thus,
fear of the state and the pathologies of weak institutions, common in Russia’s pension debates, do
not seem to play a large role in settings where the state is institutionally strong and able to make
credible commitments.
3.3 The popular press, Unions, and Reform
Interestingly, the concerns about the trustworthiness of the state raised by business representatives
were also prevalent in media commentary by sources closer to the populace: particularly editorials
and union comments. Both were deeply concerned about issues of transparency and the possibility
of government misappropriation of funds. Whereas most of the business press was more circum-
spect in its accusations, however, the popular discourse tended to be much more incendiary. Early
versions of misappropriation arguments could be seen in debates surrounding the UST. Unions,
in particular, were worried that allowing the Treasury to collect social policy contributions would
52C.f. contributions in Hall and Soskice (2001), as well as Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Thelen (2004).
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effectively make these contributions part of the government budget and allow the government to
divert it to other policy goals. The head of the FNPR labor union, Mikhail Shmakov, argued:
Assurances by government bureaucrats, that the introduction of the Unified Social
Tax will not lead to a worsening of the social conditions of the people – is more or less
duplicity and deception. If today it becomes legal to make insurance contributions into
taxes, then tomorrow this creates the opportunity and temptation to use insurance funds
for budgetary needs, decreasing spending on the social protection of many workers...”
(entry 1768).
This view was shared not only by other labor leaders, but also with leaders of local medical in-
surance organizations.53 One must be circumspect in interpreting this evidence, of course, as the
views of labor and local medical insurance organizations were likely heavily covered by the fact
that the UST was removing their previous social contribution collection powers. Nevertheless, to
the extent that their arguments resonated with business, they are likely not pure propoganda.
With respect to the main pension reforms, general editorials used very harsh language that was
evocative of fear that the pension reform was a pure exercise in rent-seeking. Novaya Gazeta, for
example, provided the most direct attack on the motives of reformers, arguing that:
[Reformers] attempt to create something comfortable for all, all the while attempting
to pretend that they have none of their own mercantile interests in the reform and
saying ‘everything is for the people’. In fact, these arguments have nothing to do with
the real essence of the upcoming reforms and play a distracting role. The head of the
pension fund, Mr. Zurabov, with comrades and his allies in the Ministries use this
to resolve their personal problems... And this super-discounted credit will allow Mr.
Zurabov and a small range of higher financial bureaucrats to attend to the matter of
reforming the pension system. These nimble reforms are utterly brazen. [Zurabov and
53For examples of more measured comments, c.f. entry 1484, 1572, 1581, 1630, 1655 (although edge case), 1677,
1732, 1737, 1768. Others were even more inflammatory, all but accusing the government of bribery, c.f. entries 1681,
1683, 1690, 1704. Of course, others argued the opposite: the UST would actually decrease rent-seeking using social
policy funds, c.f. entry 1486, 1491, 1734, 1766 .
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his allies are] stealing already from current pensioners, they are now set to steal the
future of workers (Novaya Gazeta, editorial, entry 890).
Other papers, especially those with older readership or with historical connections to the Commu-
nist Party were similarly scathing in their views that funds would be abused by the government in
the absence of reform.54 In the eyes of these papers only with non-governmental controls (usually
by unions) could potential malfeasance by averted. As I note below, however, the popular press
and unions differed from business in that they were also skeptical of the trustworthiness of private
pension funds (Ashwin and Clarke (2003)).
Unlike the Communist press, the majority of the popular press was a bit more subtle in attack-
ing the government’s trustworthiness, picking up hold-up cost arguments similar to those made in
the business press. During the debate over the main pension reforms, Izvestia Moscow, for ex-
ample, noted that proposals to drag out the transition to private control for two years meant that,
“Pension Reform stumbled exactly in the place where it began – for two years all of the funds will
be under the full and almost uncontrolled discretion of the pension fund (for which the results of
audits have been closed to the public and most in the government). The arithmetic: examples of
brakes on reform will be greater than examples of pushing it.” (Izvestia Moscow, editorial, entry
220). As with business, the fear was that the government would drag out the process in order to
maintain access to funds for the purposes of rent-seeking or to retain the ability to divert social
policy funds to other priorities.
Other sources tended to focus on specific instances of government hold-up. As with the busi-
ness oriented press, many were quick to jump on the government’s unwillingness to properly pro-
vide information about the pension reform and private management companies as evidence of a
desire to monopolize contributions as long as possible for the PFRF. As with business, many per-
ceived this as a means of preserving the ability to divert social policy funds to other uses. During
the controversy over pension fund advertising, Novaya Gazeta noted, “ The vast majority of Rus-
sians will remain clients of the state system ‘by default’, because no one knows anything about
the reforms. They do not know anything, because for the government it is profitable to keep the
54For further examples, c.f. 113 115, 118, 197, 240, 259, 270, 400, 409, 737, 869, 893, 1029, 1081, 1083, 1128,
1129, 1130, 1211, 1290.
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populace in ignorance. From this, the government receives vast working capital, which it can use
at its own discretion” (Novaya Gazeta, editorial, entry 895).55 Again, these arguments echoed fears
during the UST debates about the willingness of the government to use funds earmarked for social
policy to achieve other goals and/or as a source of rents.
Taken together, arguments in the popular press were quite consistent with the observable im-
plications of the misappropriation pathology for social policy discourse. As with the business
press, fears that the lack of transparency inherent in government control, coupled with the very
real possibility of diverting funds for policy priority (and rents), led the popular press to heavily
emphasize the need for more transparency in social policy. Much of the press made clear that this
was a very real possibility under state control.
While concern about the potential for government corruption was strong in the press initially,
another prominent narrative in the general press emerged while enabling legislation was being
put into effect: the reforms were a betrayal by the state of the social contract and guaranteed old
age income. These arguments are worth reviewing, because they reflected the feeling that the
state could not be trusted to make credible commitments to social policy. They also reflected am-
bivalence about private control of social policy, consistent with expectations under weak contract
enforcement.
Among older workers and pensioners, who had grown up under the Soviet social contract, a
sense of betrayal emerged in part due to the shift from state responsibility for pensions implicit in
the existing PAYG system to the individual responsibility inherent in a capitalized system. This
shift fundamentally violated the solidarity inherent in the idealized Soviet social model (Chandler,
2004, Cook, 1993). A 2003 article in the popular newspaper, Vashye Pravo, illustrates part of the
logic, noting that, “Attending to the fulfillment of the demands of the law is the duty of the govern-
ment, because pensions are its constitutional obligation. It is attempting to shift this responsibility
to employees. Not only is this illegal – it is immoral. It is better for employers to be monitored
by those with the duty for it – the [state] enforcement authorities. Workers should work” (Vashye
pravo, editorial, entry 42).56 For the purposes of evaluating the effects of institutions on individu-
55For other references to hold-up costs in the context of the government’s unwillingness to advertise the reforms,
c.f. 223, 282, 493, 808, 856, 1239.
56for more such arguments, c.f. entries 37, 68, 466, 869, 876, 893, 894, 895, 946, 994
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als’ preferences, this argument is particularly notable, because it suggests implicit trust in the state.
Individuals could only feel betrayed by buck-passing of the state’s responsibility for pensions if
they trusted the state to provide benefits in the first place. Or, perhaps more accurately, at least
trusted the state more than the private sector. In this sense, this may be less a ringing endorse-
ment of the state and more evidence of weak contract enforcement at play. Recall that under weak
contract enforcement, individuals should be skeptical of allowing third-parties, particularly private
ones, to control social policy funds.
The sense that the state was betraying the social contract was also manifest in narratives sur-
rounding the effect of the reforms on future beneficiaries and in part comport with expectations
under institutionally induced macro-economic risk. Current workers seemed unable to trust the
state’s commitment – inherent in the move from PAYG to individualized investment accounts –
that it would backstop benefits in case of market instability. An editorial in Moscovskie Novosti,
for example, argues, “Now to ask the question: is there a great belief that the government in 25
years will be able to insure the safety of these (pension) funds against inflation, not to mention
growth? The credit history of our government is not too enviable: it created for its subjects one
time depreciations in savings: once [via] default and once [via] devaluation” (Moscovskie Novosti,
editorial, entry 854). While not directly accusing the state of corruption, the argument nonetheless
evoked the sense that the time horizons of a capitalized system make it harder for the state to com-
mit that benefits will be there for current contributors when they retire. Novaya Gazeta similarly
argued that, “There is no reason to believe that the security of pensions will increase. There is
not the slightest guarantee that ‘capitalized’ pension funds will not turn to dust at the moment of
retirement” (entry 892). Again, implicit in these arguments is the notion that the PAYG system,
imperfect as it might be, nonetheless was more likely to provide similar (or superior) protection
than a capitalized system. Changing to a capitalized system jeopardized future benefits, partic-
ularly under conditions of macro-economic instability caused by government policy. This both
increased macro-economic risk and endangering the social contract.
Although possibly exacerbated by fear of the macro-economic implications of poor institutions
(volatile growth, insecure investments, etc.) in this case, it is important to note that concerns over
future benefits are not necessarily unique to poor institutional settings. Indeed many editorials
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making these types of arguments generally cited the danger of black swan financial crises, rather
than specific malfeasance.57 Nonetheless, the fact that by the time of the pension reform Russia had
already suffered through such black swan crises for reasons that could be largely tied to government
rent-seeking and mismanagement should indicate that Russian actors had institutional quality in
mind when making these types of arguments (Gehlbach, 2008, Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). Such
views are therefore clearly consistent with the logic of the misappropriation pathology. To the
extent that individuals were worried about macro-economic risk and its effects on their future
benefits, it is also consistent with fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk.
While fear of the state was an important concern for the popular press, fear of private fund
management was also prominent in ways consistent with weak contract enforcement. Many busi-
nesses readily acknowledged that some firms would be able to take advantage of the pension reform
in order to drum up investment. The Vice-President of one independent NPF explained the logic
nicely:
It’s understandable that corporate transitions to the private pension system, will occur
within the framework of one management company or NPF. It is obvious that these
NPF or management company, which will belong to to this corporate giant, will be
motivated to return pension savings into its corporation in the form of investment.
Notwithstanding future legislative restrictions, there are a million opportunities to do
this.” (Vitalii Plotnikov, VP NPF First-National, entry 463)
Large corporations were also relatively honest about the degree to which these possibilities enticed
them. The General Director of Lukoil’s NPF, Mikhail Berezhnoy, freely admitted that, “ it is
obvious that the NPF’s of major corporations will work with their own management companies
and [make] special deals. The idea of funds transfers, generated within the [firm’s] occupational
pension system, to ‘foreign managers’ seems delusional” (Mikhael Berezhnoy, General Director
NPF ”Lukoil-Gaurant”, entry 593). From the standpoint of such large firms, workers’ pension
57Interestingly, this strain of argumentation almost completely ignored the fact that PAYG systems would be just
as vulnerable to financial crises and demographic problems. Sources primarily used these arguments to attack the
pension reform, not considering that a PAYG system is hostage to current contributions, which would suffer during
moments of crisis, result in decreased benefits, and also implicitly break the social contract. For other arguments in
this vein, c.f. entries 28, 68, 158, 163, 164, 853, 871, 909, 970, 977, 1151, 1226, 1261
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funds were just another financial tool.
Small NPFs feared that the ability of large firms to use the pension contributions of their
employees as a cheap source of credit and investment would lead to market monopolization by
these large firms. Again, Vitalii Plotnikov nicely captured the logic of this fear, when he argued
that “The pension market is monopolized and the risk of this stems from the system itself. Large
corporations help NPFs to attract participants from their own workers. Smaller NPFS will be forced
to invest tens of millions of dollars on advertising. Money they don’t have” (Vitalii Plotnikov, VP
NPF First-National, entry 721). In their view, failure of the government to act to curb the largest
employers from capturing their workers’ contributions would cut independent NPFs out of the
market entirely.58
The possibility that firms would use contributions as a form of self-investment, therefore abus-
ing the system, was not particularly reassuring to the populace. Concerns about abuse by large
firms was particularly prominent amongst civil society groups and in editorials, both of whom
likened it to rent-seeking. Of particular concern was the fact that firms could make use of their
power over workers in order to force them to choose a management company dictated by the
firm.59 This fear was especially pronounced, because many were highly suspicious of the motives
of the private sector. In the regulatory vacuum following the collapse of the USSR, many lost their
savings to seemingly official pyramid schemes and poorly run banks, thus leaving a legacy of dis-
trust of the private sector (Sokhey, 2010).60 Indeed, so widespread was the legacy of these schemes
that the name of one of the most notorious – MMM – has become popular slang for pyramid or
confidence schemes in general.
Businesses statements that large firms would use pension investment funds to their own benefit
could hardly be reassuring. The Communist Party oriented press, which generally attacked all
neo-liberal reforms, was particularly brutal in its assessment. In an article on Pension Reform,
Komsomolskaya Pravda, for example, argued that “The Russian press has amply shown the system
of robbery of the population carried out by means of the aforementioned [social policy] reforms,
58For additional comments from businesses in this vein, c.f. entries 246, 290, 442, 457, 463 and 464, 479, 480 and
483, 500, 501, 503, 504, 593, 721, 938, 1275.
59c.f. entries 499, 721, 896
60c.f. entry 415 for a direct comment along these lines.
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and it is quite easy to identify specific banks, who do business through regular scams, as well as
people, who stand behind those banks.” (C. Norka, editorial in Komsomolskaya Pravda, entry
783). Unless there were some way to effectively enforce contracts, thus preventing NPFs from
committing abuse, this element of the press regarded the reforms as a pure exercise in corporate
rent-seeking.
More mainstream media sources moderated their language somewhat, but made similar argu-
ments. An unsigned editorial in the Moscow edition of a popular paper, Izvestia, touches on the
implications of this fear for pension reform, noting that, “Most of the populace breaks out in a
cold sweat from one noun ‘reform’ in conjunction with the adjective ‘pension’. Notional accounts
are involuntarily associated with MMM, where making real savings for contingencies has already
failed” (Izvestia Moscow, entry 195). Another widely read newspaper, Novaya Gazeta similarly
points out that,
The risks in this new system are clearer than the advantages. First, the government
has made no promises to do anything about pension funds, which are supposed to
collect contributions from year to year. And we all remember well what happens
sometimes with non-government financial institutions and with the money invested in
them.” (Novaya Gazeta, entry 894)
Implicit in this statement is the notion that private sector risk and lack of controls could lead to
disaster.
Whether realistic or not, many editorials also linked fear of the private sector to perceptions
that the government would be unable to keep up with regulatory supervision, even where such
supervision legislatively mandated. In a separate editorial written in late 2002, well after passage
of initial reforms, Izvestia points out, “ Inspections of the NPFs under the Ministry of Labor in
the form it currently exists, cannot effectively monitor the work of the funds – market participants
themselves agree with this. The inspections have no system of punishment for improper use of
pension funds” (Izvestia, entry 245). Taken together, these narratives suggest that the public, at
least as represented through the editorials of major newspapers, was deeply afraid that the NPFs
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would steal, misuse, or just lose their retirement savings.61 Such fears are consistent with the
logic of weak contract enforcement, which argues that poor institutions make private contract
enforcement difficult and thus decrease support for social policy that delegates control to third
parties.
Finally, the popular press was also concerned about free-riding and tax evasion, focusing par-
ticularly on the ways in which the UST shaped the incentives of businesses to draw their em-
ployee’s wages out of the shadows. Popular newspapers such as Argumenti i Facti, Itogi, Novai
Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Krasnaya Zvezda generally agreed with (and repeated in
editorials) the government’s argument that the UST would encourage employers to both pay their
employees more and to do so officially.62 Others, however, were more skeptical. For example,
although it generally agreed that the ESN encouraged employers to pay social policy contributions
(entry 1545, 1546) Moscovskii Komsomolets argued that the ESN would only be effective at elim-
inating free-riders if service provision was adequate. In an editorial, it noted that, “In addition to
the Unified Social Tax, they (firms) will pay also [pension] insurance contributions for each em-
ployee. It is obvious that some employers, who barely make ends meet, won’t like this situation.
Consequently, they will once again hide the real size of their employee’s wages from the tax ser-
vice. How the government will escape this is unknown...” (11/23/2001, entry 1558).63 Despite the
fact that such arguments were made, however, it is important to note that concerns about the effect
of reform on informality, as well as complaints about informality’s dead-weight costs on benefits,
were dominated by other actors. Nevertheless, for some actors, it was clearly a factor in favor
of a capitalized system, which many felt would decrease incentives for informality and improve
pension provision.64
61For more comments on the populace’s fear of expropriation by the private sector, c.f., entries 28, 49, 68, 142, 174,
340, 408, 415, 740, 787, 748, 791, 892, 921, 947, 971, 982, 1004, 1029, 1084, 1104, 1105, 1107, 1131, 1117, 1275.
For more on the populace’s fear of inability to monitor NPF activity, c.f. 42, 87, 525, 532, 444, 497, 1097, 1104, 1105,
1106, 1107, 1246.
62See also, entries 1347, 1350, 1391, 1405, 1422, 1492, 1496, 1545, 1546, 1637.
63See also, entry 1407. This argument mirrored some being made in the Duma. Oksana Dmitrievna, head of the
taxation and budget committee and member of the Fatherland – All Russia (OVR) pro-kremlin party also noted that,
“if there is no guarantee for employees to receive an adequate pension, employers will have to pay additional funds in
addition to the Unified Social Tax regardless to insure their employees against old-age – why would they want to then
honestly pay their debts to the pension fund?” (09/11/2001 entry 1555).
64For more arguments along the informality dimension, c.f. entries 4, 22, 45, 92, 127, 946, 1151, 1253, 1290,1317.
Note that some were pessimistic about the extent to which a capitalized system could actually resolve informality
problems (entries 48 and 893). Reasons given included the extent of collusion by unions and employers to lower
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To summarize, the dominant strain of institutional argument in the popular press revolved
around misappropriation and fears that government monopoly would lead to a misuse of funds.
A subset of such arguments was linked to fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk,
in so far as the popular press feared that social policy funds would either fuel financial crises or
be dissipated by them. In both cases, however, fears were connected to the government’s actions
and were similar in flavor to arguments being made in the business press. A second dominant
strain revolved around arguments that the pension reform abrogated the social contract. Whereas
much of this strain of argument was focused on the ways in which the government was abrogating
its responsibilities and commitments to the elderly, an important undercurrent was distrust of the
private sector and market investments as a means of guaranteeing income in old age. Skepticism
was particularly strong given the massive macro-economic instability of the 1990’s and perceptions
that the government’s irresponsible policy decisions were to blame. In this sense, the logic of
this strain of argument was consistent with weak contract enforcement and fear of institutionally
induced macro-economic risk. Finally, tax evasion and free-rider concerns also emerged in the
popular press, although to a much lesser degree than other types of arguments.
4 Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to provide an illustration of how concerns over institutional quality play out
in the popular and business discourse surrounding debates about welfare state reform by analyzing
transcripts of legislative debates alongside a database of comments from firms, individual citizens,
business associations, NGO’s, and editorial boards in the press. The analysis suggests that trust in
the state and in private actors were core to the debates in Russia. On the one hand, commentary
by business and the popular press emphasized that reforms potentially gave the state access to vast
resources, which at best could be diverted to other policy priorities and at worst would be subject
to rent-seeking. Not only did both emphasize the potential for state officials to profit off of the
slow pace of reform, but once the state actually began imposing hold-up costs on private pension
official wages in exchange for higher informal pay (31), high tax rates (703 and 1014), the pervasiveness of informal
pay even among high skill workers (94 and 1140), and difficulty in holding firms accountable even when they refused
to pay social contributions (876).
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funds they vociferously attacked the government to attempt to stop them. Both also focused on
the potential for the government to misuse funds in ways that would heighten macro-economic
volatility, further increasing risk. On the other hand, both business and the popular press were
also suspicious of the motives of private pension funds, arguing that they were potentially cynical
vehicles to drum up investment in their parent organizations and at worst cover for outright theft.
Finally, both the business and popular press were also cognizant of the effect of free-riding on the
provision of social policy and discussed the ways in which the reform did (or did not) solve the
free-rider problem, although such arguments were much rarer in the corpus than other arguments.
Thus, the chapter finds evidence linking all four of the pathologies of poor institutions pro-
posed in chapter 1 to preferences (and arguments) for social policy. It is worth noting, however,
that in Russia the logic of fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk was closely tied to
that of misappropriation. That is, many were afraid of leaving social policy in the hands of the
government, because funds associated with it could be diverted to uses that increased the risk of
financial crisis. This logic differs somewhat from the theoretical logic proposed in chapter 1. The
other three pathologies, by contrast, closely followed the logic laid out in chapter 1.
While illustrative, this chapter has a number of limits that should be kept in mind. First,
interviews with relevant business associations suggest that many of the business actors that were
most interested in the reform were silent. This is in part, because the vast majority of firms were
only interested in social policy reform to the extent that it lowered their tax burden. This is also in
part because those firms with genuine interest in the design of social policy – large, profitable firms
typically working in the metallurgy or resource extraction sectors – dominated decision making by
the large employer associations, agreeing to push for lower taxes in exchange for other firms’
support for their preferred welfare state design. Thus, the large employers’ associations did much
of the heavy lifting due to a general consensus within their memberships.
Second, while Russia in the early 2000’s shares many characteristics with the average, middle-
income developing country, it is worth noting that its experience under Communism makes it
distinct in several ways. The level of development in Russia was higher, even if the economic
collapse that followed the demise of Communism ultimately crushed living standards and set the
country back significantly. This economically brought it to levels broadly similar to those in the
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developing world. At the same time, Russia’s experience with the comprehensive Communist
welfare state provided a strong legacy effect that both created expectations of how social policy
should function and created greater ideological affinity with such institutions. As a consequence,
the relative lack of debate about whether a welfare state should exist at all in Russia may not
translate to other settings. Although important in the popular press, it is worth noting, however,
that the Communist social contract, and the obligation of the state to continue it, was only one
among many arguments marshaled during debates about social policy reform.
Finally, the chapter illustrates the discourse of reform in a setting with poor institutional qual-
ity – Russia – but does not provide any direct contrast with a setting with better quality institutions
using primary sources. A review of two studies similar to this one by Swensen (2002) and Mares
(2003a) suggests that concerns over misappropriation, macro-economic risk, contract enforcement,
and informality were not common in settings with better institutions: specifically the US, Sweden,
Germany, and France (Mares, 2003a, Swensen, 2002). Indeed, far from being a source of prob-
lems, the state served as the critical guarantor that made agreements between and within labor and
capital credible for all actors. Similarly, although Swensen (2002) briefly suggests that free-riding
was a concern for firms in Sweden seeking social policy reform, the nature of the threat was quite
different. In Sweden, state control was viewed as a way of imposing wage floors on informal com-
petitors and forcing them to contribute to the welfare state. Absent such controls, fly-by-night firms
could freely undercut their formal competitors on labor costs and tax constraints, creating condi-
tions for unfair competition. Strong institutional quality thus made the Swedish state a solution to
this problem rather than a cause.
In order to further explore preferences for social policy, the following two chapters use survey
evidence gathered from Russian firms and individuals. This single country approach allows for
controls for omitted variable bias, while at the same time providing insights into preferences under
weak institutions. More importantly, the survey data presented in the next two chapters provides
opportunities for more systematic tests of the insights derived from the qualitative analysis of this
chapter, as well as additional observable implications of my theory.
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Chapter 4
Russian Firms and Social Policy
How do institutions shape the preferences of firms for social policy? In the previous chapter, I
showed that businesses and their associations were quite concerned about the implications of poor
institutions for social policy reform in Russia. In particular, firms were worried about the effects
of misappropriation, of government investment policy on macro-economic risk, and, to a lesser
extent, free-riding and its implications for revenue. At the same time, business was also quite
sensitive to the populace’s fears that contracts made with private actors would be unenforceable,
strongly defending a private pension system. This being said, the previous chapter did not provide
strong intuitions about the characteristics of firms that support social policy. The willingness of
Russian firms to allow the large associations, financial firms, and metallurgy sectors do most of the
heavy lobbying obscures those firms who supported social policy but were unwilling to lobby in the
press. This chapter builds on the findings of the previous chapter by providing a more systematic
test of my argument. By using survey data on Russian firms, it should be possible to explore the
preferences of actors that were silent during pension reform debates.
In this chapter, I explicitly take the firm as the unit of analysis and explore the determinants
of their support for state-run social policy in Russia using a unique survey of 666 firms across 11
Russian regions.1 Because the small number of regions makes it difficult to identify regional-level
effects, I assume institutions are universally poor in Russia’s regions and focus on the observable
1Unfortunately, exploring other aspects of social policy is not possible with this data, since there is only one survey
instrument dealing with social policy.
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implications of the misappropriation and free-rider pathologies for support for social policy in such
settings.2 Recall that both the misappropriation and free-riding perspectives outlined in chapter 1
suggest that certain types of firms can take advantage of weak institutions to mitigate costs or shift
them onto others. The misappropriation pathology suggests that the politically well-connected can
take advantage of links to the state to mitigate the costs of social policy in settings with weak insti-
tutions, making state-run policies more attractive. Similarly, under free-riding one would predict
that firms with a comparative advantage in tax evasion (due to firm-level characteristics) have an
easier time evading taxes in weak institutional environments where the state controls social policy,
making them more supportive of such systems. Chapter 2 already provided some evidence that
the smallest businesses’ (i.e. self-employed) preferences are consistent with expectations under
free-riding, although there were few firm level controls. This chapter expands the test to more
traditional firms. The politically well-connected and those with a comparative advantage in tax
evasion should both support social policy in Russia, where poor institutions enable free-riding and
misappropriation that allow them to reap unexpected benefits from certain types of social policy.
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature on social policy preferences. First, it
extends our understanding of firm preferences to settings not considered in the existing, Western-
oriented literature on firms and social policy. Recent work has underscored the importance of
firms in debates about the welfare state (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001, Manow, 2001,
Mares, 2001, Rhodes, 2001, Swensen, 1997). Given this and the fact that poor institutions are
endemic in the developing world, understanding the relationship between institutional quality and
firm preferences is critical to making predictions about the rise and evolution of the welfare state
outside of the OECD. This can also help to resolve the long-standing puzzle of welfare state origins
and development in authoritarian and poorly institutionalized settings (Mares and Carnes, 2009),
as well as provide new perspective on controversies over the role of labor market considerations in
firm preferences.3 Second, this chapter contributes to the welfare state literature methodologically
through the use of a micro-level, firm survey. The most prominent work on firm preferences has
2The World Bank’s Governance Indicators, as just one example, place Russia in the bottom 23% of countries for
control of bureaucratic corruption and the bottom 20% for Rule of Law. I justify this assumption in greater detail in
section 2 of this chapter.
3For recent work on the labor market motivation of firms, c.f. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice (2001), Kuo
(2010), Manow (2001), Mares (2001), Martin (2005), Rhodes (2001), Swensen (1997), Yang (2013). For rebuttal, c.f.
Hacker and Pierson (2002), Paster (2013).
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used archival materials from businesses and business associations to expand our understanding
of firm preferences and lobbying (c.f. Kuo (2010), Mares (2005b, 2003a, 2001), Swensen (2002,
1991), Thelen (2004). This chapter seeks to complement these studies with new data and the other
traditional benefits of large-N survey work.
In the next section, I present the working hypotheses for this chapter. Section 2 briefly dis-
cusses how social policy in Russia in the mid-2000’s served the interests of firms. Section 3 in-
troduces the survey instrument and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results
of the main analysis, robustness checks, and a validation exercise of the conceptual validity of the
measures. Section 5 concludes.
1 Firm Level Preferences for Social Policy
In this chapter, I focus primarily on control, for which predictions are quite clear. Absent institu-
tions, existing work has largely characterized firms’ preferences over social policy as a function of
two factors: skill profile and size. Skill profile mainly dictates whether firms desire social policy in
the first place. A firms’ skill profile refers to the level of skill its employees need in order to execute
its production strategy. Intuitively, firms with a high skill profile face labor market shortages, since
high level skills require greater investment in human capital by workers and are therefore scarcer
than more generic skills. For firms, social policy can help to overcome inter-firm and employer-
employee commitment problems and encourage co-investment in skill (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and
Soskice, 2001, Mares, 2001, Thelen, 2004). Skill intensive firms benefit from social policy, be-
cause it decreases pressure for outsize wage premia and makes skill acquisition affordable (Mares,
2003a,b, Swensen, 2002). Firm size, by contrast, governs who should control social policy. In
her seminal work, Mares (2003a) argues that preferences over control depend on the trade-off be-
tween administrative costs and discretion over compensation. Large firms have the resources to
administer their own social policy programs and prefer to do so in order to increase discretion over
employee compensation. Small firm cannot afford to administer social policy and therefore prefer
state controlled systems in order save on costs.
How do weak institutions change these predictions? Like individuals, firms look to maximize
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their net gains from social policy contingent on their tax contributions and any dead-weight costs
of taxation. Whereas for individuals the benefits come in the form of direct transfers, for firms
benefits accrue through the effect of transfers on the labor market and labor costs. The relative
ratio between these benefits, taxes, and the extent to which contributions are subject to wastage
(i.e. dead-weight costs) can be thought of as determining whether a given firm supports social
policies. A naive view is that ceteris paribus in the presence of poor institutions – where there
are few constraints on officials – officials are free to misappropriate funds, ignore free-riding,
selectively enforce contracts, or engage in opportunistic activities that drive up macro-economic
risk. Regardless of which of these pathologies is operative, weak institutions thus increase the
dead-weight costs for firms, decreasing support. This being said, while support for social policy
should be lower overall in systems with weak institutions, it is not clear that poor institutions
should alter predictions about relative support for social policy among firms. That is, within a
setting with poor institutions, we would expect skill profile and size to predict relative support for
social policy as suggested by existing work. What changes in this naive view is that the overall
level of support for social policy is lower across the board.
As I argued in chapter 1 extending existing models of social policy preferences to weak in-
stitutional settings rests on strong assumptions, however. All actors are assumed to be bearing an
evenly distributed tax burden and to share equally in the dead-weight costs of social policy. This
need not be the case. Where some are able to take advantage of weak institutions to reduce or shift
costs to others, poor institutions may make social policy more attractive than it would otherwise
be. While possibilities for such cost-shifting exist where institutions are good, poor institutions ex-
pand possibilities by loosening constraints meant to check such behavior. Thus, where actors can
take advantage of weak institutions to engage in cost shifting strategies unavailable where institu-
tions actually constrain, we would expect those most well-positioned to engage in cost-shifting to
support social policy more than they would otherwise.
In this chapter, I draw on my discussion of the misappropriation and free-riding pathologies
in chapter 1 to highlight two groups who can engage in such cost-shifting. First, some firms
can create relationships with politicians that allow them to de facto hold politicians accountable
and to potentially glean political and economic favors. As a general rule, a large body of work
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has shown that firms with strong political connections generally seem to prosper in settings with
poor institutions (Faccio, 2006, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006, Frye and Iwasaki, 2011,
Hellman, 1998). For politicians, such well-connected firms can provide the necessary resources to
insure stable revenues (and sources of rents) they need to retain power. Given their importance to
bureaucrats, such firms can often count on their connections to ensure privileged access to public
goods, such as social policy, and measures to protect their investments (Gehlbach, 2008, Slinko,
Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2005). In a world where misappropriation is rampant, one can image
that such firms can reap a number of benefits that increase the attractiveness of social policy.
At the most general level, access to subsidized loans and preferential access to public goods
weakens the budget constraint on firms, significantly expanding the range over which such policies
bring benefits. Relaxing budget constraints makes firms more amenable to spending on social pol-
icy, particularly if such programs are priorities for authorities. Indeed several business association
officers that I interviewed were quick to point out that public sector firms and companies with large
government stakes tended to be the least vocal about lowering taxes and the most supportive of so-
cial policy spending, while smaller, private firms tended to be more concerned about the effects of
such programs on their competitiveness (Interviews BA20130613, BA20130716, BA20130801).
More specifically, where misappropriation is possible, connected firms can also benefit more di-
rectly. Since social policy funds must be stored, often over long periods, these funds are vulnerable
to diversion to subsidize loans and investment in favored firms. Indeed, chapter 3 showed that busi-
nesses were particularly worried about such wastrel government investment. Consequently, ceteris
paribus politically connected firms should support social policy, as they can use the privilege of
connections to defray its costs where institutions are poor.
Second, the absence of constraints on government officials encourages them to shirk responsi-
bility and cut-back on effort. Consequently, those who are harder for the state to track and monitor
– those with mobile assets and those in the informal economy – can take advantage of bad insti-
tutions to avoid taxes, since officials have few incentives to compel tax compliance. So long as
benefits are universal or quasi-universal, their employees still receive them, thus allowing them to
free-ride. If savings from tax evasion outweigh the dead-weight costs of poor institutions, such
firms will support social policy more than the average firm in weak institutional settings.
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Before moving on, it is important to make one caveat about the predictions made here. In
this chapter, I motivate my discussion by focusing on poor institutional settings as enabling condi-
tions that facilitate cost-shifting by the well-connected and tax evaders. This need not be the case,
however. Even in relatively well-institutionalized settings such as the United States and Western
Europe, the ability to glean favors from political friends and to evade taxes is not entirely ab-
sent.4 Consequently, one could easily observe a relationship between well-connected firms and
tax-evaders in these countries and support for social policy. I do not discount this possibility the-
oretically and, due to data limitations, I cannot test it directly here. Nonetheless, I argue that the
magnitude of the effects should be stronger in settings with poor institutional constraints, which
provide more fertile ground for firms to turn connections into benefits and ease tax evasion.5
2 Contextualizing Russian Social Policy and Institutions
Before turning to the empirical section of this chapter, it is worth providing a bit of context for
the survey. At the time of the firm survey used in this chapter (2005), Russia’s institutional en-
vironment was rather bleak in comparison to international averages in 2005, as noted above. The
poor quality of national institutions was reflected at the sub-national level. Figure 4.1 shows some
of this variation, by employing regionally aggregated data from a 2005 survey of 4,350 firms in
80 Russian regions that asked firms whether regional bureaucrats “often” engage in illegal activity.
The survey organization reported that this was generally perceived as a question about the extent of
corruption (Vainberg and Rybnikova, 2006).6 On average (the blue line in the figure), 16% of firms
reported that their regional bureaucrats were engaged in illegalities. As the figure demonstrates,
however, there was a wide degree of variation, with 11 regions having shares higher than 30% and
25 reporting below 10%. Importantly, though, the rates are generally high for most regions.
Turning attention to another facet of poor institutions, Figure 4.2 shows variation across Rus-
4And indeed in the US there is amble evidence such evasion may be a legal consequence of poorly written and
loophole ridden tax laws. I thank participants at the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition Seminar for
this insight.
5I take this question up again in the conclusion of this chapter.
6While not ideal, this survey is one of the few surveys contemporaneous to the one used in this chapter that asks
about corruption in a large number of Russian regions.
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Figure 4.1: Corruption: Regional Average of Firms who Often Face Illegal Action When Dealing
with Regional Bureaucrats
sia’s 89 regions in investment risk ratings given by the financial consulting firm RA Expert.7 The
average rating on the index is 1.2 (the blue line in the figure), with most regions falling below
that. Variation is quite low, since most regions tend to cluster narrowly around 1, which is the
level of investment risk for Russia as a whole.8 Nevertheless, considering investment in Russia as
a whole was considered quite risky in 2005, this is an indication of generally poor institutions (c.f.
International Country Risk Group (2006)).
2.1 Russian Social Policy
The weak institutional environment noted above forms the backdrop for understanding how firms
preferences for social policy in Russia. Chapter 3 alluded to many of the problems faced by the
Russian social policy system in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Sharp declines in wages, rapid popula-
tion aging, widespread unemployment, and rapid expansion of the informal economy undermined
state financing designed to provide social benefits for a command economy (Dobronogov and
7The rating encapsulates political, legal, economic, financial, social, and ecological risks into an index that rates
the total risk of Russia (as a country) as 1 and all regions in relation to that. Details and data can be found in RA
Expert (2004).
8The main outlier regions are the Caucuses, where conflicts and insurgency in the 1990’s and early 2000’s created
massive investment risks.
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Figure 4.2: Investment Risk: RA Expert Investment Risk Rating Index – 2004
Mayhew, 2000, Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Jensen, 2003, Williamson, Howling, and Maroto,
2006). At the same time, weak institutional controls over the bureaucracy responsible for collecting
taxes allowed officials to turn a blind eye to tax evasion in exchange for rent-seeking opportunities
and political favors (Cook, 2007, Gehlbach, 2008, Shleifer and Treisman, 2000, Treisman, 1999).
These issues were exacerbated by the vast expansion of the informal sector during the transition,
as individual responded to unemployment and new market opportunities by entering the shadow
economy, which made it hard for a country with weak state capacity, like Russia, to police evasion.
Indeed, state capacity was so weak in Russia that many employers in the formal sector also created
tax evasion schemes to save on payroll taxes (Dmitriev and Maleva, 1997, Ovtcharova and Popova,
2001, Treisman, 1999, Yakovlev, 2001).
The previous chapter already detailed the efforts by the Russian government to fix the social
policy system through reforms of the tax system to reform the UST, as well as the pension reforms.
These reforms, along with centralizing reforms that gave the federal government more control over
regional tax authorities, went a long way towards solving the revenue crisis (Gorodnichenko et
al., 2009, Martinez-Vasquez, Timofeev, and Boex, 2006, Remington, 2011, Slonimczyk, 2012). In
conjunction with the tax reforms, the government also altered the relationship of social policy to the
federal budget and created opportunities for private sector involvement in areas beyond pensions.
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Health care, for example, was removed from the purview of the national budget and devolved to
regional off-budget funds with dedicated tax revenues. Private insurance funds were brought in
to negotiate with local service providers on behalf of these regional funds in order to introduce
an element of privatization (Burger, Field, and Twigg, 1998, Twigg, 1998). Nonetheless, reforms
outside of the pension system remained rather limited both in scope and in their effects. Many of
the improvements to the Russian social policy system stemmed from tax reform and improvements
to the general economy, although specific policy changes did help somewhat (Cook, 2007).
What were the implications of the Russian system for preferences over social policy in 2005?
Prior to reform, the populace almost universally regarded the pension system as inadequate for
providing old-age security. Although the reforms were helpful in resolving some of the most bla-
tant problems with the pension system, the ratio between nominal average pensions and wages for
the median region was about half in 2000 and fell to less than one-third in the mid-2000s. Re-
peated efforts by the government to cope by raising minimum guaranteed payouts were largely
unsuccessful, although they helped somewhat (Remington, 2011). For health care, the obligatory
basic insurance coverage promised by the state did not provide much in the way of advanced care,
nor did the quality of care provided improve much (Cerami, 2009). More importantly, regional
governments were often left in charge of covering health insurance for the unemployed, exposing
these groups to the vagaries of regional budgeting (Wagstaff, 2009). Institutionally both the health-
care and pension systems were plagued by accusations of corruption, mis-management of funds,
and outright theft on the part of both public and private providers (Burger, Field, and Twigg, 1998,
Cook, 2007, Twigg, 1998). Both systems also retained universal components, making them vul-
nerable to free-riders even in the face of the UST reforms attempts to make paying taxes attractive
to individuals and firms.
From employers’ perspective, the social policy system circa 2005 therefore provided uncertain
labor market benefits. On the one hand, the relative inadequacy of the basic state-run system meant
that firms were forced to offer supplementary benefits or wage premiums in order to attract highly
skilled workers (Remington, 2011). The mixed system facilitated high-skill labor market strategies
for larger, profitable firms, particularly state-owned or partially state owned firms that could draw
on government resources to defray costs. For such firms, the public component was not crucial to
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the labor market value of the programs, but several of the business association leaders I interviewed
emphasized to me that the marginal benefits of the universal component of the welfare state were
worthwhile to firms, particularly government affiliated ones, with weak budget constraints (In-
terviews BA20130613, BA20130716, BA20130801). For others, however private provision was
too expensive and the existing system remained vulnerable to predatory officials and opportunistic
policy reversals designed to favor the state-run system.9 On the other hand, because many of the
problems of the system stemmed from inadequate benefits provision, an increase in funding could
ceteris paribus make it an efficacious part of broader labor market strategy. Again, though, poor
institutions made such a strategy dangerous, as participants would be vulnerable to the costs of
poor institutions.10 In either case, however, the framework introduced above suggests that firms
that could protect themselves or free-ride might be able to derive benefits despite the drawbacks of
poor institutions.
3 Data and Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses laid out in section 1, I employ a survey of 666 Russian executives11
in eleven regions that was conducted in 2005. The survey covers 23 industrial sectors, excluding
agriculture and communal, health, and social services. Firms were randomly selected based on a
stratified design, resulting in a survey that roughly mirrors the size and sectoral composition of the
national economy.12
The timing of the survey is of particular note, because the survey was conducted after reforms
to the health care system and final enabling legislation for the 2001 pension reform had been
9For example, the vice-president of Russia’s largest employer association, Igor Iorens, complained three years after
the pension reform that government officials effectively eliminated the private system as a real choice by manipulating
regulations to slow down transfers from the government to private system (Russkii Polis (05/01/2003). “Dokazatel’stvo
obratnovo”.) [1061]. Other examples can be found in chapter 3, where I systematically review public opinion on the
pension reform through the lens of the Russian press.
10For examples of this in the Russian press, Selivanovna, M. (05/05/2002). “Interv’ju s Aleksandrom Shohinom”.
BOSS [19]; Golikova, L. (11/27/2001). “Posle reformy budet tol’ko huzhe”. Kommersant” [612]; Korobkova, I
(07/15/2002). “Lakomyj pensioner”. Kompanija. One labor union head indicated the magnitude of the problem to
me, noting that it was almost impossible to audit whether contributions were properly credited. Employers or unions
would have had to know someone important to get access to the data (Interview LU20130723).
11Chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and chief legal officers
12More details on the sample selection, composition, and representativeness can be found in Frye (2006). Summary
statistics are presented in table 4.4.
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passed. As noted above, this made private control a realistic possibility for the first time and
gave firms exposure to private and public systems of controlling social policy. Survey instruments
designed to parse out preferences for government control would therefore have been salient and
topical to respondents. At the same time, because the survey was conducted during controversies
over the withdrawal of non-monetary social benefits and the implementation of pension reforms,
social policy generosity was salient for both the populace and enterprises (Cook, 2007).
I make use of the following survey instrument to measure preferences for social policy:
In society there are different views about the scale of funding for the social sphere and the direction
of its development. Which of the following statements do you agree with?
1. It is necessary to increase social spending by increasing taxes and mandatory payments
2. It is necessary to maintain social spending at the same level, leaving taxes and mandatory
payments at the same level
3. It is necessary to reduce social spending while reducing taxes and mandatory payments
4. Hard to say
For my purposes, this instrument has several valuable features. First, the reference in the original
Russian to “the social sphere” primes respondents to think about state control, as the term is rarely
used with private programs or funds. Expansion of the system and state control are therefore at
the heart of this question. Second, the instrument directly evokes taxation policy. This primes
respondents to think carefully about the cost trade-offs inherent in providing more generous social
policies (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008). Finally, this question is also helpful in that it is rather
vague about social policy. Normally, respondents may have very different programs in mind when
answering this type of question. Here, this ambiguity is helpful, as it narrowly focuses the question
on control, rather than different risk types. The cost is masking potential heterogeneity due to
variation in the risk profile of firms, but this is a small issue given the focus here on control.
There are two main challenges when interpreting this instrument. First, the question wording
makes it difficult to distinguish between firms who do not trust the state to provide social policy
and those who simply believe taxes are too high. Fortunately, the survey includes questions that
195
Figure 4.3: Support for Social Policy Spending Increases
allow for controls on the appetite of firms for spending and for ideological attitudes. Second, many
firms availed themselves of the “hard to say” option (26%). On the one hand, firms simply may
not care whether social spending is altered along with taxes or may not know enough to judge. On
the other hand, firms may have found this question to be sensitive.
In this chapter, I take the former view. First, analysis of “hard to say” answers fail to turn
up systematic predictors (see Table 4.1 below), which is implausible if the question is sensitive.
Second, qualitative evidence gathered during interviews with business associations during my field
work suggests many firms do not think about social policy until asked and tend to find the status
quo adequate (BA20130613, BA20130801). Indeed an informal poll of over 200 Moscow business
associations I conducted supports this supposition: only a handful of (usually large) associations
reported being interested in social policy issues. Moreover, in none of my interviews did it ever
seem that business owners or business association leaders lacked knowledge of social policy, an-
other possible explanation. Finally, it seems implausible that the question was sensitive. Questions
dealing with corruption – a clearly sensitive question – elicited far fewer missing responses. Con-
sequently, I deal with this issue by lumping “hard to say” answers in with those who answered that
the status quo is appropriate. 13
13Reported results are also robust to alternative means of dealing with these missing responses, such as list-wise
deletion or assuming these firms oppose social policy. Results available upon request.
196
All told approximately 22% of the sample of firms supported increases in social spending
along with a higher tax burden to support it, while about 15% of firms preferred a decrease in
both social spending and the tax burden. Figure 4.3 summarizes the dependent variable across
all regions in the sample and sorts regions according to aggregated responses to a question about
perceptions of corruption on the survey.14 The regional distribution of answers is quite striking.
In the Republic of Bashkortostan, for example, only 2% of firms support increases in government
controlled social spending, whereas in Moscow 36% of firms do. Strikingly, these are the regions
with the highest and lowest levels of perceived corruption according to this survey. Nonetheless,
the relationship is not straightforward, as figure 4.3 indicates. As noted above, this is likely because
Russian institutions are uniformly poor.
Section 1 posited a number of hypotheses about the ways in which firms win and lose from
social policy under poor institutional conditions. In order to explore firms’ preferences for social
policy, I begin by estimating a simple ordered probit model with fixed effects for regions and
sectors and cluster corrected standard errors.15 The probit model has the structural form:
Yi = α + βDi + γXi + ρIr + χr + εi (4.1)
where Di is a vector of individual, firm-level characteristics of interest for firm i, Xi is a vector of
firm-level controls (discussed below), ρr and χs are vectors of regional fixed effects (for region r)
and sector fixed effects (for sector s), and εi is the error term.
3.1 Measuring Privilege and Free-riding
The hypotheses developed in Section 1 suggest that in poor institutional environments, firms will
be more likely to support social policy if they are insulated from the dead-weight costs of poor
institutions. I argued that well-connected firms and those able to evade taxes are uniquely insulated.
To test this argument, I make use of several measures. First, under misappropriation firms may
14This variable comes from a question asking firms about the extent to which regional bureaucrats are corrupt or
take bribes from the same survey that provides the dependent variable.
15Results in this chapter are robust to alternative specifications including OLS, Multi-level linear regression using
cluster corrected, bootstrap standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008, Harden, 2011, Leoni, 2009).
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be able to mitigate the costs of poor institutions by taking advantage of political connections.
Unfortunately, in this survey there are no direct questions about the relationship of the firm manager
to regional officials or the presence of state officials on the firms’ executive board. To get at these
connections, I make use of questions about the ownership structure of firms to create a dummy
variable indicating state ownership. My survey allows me to distinguish between four types of
firms: those originally registered as private with no current state-ownership, fully privatized firms,
privatized firms in which the state retained a partial stake, and fully state-owned firms.16 I construct
my state-ownership dummy using the latter two categories.
Firms with state ownership should be strongly connected to key politicians, since the latter – in
their role as public servants – own the former outright. Government (and government appointed)
officials typically hold seats on the boards of directors for these firms (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011).
Moreover, existing work provides some evidence that state ownership is enough of a political
connection to allow firms to derive benefits unavailable to others. In Russia, evidence indicates
that state-owned firms are more likely to benefit from the selective provision of public goods and
additional property rights protections (Gehlbach, 2008, Juurikkala and Lazareva , 2006). They
are also more likely to receive preferential tax treatment, better access to government orders, and
access to credit, all of which can help them to mitigate both the actual costs of social policy and
weakened competitiveness from having to pay for it (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011). Indeed, when asked
about how different companies would react to tax increases to pay for greater social policy, the
head of a major Russian business association said:
All employers are well aware that increases in taxes – this is a decrease in their in-
come. Maybe not by 100%, but by 50 for sure. Especially in small companies and in
companies in the private sector. Everyone understands that this doesn’t concern large
government firms, they can just absorb the new rates. But what can the rest of us do?
(Interview BA2-20131007)
16Firms were first asked if they were formed as a state or private enterprise. If formed as a state-owned enterprise,
they were then asked if they were privatized. This distinguishes de novo and fully state-owned firms. To distinguish
between firms with residual state ownership and fully privatized firms, I make use of a question that asks about the
make-up of firms’ stock holders. Firms that indicated ownership by municipal, regional, or federal authorities were
coded as having residual ownership. This coding matches reasonably well with an alternative approach that looks at
the legal status of companies but captures cases where the state has an equity stake in public companies.
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At the same time, in Russia flows from the funded component of pensions were available
to the government as cheap credit (Entry 19, 205, 259, 330, 526, 700). During debates about
pension reform in the early 2000’s there was a great deal of fear that this would be misused by the
government as a means of rapidly increasing spending and increasing support for, and investment
in, state-owned firms.17 As Andrei Godzinski, president of the Eastern Finance Company notes,
there were few controls on such funds:
The reform (of the pension system) has created one outrage. This is that money is
being transfered to Vnesheconombank (a major government owned investment bank)
– this is an outrage squared. Why did they (the government) do this? To collect for
themselves massive resources that they can spend without control. (Entry 902)
Indeed, one of the government’s major responses to the 2008 financial crisis was to engage in
massive deficit spending in order to provide bailouts to troubled state-owned firms, among other
measures (Gurvich et al., 2010, Vartapetov, 2011). With respect to social policy, these types of
benefits – privileged access to public goods, property rights, credit, and government support – are
all important, because they provide state-owned firms with comparative advantages vis-a-vis other
firms that help them lower costs and risk.
It is important to note that a dummy for state owned firms is a somewhat noisy measure. Fully
state-owned firms, in particular, are likely to differ from their private counterparts on a host of
dimensions – ideology, competitiveness, budget constraints – that may influence preferences for
social policy through channels other than privilege. Nonetheless, this is one of the easiest and most
reliable measures of connections.18 I explore alternative interpretations of this variable, as well as
attempt to illustrate what types of advantages state-owned firms are receiving in Section 4.1.
I also measure privilege more indirectly by looking at outcomes that should be associated
with political connections. One proxy is through the use of a survey instrument that asks firms
whether they make sales to the government. In Russia, government sales are often used as a way
17I discuss this fear in greater depth in a chapter of my dissertation, which uses content analysis of the Russian press
to explore the logic linking institutional quality and social policy preferences
18Compare studies such as Frye and Iwasaki (2011), Gehlbach (2008) to studies that use more elaborate criteria,
such as Faccio (2006). The latter make strong assumptions about ownership and connections while also relying on a
non-anonymous sample. Such techniques are difficult to replicate with survey data.
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of rewarding firms for good behavior, particularly with respect to mobilizing the electorate in favor
of Kremlin-supported candidates (Frye et al., 2014, Mironov and Zhuravskaya, 2014). That firms
receive these rewards is both a reflection of the importance of the firms to the government, and the
possibility that these firms may be of sufficient value to receive other government favors. Again,
however, I expect this measure to be somewhat noisy, since some firms will win government sales
on the merits of their products.
Another indirect proxy is through a survey instrument that asks firms if they attempt to influ-
ence new laws and normative acts important to their business and to what extent they are success-
ful. Intuitively, firms who lobby and believe they exert great influence are likely to benefit from
political connections. Previous work on the effect of political connections has used survey instru-
ments of this type in analysis (Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya, 2005). Because social policy
is mostly overseen at the federal levels, I include a dummy variable equal to one if firms report
having lobbied the federal government.19
A second proxy is firms’ confidence in being able to successfully resolve disputes against the
government. Protection of property rights from the state is one of the most important privileges
firms can receive from connections in poor institutional environments and an important determi-
nant of investment (Gehlbach, 2008, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Haber, 2007, Haber, Maurer, and
Razo, 2003). I capture this by using an instrument that asks firms about their confidence in winning
in court against the regional government 20 Although this measure does not directly reflect connec-
tions between the firm and government, the ability to successfully defend oneself from regional
governments implies some sort of alliance with key officials given the relative dependence of the
judicial system on executives at the regional level. While, this variable is strongly associated with
other forms of leverage (size, market power, etc.) that might help in protecting firms, once one
controls for these features, it can provide evidence that firms’ ability to defend themselves from
predation – rather than ability to free-ride – governs preferences for social policy.
Testing the free-rider perspective is a bit more complex, as the survey used in this chapter offers
19For robustness, however, I also tried variables indicating whether the firm had lobbied at the regional or municipal
level. Results remain the same for any permutation of this variable.
20The survey instrument asks, “Can your firm defend its legal interest through negotiations, without use of the
arbitration courts, in economic disputes with [the executive branch of your region/federal agencies]?”
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no instruments that directly tap traditional measures of the ability to free-ride. Factor mobility, for
example, can only be measured using coarse sector fixed effects, which are themselves highly
correlated with other determinants of preferences for social policy such as skill profile. Similarly,
firm size is highly correlated with sector, with the largest firms in the sample generally belonging
to the oil and gas sector and heavy manufacturing and the smallest to the retail sector.21 Moreover,
firm size is likely to be correlated with other factors – the ability of firms to take advantage of
economies of scale, lobbying capacity, ability to provide officials with rents, political connections
– that may influence preferences for social policy along other channels.22 Indeed, existing work
has found that large firms are more likely to capture and be captured by state officials, particularly
in post-communist states like Russia (Gehlbach, 2008, Hellman, 1998). Consequently, firm size
is difficult to interpret and could actually proxy for both political connections and ability to evade
taxes.
One available proxy, however, is the extent to which firms are visible to regulatory authorities.
The more interaction a firm has with government officials, the more difficult it is to hide critical tax-
related information – sales, number of employees, and employee salaries – from the authorities and
the harder it should be to evade taxes. To capture this, I make use of a question that asks firms, “In
the last year, how many times was your firm subjected inspections from government organs (fire
safety, sanitary, etc.)?”, to generate a measure of the logged number of inspections experienced
by the firm. An important feature of this measure is that it captures inspections generally, rather
than specifically those carried out by tax authorities. While the former indicate the ease with
which government can find firms, a large body of evidence suggests that the latter tends to lead
to collusive arrangements to evade taxes (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan, 2014). Thus,
eliminating these inspections from the variable is important for cleanly capturing firms’ visibility,
rather than opportunities to bribe tax officials into looking the other way.
It is important to note, however, that this measure is not a perfect proxy and has potentially
ambiguous interpretations in the same way firm size does. While I argue that firms that can avoid
inspection by the authorities are less visible (and therefore more able to evade taxes) than other
21Pairwise correlations between firm size and these sectors are 0.2756 (oil and gas), 0.2646 (heavy manufacturing),
and -0.2753 (retail). All these correlations are significant at the 99.9% level.
22Section 4.1 demonstrates the multi-faceted effects of firm size empirically.
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firms, they might simply be using political connections to avoid inspection. This would be incon-
sistent with expectations under free-riding. I address this ambiguity directly in the Section 4.1 with
some tests designed to validate this measure as one of visibility and not political connections.
3.2 Controls
In addition to the variables of substantive interest noted above, I also include controls for a num-
ber of basic firm level characteristics: the logged number of employees at the firm, whether the
firm exported products in the previous year, firms’ labor costs as a percentage of total production
costs, whether competition from other firms poses a problem for firm development, and whether
or not the firm provides supplementary pensions and health care policies.23 I also include a mea-
sure of competitiveness – whether the firm reported profits in the previous year. I supplement this
with a question about the degree to which credit constraints hamper the firms’ development, as this
variable is important to understanding the degree of flexibility firms have in meeting competing pri-
orities (expansion, wage bills, taxes, etc.) while under budget constraints. In addition, ownership
structure is an important predictor of firm behavior in a wide variety of surveys of Eastern Euro-
pean firms.24 Consequently, I include the dummy variable described above for state-ownership in
all specifications. Finally, as a means of controlling for potential unobserved heterogeneity due to
selection of certain types of executives into certain types of firms, I also control for key individual
level characteristics that have proven robust in nearly all studies – manager’s age, level of educa-
tion, and gender – in my main specifications (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).25 I explore managerial
characteristics in further detail in the robustness section of this chapter, as the selection problem is
a potentially important alternative explanation for my findings.
I also include control variables of greater substantive interest. Existing studies posit that firms’
preferences for social policy are governed by firms’ labor market needs (Mares, 2003a, Swensen,
2002). Conceptually, existing work tends to treat this variable as a means of measuring the relative
skill intensity of firms and their demand for skilled labor (Thelen, 2004). Unfortunately, no such
23These are generally offered as complements to the universal government programs in Russia.
24For examples, c.f. Beazer (2012), Frye (2006), Frye and Iwasaki (2011), Frye et al. (2014), Gimpelson and Zudina
(2012).
25See Table 1.1 for a complete list of supporting studies
202
measure exists on my survey instrument. Instead, I make use of a related measure that captures
firms’ bargaining power vis-a-vis their employees. Conceptually, the easier it is for a given firm to
meet its demand for skilled labor, the less labor market constraints should govern its preferences.
As a simple proxy for the degree to which labor market considerations bind, I use a variable
which captures the difficulty that firms have in finding qualified managers. I select this measure
for two reasons. First, the survey uses a term for qualified specialists (kvalifitsirovannie rabotchi)
that can applies broadly to both workers with advanced education and those with small amounts
of on-the-job training. As work on labor markets in Russia has amply demonstrated, however,
the labor market needs of firms for these more narrowly defined types of specialists varies consid-
erably: the former tend to be scarce, while the latter are abundant (Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov,
and Lukiyanova, 2010, Tan et al., 2007). Because of the question wording, it is therefore impos-
sible to know what type of worker managers are thinking about when they answer this question.
Consequently, two firms with similar skill profiles in the same labor market may answer this ques-
tion differently based on what the manager perceives “qualified workers” to mean. Second, the
question on difficulties in finding qualified managers is helpful, because the category is relatively
well-defined in Russia and represents a relatively scarce variety of skill that firms traditionally have
difficulty finding on the labor market (Gimpelson, Kapeliushnikov, and Lukiyanova, 2010, RSPP,
2014, 2013, Tan et al., 2007). As such, this measure is a good proxy for firms’ bargaining power
vis-a-vis local labor markets and other firms. To the extent that managers are in high demand,
success in finding managers is likely to be strongly correlated with the ability to find the sorts of
high skill individuals that existing literature highlights.
4 Results
Table 4.1 presents the main results, which are consistent with both the misappropriation and free-
rider hypotheses discussed above. Model 4.1.1 introduces the baseline model, which includes
the full set of controls outlined in section 3.2 and the state ownership dummy variable. The co-
efficient of the state ownership dummy is positive and significant at conventional levels, indicating
that state-owned firms are more likely to support government control of social policy. To the
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extent that state ownership is a proxy for political connections, this result is consistent with the
misappropriation hypothesis.
With respect to the control variables, Model 4.1.1 indicates that labor market concerns are
statistically significant predictors of firms’ support for state-controlled social policy at the 5%
level. As expected, firms with difficulties in attracting qualified managers are more likely to support
increases in state-controlled social policy spending. This is consistent with work that highlights the
importance of labor market demand for skills in social policy preferences (Mares, 2003a, Swensen,
2002). Labor costs as a share of total revenue are also a significan predictor of social policy
preferences at conventional levels, but have the opposite effect. Firms that spend a larger share of
revenue on labor being more likely to oppose increases in social policy spending. This result is
also unsurprising, since firms with high labor costs are unlikely to be sympathetic to tax increases
that would further increase labor costs.
Other control variables, such as firm size and export orientation, are not significant at conven-
tional levels in most specifications of Table 4.1. These results are somewhat odd, given predictions
in the existing literature, particularly for firm size. This may be partially due to the fact, noted
above, that firm size is simultaneously correlated with political power in Russia and visibility to
tax authorities – potentially countervailing effects. Indeed, only when one controls for inspections
(model 4.1.5), a measure of visibility, does firm size become a significant (positive) predictor of
support for social policy. I discuss this result further below, when I validate my interpretation of
the other substantive variables of interest. Finally, it should be noted that managers’ characteristics
were insignificant predictors of firms’ attitudes towards social policy.26 This result mitigates some
concerns that answers to the social policy question reflect the personal preferences of managers,
since age, gender, and education are typically all extremely robust predictors of individuals’ pref-
erences for social policy and redistribution (c.f. Alesina and Giuliano (2011)). Here, the evidence
suggests managers are answering with their firms’ strategic goals and limitations in mind.27
Model 4.1.2 introduces the dummy variable indicating whether the firm sells products to the
government. Recall that government sales can be highly political in Russia and are often used as a
26These are omitted from the reported results in table 4.1, but are available upon request.
27This does not eliminate the possibility that managers’ ideological leanings shape their answers. I deal with this
possibility in greater detail in the next section.
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way to reward firms. Where misappropriation is rampant, firms with government sales are indeed
more likely to support social policy, although the result is only significant at the 10% level. By
contrast, the measures indicating that firms lobby the government and confidence in their ability
to protect their property rights vis-a-vis regional governments in court (models 4.1.3 and 4.1.4
respectively) are not significant at conventional levels. Taken together, therefore, the first four
models in table 4.1 support my theory’s predictions under the misappropriation pathology, although
they also suggest that one must be cautious in defining political connections. Proxies like property
rights protection seems to matter less than other form of privilege.
Model 4.1.5 introduces the proxy for free-riding, the log number of inspections the firm has
experienced in the last year. As expected, log inspections are a negative and significant predictor
of support for social policy: the more a firm has been inspected, the less it supports state-controlled
social policy spending. As noted above, this result is consistent with both misappropriation and
free-riding. On the one hand, firms that are inspected more often may not face government inspec-
tions due to protection from state allies, a form of privilege that allows them to deflect the costs of
poor institutions. On the other hand, firms that are less subject to inspection may also be better at
hiding themselves from the government, allowing them to evade taxes and free-ride. I attempt to
distinguish between these two in the next section.
It is worth briefly noting here that these results buttress (and are butressed) by the findings of
chapter 2. Recall that there I showed that the self-employed are more supportive of social policy
in settings with weak institutions. Although I treated those results as individual level results,
one could also argue that they say something about the preferences of the smallest firms, who
indisputably have advantages in hiding from the tax authorities. Obviously, one must be cautious
in conflating individual business owners’ preferences with their firm due to the lack of firm level
controls in chapter 2. Nevertheless, the fact that results for firms with a comparative advantage in
tax evasion in weak institutional settings are similar across these different tests is reassuring.
Finally, model 4.1.6 checks whether the results of the previous models may have been due
to selection effects related to non-response. I make use of a simple logit model, in which the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm responded “hard to say” to the social policy
expansion question and the right hand side consists of the set of controls from the previous models
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and the two main, significant independent variables of interest: the state ownership dummy and log
inspections. None of these variables is a significant predictor of answering “hard to say”, indicating
that results are unlikely to be due to systematic selection effects.28
Figure 4.4: Substantive Effects of Individual Level Predictors of Support or Social Policy
To put the results into context, Figure 4.4 provides a sense of the relative predictive power of
the log inspections variable and the state ownership dummy in comparison to the other statistically
significant controls.29 For continuous variables, the figure shows the first difference in the pre-
dicted probability that the median firm supports more social policy spending and higher taxes and
the continuous variable of interest moves from the median to the 90th percentile value. First differ-
ences for the state ownership dummy variable were taken between state owned firms and private
firms, with all other variables held at the median.
Interestingly, the substantive effect of the state ownership variable is by far the largest, with
state owned firms being about 9.8% more likely to support state-run social policy than other firms.
Log inspections had a smaller, but still large effect, making firms about 6% less likely to support
28These results are also consistent with the fact that these results are more or less missing at random. In unreported
regressions, I engage in list-wise deletion of firms that answered “hard to say”, which does not substantially alter
results.
29The figure was constructed using quasi-bayesian simulated predicted probabilities (and their 95% confidence
intervals) derived from models 4.1.5. Simulations were obtained in R.
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social policy spending as one goes from a median level of inspections to the 90th percentile. These
effects are as strong or stronger than the effects of going from a median to an acute level of need for
managers (4.9% more likely to favor social policy), from a median to a particularly large firm size
(5.1% more likely to favor social policy), and from median to particularly high labor costs (5.1%
less likely to support social policy). While most of these effects may seem objectively small, it
is important to note that effect sizes of 3-4% are large in comparison to the types of substantive
effects generally identified in the individual level literature, even when going from the median to
the 90th percentile of income. Rehm (2009), for example, estimates the probability of support
for social policy to decreases by about 5% as one goes from the median to the 90th percentile in
income and increases by 6% and and 3% as one goes from the median to the 90th percentile in
occupational unemployment rates and skill specificity respectively.
In order to insure the robustness of these results, I ran some additional tests. First, I recreated
the above specifications with the full set of ownership dummies – private firms, fully privatized
firms, partially privatized firms, and fully state-owned firms – instead of the more coarse state-
ownership dummy used in the main specifications. Results remain mostly robust, although these
tests suggest that much of the effect of the coarse state-ownership dummy comes from the strong
(both substantively and statistically) preferences of fully state-owned firms. Partially state-owned
firms tend to support government control more than other types of firms, but reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in only a few specifications.
Second, I guard against the possibility that variation in the tightness of local labor markets
shapes firm preferences for social policy by rerunning the models above using multi-level models
that account for local labor market conditions. I introduced regional level unemployment into the
above specifications and controlled for social policy spending as a percentage of total regional
spending. Since the legal framework for Russian social policy is set by the central government and
formally the same across regions, the latter is a good measure of variation in social policy.30 These
additions do not substantially change the results.
I also took advantage of the fact that the survey was conducted in each region’s capital city
to explore labor markets at the micro-level. In particular, I introduce a measure of net migration
30Results are omitted due to space concerns but are available upon request.
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into the city, a proxy for labor mobility, and of the employed share of the working age population.
Again, neither variable changes the main results. Substantively, these tests yielded little insight
into the effect of regional labor markets on preferences for social policy. This is to be expected,
as the small number of 2nd level (here regional) units severely biases estimates of both standard
errors and co-efficients. While corrections exist, they tend to work poorly for applications with
fewer than 20 observations (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008, Leoni, 2009).
4.1 Evaluating Alternative Interpretations
Two of the main variables of interest – the state ownership variable and the log inspections variable
– are potentially subject to endogeneity and interpretation issues. In this section, I provide some
additional tests in order to show that the interpretations offered in the previous section are valid,
that both variables are capturing the intended concepts, and that the results of the previous section
offer some support for both the privilege and free-riding perspectives.
Table 4.2 begins by offering a few tests designed to insure that the results attributed to the
state-ownership and inspections variables are not due to factors unobserved in those tests. Unfor-
tunately, there is no way to create good instruments for either of these variables from the survey,
therefore the only option is to attempt to control for major categories of unobservables and alterna-
tive explanations. One of the main differences between state and privately owned firms is that the
former may be able to count on state support, relaxing their budget constraints and allowing them
to support otherwise unprofitable policies (Kornai, 1986). Model 4.2.1 attempts to account for soft
budget constraints by introducing a measure of the extent to which firms are confident that author-
ities will provide aid in the event of financial difficulties.31 The more certain firms are that aid is
forthcoming, the more likely that soft budget constraints are guiding their decisions. This variable
is positive, as expected, but insignificant at conventional levels. It does decrease the significance
and magnitude of the state ownership dummy (although not below the 10% level), however. This
is consistent with the notion that fully state owned firms believe that their political connections will
allow them to mitigate the costs of social policy expansions in a poor institutional setting.
31Firms could respond “certainly not”, “probably not”, “probably yes”, “certainly yes”. Higher values imply greater
certainty of support.
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One may also worry that state-owned firms are less competitive than other firms, leading them
to seek out government subsidies. The main specification includes a measure of profitability, but
this may not fully capture differences in the ability to compete. Model 4.2.2 includes additional
measures of competitiveness, including whether firms were able to engage in capital investment,
open new product lines, or received foreign investment in the last two years. None of these vari-
ables are significant and they have no effect on the state dummy variable. This suggests that
variation in competitiveness is not driving the results.
State owned firms might also differ from the private sector in that they may have to informally
contribute to regional budgets and programs in exchange for favors (Gehlbach, 2008, Treisman,
1999). On the one hand, this may cause them to favor state-run social policy as a way of decreasing
their burden. On the other hand, it might not make a difference in what the firm is asked to provide
and instead just increase costs. Model 4.2.3 introduces a series of dummy variables equal to one if
firms reported that they provided aid to regional agencies, pension funds, unemployment programs,
or construction programs. None of the new variables are significant at conventional levels and they
have no effect on the sign or significance of the state-ownership dummy.
Managers of state-owned firms might also have different ideological leanings than their coun-
terparts in private firms. In this case, differences between state-owned firms and private ones reflect
the ideology of managers, not characteristics of the firms themselves. While the main specifica-
tions control for manager level characteristics, Model 4.2.4 introduces additional measures related
to government spending. Firms were asked whether they supported increases, decreases, or status
quo levels of spending on police forces, the judiciary, and education.32 Of these, only prefer-
ences for education spending are a significant predictor of support for social policy spending at
conventional levels, with the co-efficient being positive, as expected. Even with these additions,
however, the state-ownership dummy remains positive and significant. Model 4.2.5 tackles ideol-
ogy from a different direction, including dummy variables if respondents voted for the Communist
Party, liberal parties (Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces), and a variable indicating the extent
to which the respondent supports WTO accession. All are reasonable proxies for attitudes towards
the market. Again, these have little effect on the state ownership dummy and none are significant
32Note that these questions do not evoke taxation, so individuals are not reminded of the consequences of increased
spending.
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at conventional levels. Managers do not appear to be answering based on their own ideological
predilections.
Model 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 shift focus to the proxy for visibility – log inspections – in order to
assess whether the effect attributed to this variable is due to other factors. Model 4.2.6 first verifies
that inspections are not related to general perceptions of government competence, an alternative
explanation inconsistent with the institutions based framework advanced here. I introduce two
variables into the baseline model, which capture respondents’ evaluation of the performance of
their regional governor and regional executive bodies. In this specification, the magnitude of the
log number of inspections is actually larger than in previous estimates and remains significant at
conventional levels. Moreover, the two proxies for firms’ evaluation of local officials fail to reach
significance at conventional levels. The link between inspections and opposition to government-
controlled social policy does not appear to be related to negative evaluations of the government.
Model 4.2.7 is a similar exercise that checks whether log institutions are a proxy for local
bureaucratic discretion, a variable linked to expectations of rent-seeking and opportunism in the
Eastern European context (Beazer, 2012). I include an instrument indicating whether firms believe
local bureaucrats have a high degree of discretion. Again, this variable alters neither the mag-
nitude or the sign of the inspections variable. Interestingly, the measure of perceptions of local
bureaucratic discretion is a significant, positive predictor of support for social policy. While this is
a somewhat puzzling result, it may be explainable if firms are able to make use of local corruption
and bureaucratic discretion to attempt to ease their costs (or enhance their benefits) from social
policy, even if such policies may exacerbate free-rider problems at the regional level.33
While the results presented in table 4.2 mitigate concerns over alternative interpretations some-
what, they do little to address whether the state-ownership dummy and the inspections variable are
valid measures of the privilege and visibility concepts. Table 4.3 attempts to get at these con-
cerns directly. First, if the state ownership variable accurately captures the privilege logic, then we
would expect it to be a significant predictor of the types of privileges that enable firms to mitigate
costs associated with increased social policy spending: preferential protection of property rights,
protection against corruption, and access to government subsidies in case of economic difficulties.
33Local level discretion, in particular may insulate firms from capricious local politicians, c.f (Lewis, 2003, Miller,
2000, Rauch and Evans, 1999, Rauch, 1995).
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Similarly, if the inspections variable captures power derived from political connections, rather than
visibility, it should be associated with these variables as well.
Model 4.3.1 introduces as the dependent variable the ordinal measure of the degree to which
firms are confident they can prevail in court when the regional government is a counter-party used
in Model 4.1.4. Neither inspections or the state-ownership dummy are significant predictors, al-
though both have the signs the privilege logic would predict. Model 4.3.2 introduces as a dependent
variable a measure of the extent to which firms believe regional level bribery is a problem for firms
with related economic activity, a formulation typically use by the World bank to mitigate sensi-
tivity concerns about questions on corruption (c.f. BEEPS 2012). Consistent with the privilege
perspective, state-owned firms are less likely to believe that corruption is a problem for their peer
firms at the 1% level, implying they likely have some protection from regional predation.
Models 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 look at another privilege, often associated with political connections:
government support. Models 4.3.3 and Models 4.3.4 introduce dummy measures that capture
whether firms have received aid from regional and municipal governments (respectively) over the
last two years. In Model 4.3.3, neither the state dummy or the inspections variable is significant at
conventional levels. In Model 4.3.4, however, the state ownership dummy is significant, indicating
that state-owned firms are more likely to receive aid from municipal governments than other types
of firms. Given that the regression controls for potential correlates of poor performance and the
firms share of the labor pool (both of which might drive support even in the absence of political
connections), this finding is consistent with the notion that state-owned firms can make use of
connections to gain privileges for themselves that can mitigate their costs. The inspections variable
is not significant at conventional levels, however.
Finally, models 4.3.5 examines whether state-owned firms and those that are inspected often
are more likely to make sales to the government. Again, consistent with the privilege perspective,
state-owned firms are more likely to sell to the state, a potentially important source of rents and
financial support even in tough times (Frye and Iwasaki, 2011). Taken together and combined with
results from table 4.2 that rule out the most obvious sources of omitted variable bias, models 4.3.1
– 4.3.5 provide some support for the notion that the state-ownership dummy proxies for political
connections. Consistent with work on the benefits of connections, state-owned firms are more
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likely to believe corruption is not a problem for firms like them, more likely to receive aid from
local government, and more likely to make sales to the government. Inspections, however, are
unrelated to any potential privileges.
Turning to visibility, we would expect that firms with higher visibility are more likely to have
conflicts with the government over taxes. Model 4.3.6 introduces as the dependent variable a
dummy variable that captures whether firms have had tax conflicts with the authorities in the last
two years. Unsurprisingly, the fewer times a firm was inspected the less likely it was to have
tax conflicts at the 1% level. At the same time, state-ownership does not make for fewer tax
conflicts, at least not at conventional significance levels. Taken together, these results suggest that
the number of inspections are capturing something quite different than the state-ownership dummy
and is consistent with (or at least fails to contradict) the notion that this variable measures visibility.
The fact that firms that are inspected less have fewer conflicts with the tax authorities could
simply mean that such firms are law abiding and more likely to avoid situations that could cause
conflict with the authorities. To assess this possiblity, Model 4.3.7 introduces a measure of the
extent to which firms believe following the law should be conditional on agreeing with it. Incon-
sistent with the notion that firms that are inspected at low rates are more “law-abiding”, the more
often a firm is inspected, the more likely it is to believe that laws should be followed regardless of
whether one agrees with it, a result which holds at the 5% level. Again, this result is consistent
with an interpretation of the inspections variable as a measure of visibility.
As a final test of the interpretation of the inspections variable, model 4.3.8 uses this measure as
the dependent variable to explore the determinants of being inspected. If the number of inspections
a particular firm experiences are a function of the firms’ ability to leverage political connections
as a defensive mechanism, then it should be correlated with other potential measures of privilege
such as state-ownership once one controls for regulatory variation across firms.34 The dummy
variable for state ownership is negative in model 4.3.8, consistent with the notion that connections
may lower the number of inspections; however, the variable is insignificant at conventional levels.
Consequently, it does not appear that firms that are well-connected are able to use these connections
34I do this by introducing the variable measuring firms’ perceptions of their regulatory burden discussed above. This
is likely endogenous, but is the only way to measure variation in the extent to which sectors are regulated. Omitting
this term does not change the results.
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to prevent inspections. Taken together with the other results presented in table 4.3, this lends
support to my argument that the inspections variable measures firms’ visibility to state organs,
which is in turn a proxy for firms’ ability to free-ride.35
Before concluding, it is worth pointing out that table 4.3 helps to illustrate some of the ambi-
guities of the effect of firm size. Recall that section 3.1 claimed that firm size might be simulta-
neously a measure of privilege and of visibility. Consistent with the notion that large firms may
benefit from political connections, firm size is positive and significant in model 4.3.1, indicating
that larger firms are more likely to be able to prevail against regional government bodies in court.
Similarly, large firms are more likely to receive government aid (at local and regional levels), re-
sults which hold at conventional levels (Model 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). All of these results are subject
to alternative interpretations, of course, but they are at least consistent with the notion that large
firms have political connections and use them to receive privileges from the state. As noted above,
existing work on business-state relations in the post-Soviet space is also consistent with this story
(c.f. Gehlbach (2008), Hellman (1998)). Somewhat predictably, however, firm size is also associ-
ated with visibility. In models 4.3.6 and 4.3.8, firm size is a significant predictor of both a higher
probability of tax conflict and a greater number of inspections (respectively). Given that firm size
is associated with both privilege and free-riding, which generate opposite predictions about the
effect of firm size on social policy preferences, it is unsurprising that this variable proved mostly
insignificant at conventional levels in table 4.1, except for when we control for visibility directly
(model 4.1.6). Firm size captures two countervailing effects.
35Another potential test is to look at whether sectors traditionally associated with tax evasion are also less likely to
be inspected. In Russia, tax evasion tends to be correlated with particular (especially service sector) industries and firm
size (i.e. small firms) (Gimpelson and Zudina, 2012). One must be cautious, however, since tax evasion and informality
in Russia is characterized by both formal and informal components working side-by-side, which often results in both
hidden production and hidden wages in unexpected places, such as large industrial firms (Dolgopiatova, 1998, Johnson,
McMillan, and Woodruff, 2000, Kaufman and Kaliberda, 1996, Ovtcharova and Popova, 2001, Yakovlev, 2001). Here
I reject this approach, however, since sector dummies also proxy for a large number of factors other than propensity
for tax evasion that may shape propensity to be inspected.
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5 Conclusion
This chapter takes individual firms as the unit of analysis and examines the determinants of their
support for social policy using a heretofore underutilized technique: a firm survey. At its most ba-
sic, the chapter suggests that support for social policy amongst Russian firms is largely tied to labor
concerns. Firms with more difficulty finding qualified managers were more likely to support social
policy, while those with lower labor costs were less likely to support social policy. This finding is
in keeping with the emphasis on the labor market value of social policy to firms and validates the
Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Mares, 2003a, Swensen, 2002) against
recent critiques (Hacker and Pierson, 2002, Paster, 2013). Interestingly, however, other predictors
of support for social policy commonly cited in the literature – import/export orientation and firm
size – were not significant predictors of support for social policy. In large part, this may be due to
the correlation of these variables with both political power and the ability to evade taxes, both im-
portant determinants of support for social policy according to my theory, but which have opposite
signs.
Turning to the main argument, this chapter suggests that poor institutional settings create op-
portunities that allow some firms to profit. I draw on the observable implications of my central
argument to suggest that two groups are well-positioned to take advantage of weak institutions.
On the one hand, firms with privileged connections to the state can take advantage of these con-
nections to gain access to resources that mitigate costs associated with poor institutions. With
weaker budget constraints, social policy becomes more attractive. On the other hand, firms that
can hide from state officials and evade taxes can free-ride on social policy – letting others pay
the costs while they reap the benefits. While such groups may always be able to shift costs and
free-ride, I argue this type of strategy is more likely in poor institutional settings, where officials
are more weakly constrained. Consistent with this argument, I find that well-connected firms –
specifically state-owned firms – and those likely to be able to hide from the state – firms that expe-
rience low inspection rates – are more likely to support social policy in Russia, where institutions
are generally poor. These findings remain robust and consistent in the face of leading alternative
interpretations of them, controls for manager characteristics and ideology, and tests of the concep-
tual validity of the measures. The finding that firms with a comparative advantage in tax evasion
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support social policy in weak institutional settings is also consistent with evidence presented in
chapter 2. There, the self-employed, who are typically running small businesses, were also more
likely to support social policy in settings with weaker institutions, where they are more easily to
take advantage of their small size to evade taxes.
An important caveat must be made, however. This chapter took regional institutional quality
as uniformly poor when examining the preferences of firms. This leaves the question of whether
preferences vary ceteris paribus according to institutional quality open. At various points in this
chapter, I have suggested that free-riders everywhere may support the welfare state, so long as it
is set up in ways that allow them to benefit. Similarly, the politically well-connected may be able
to trade on the privileges of their connections to derive additional benefits from the welfare state
regardless of institutional quality. Viewed in this light, institutional quality conditions preferences
only in so far as it makes it easier to evade taxes or to trade on one’s privileges. That is, tax evaders
and the well-connected have the same preferences in strong and weak institutional settings, there
are just more of both groups where institutions are poor. Data limitations make it difficult to
address this question in this chapter, as there are only 11 regions in my sample. Appendix 6 does
so anyway, but results must be taken with caution. While chapter 2 allowed for some comparison
of the self-employed, effectively small business owners who can evade taxes, across countries
with varying institutional quality, the lack of firm level controls in that chapter make it difficult to
distinguish between individual business owners and their firms.
In the next chapter, I attempt to address this question in a more empirically sound way, albeit
with individual level data. I make use of a set of novel framing experiments that should make it
easier to detect unconditional effects of institutional quality on the preferences of the general popu-
lace. In doing so, I also provide a more rigorous test of which pathologies govern the unconditional
link between poor institutions and support for social policy.
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Table 4.1: Firms’ Preferences for Increased Spending on State-controlled Social Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Hard to Say (social policy)
Log employees 0.037 0.030 0.042 0.038 0.079*** 0.031
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.063)
Credit problems -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 0.004
(1=Yes) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.060)
Profitability -0.034 -0.031 -0.031 0.006 -0.038 -0.083
(1=Profitable last year) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.082) (0.105)
Degree of competition 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 -0.011
(Higher=More problematic) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.051)
Exporting firm -0.236 -0.271* -0.225 -0.240 -0.241 0.056
(1=Yes) (0.154) (0.161) (0.139) (0.151) (0.159) (0.139)
Firm provides social benefits 0.099 0.099 0.104 0.067 0.085 -0.185
(1=Yes) (0.126) (0.123) (0.126) (0.138) (0.128) (0.152)
Problems finding managers 0.072** 0.077*** 0.071** 0.065** 0.078*** -0.044
(Higher=More problematic) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.055)
Labor costs -0.205* -0.208* -0.203* -0.242** -0.213* 0.148
(Higher=Larger share of revenue) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.105) (0.109) (0.105)
State ownership 0.299** 0.303** 0.303** 0.274** 0.310** 0.068





Confidence in courts vs. regional 0.006
(Higher=Firm more likely to win) (0.068)
Log inspections -0.171*** -0.074
(0.039) (0.086)
Cut-point 1 -1.078 -0.855 -1.114* -1.394 -1.019 1.219
(0.664) (0.695) (0.625) (0.932) (0.637) (0.923)
Cut-point 2 0.935 1.173* 0.900 0.592 1.013*
(0.655) (0.691) (0.618) (0.927) (0.614)
Manager Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Groups 11 11 11 11 11 11
Observations 544 531 544 495 544 544
Pseudo R-squared 0.0999 0.0936 0.100 0.0913 0.109 0.0876
Model 1 - 6: Dependent variable is preferences for State-controlled social policy expansion.
Model 7: Dependent variable is those who answered“hard to say” to social policy instrument.
Manager characteristics are education, log age, and gender.
Cluster corrected (region) standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.2: Evaluating Alternative Interpretations for State Ownership and Inspections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
State ownership 0.283* 0.318*** 0.288** 0.332** 0.294** 0.259** 0.363***
(1=Yes) (0.145) (0.123) (0.129) (0.149) (0.132) (0.129) (0.135)
Log inspections -0.194*** -0.148**
(0.044) (0.057)
Probability of getting aid 0.073
(Higher=More Confident) (0.067)
Recent Foreign investment -0.183
(1=Yes) (0.253)
Recent Capital Investment -0.060
(1=Yes) (0.144)
Product line innovation -0.026
(1=Yes) (0.148)
Aid regional unemployment -0.026
(1=Provide aid) (0.143)
Aid regional construction 0.166
(1=Provide aid) (0.166)
Aid regional agencies -0.036
(1=Provide aid) (0.160)
Aid Regional pensions 0.124
(1=Provide aid) (0.123)
Police spending -0.094
(1=Should be Higher) (0.093)
Judicial spending -0.050
(1=Should be Higher) (0.178)
Education spending 0.291*
(1=Should be Higher) (0.167)
Voted for KPRF -0.238
(1=Yes) (0.252)




Regional bureaucracy rating 0.035
(Higher=Higher approval) (0.087)




Cut-point 1 -0.966 -1.214* -1.182* -0.971 -1.054 -1.314* 0.420
(0.632) (0.659) (0.669) (0.703) (0.724) (0.748) (0.882)
Cut-point 2 1.049* 0.807 0.834 1.083 0.962 0.690 2.551***
(0.624) (0.678) (0.656) (0.715) (0.706) (0.733) (0.819)
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 532 526 540 491 498 488 376
Pseudo R-squared 0.0987 0.106 0.103 0.121 0.104 0.116 0.151
Dependent variable is preferences for State-controlled social policy expansion.
Firm level controls as in Table 4.1.
Manager characteristics are education, log age, and gender.
Cluster corrected (region) standard errors in parentheses.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log Employees 666 4.989 1.532 1.386 11.156
Credit Problems 629 3.431 1.486 1 5
Profitable 650 .602 .65 -1 1
Degree of Competition 657 2.376 1.347 0 4
Exporting Firm 666 .255 .436 0 1
Firm Provides Social Benefits 655 .631 .483 0 1
Problems finding managers 658 3.488 1.407 1 5
Labor costs 599 .938 .663 0 2
Log of respondent’s age 666 1.041 .288 0 1.386
Respondent’s Education 666 2.925 .581 1 4
Respondent’s Gender 666 .207 .406 0 1
State Ownership 665 .22 .414 0 1
Government Sales 644 .651 .477 0 1
Firm Lobbies 666 .523 .5 0 1
Confidence in courts vs. regional government 598 2.704 .995 1 4
Regional Corruption Burden 544 2.711 1.393 1 5
Government Support: Regional 649 .125 .331 0 1
Government Support: Municipal 584 .14 .348 0 1
taxconflict 666 .194 .395 0 1
Conditionality of Legal Compliance 627 3.396 .781 1 4
Regulatory Burden 651 3.465 1.332 1 5
6 Appendix: Regional Level Determinants of Social Policy Sup-
port
The main paper made the assumption that Russian firms face a poor institutional environment
regardless of where they are located in the country. In this section, I relax this assumption in order
to take advantage of regional level variation in the quality of institutions across Russia’s regions.
Although it is difficult to argue that institutions are truly good in any Russian region some regions
are certainly worse than others.
This being said, there are three important caveats that must be made before proceeding to
analysis. First, the survey data on firm preferences that I have is quite limited in its scope: there
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are only 11 regions in the sample. While it is still possible to recover meaningful effects on second-
level characteristics (i.e. at the region level) from such a small sample, it represents a very hard test
(Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008, Gelman and Hill, 2007, Leoni, 2009). Second, endogeneity
is also a concern. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) argue that democratization
and regime change come about as a consequence of class conflicts and the redistributive pressures
they place on the state. This implies that the quality of institutions today may have a lot to do
with the preferences of the population for social policy in the past and that institutional quality and
preferences for redistribution are co-determined. Consequently, any direct effect of institutional
quality on preferences for redistribution must be interpreted with caution.
Finally, there is some question as to the extent to which variation in the small sub-sample of
Russian regions presented here is representative of the whole and sufficient to capture the effect
of regional level variables. The regions in my survey sample are indicated in red in figures 4.1
and 4.2. The population mean is denoted in blue, while the red lines denotes one standard devi-
ation above and below the mean. There is a great deal of variation in perceptions of corruption
(figure 4.1) among the sample regions, but they tend to be relatively tightly clustered with respect
to investment risk (figure 4.2). Consequently, it may be possible to see how expectations about
rent-seeking and the ability to monitor bureaucrats shape social policy preferences in this sample,
but doing the same for expectations about state capacity would be hard.
In order to capture different aspects of institutional quality and their effect on social policy, I
make use of several alternative measures. First, in order to measure the extent to which perceived
corruption shapes preferences for social policy, I take the regional average response to an item on
the firm survey that asks respondents to what extent they believe local bureaucrats are corrupt. This
focus on perceived, rather than actual corruption, stems from a similar focus in existing models of
institutional quality and investment, where rational individuals who perceive institutional quality to
be poor should never invest in the first place (North, 1990, North and Weingast, 1989). Empirical
work focusing on the effect of various pathologies of poor institutional environments – bureaucratic
discretion (Beazer, 2012) and uncertainty for well-connected firms (Frye and Yakovlev, 2013) –
have also tended to support the notion that perceptions matter a lot for investment.36
36For a discussion of this distinction, c.f. Treisman (2007).
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Second, I measure problems with monitoring local officials more generally by including region
average responses to an item on the firm survey asking about the extent of local bureaucratic
discretion. As noted above, where officials have discretion, they may be able to manipulate laws in
ways that generate rents at the expense of business (Beazer, 2012). Social policy, underpinned by
complex tax and benefit distribution laws is potentially particularly vulnerable to such discretion.
Third, I include a measure of regional investment risk as a proxy for fears of grand corruption and
expropriation by regional authorities. The Russian consulting firm, RA Expert, releases yearly risk
ratings of all Russian regions based on expert assessments of political, legal, economic, financial,
social, and ecological risks.37 The higher a region scores on RA Expert’s index, the lower the
quality of institutions and the higher the investment risk.
Fourth, I test (Mares, 2005a)’ theory that state capacity is critical to support for social policy. I
measure state-capacity by including a measure of the total share of non-resource taxes in regional
budgets. The higher a regions’ share of non-tax revenue, the more likely evasion is rampant and the
weaker state capacity. Finally, drawing on the notion that low levels of political accountability may
exacerbate deficiencies in the ability of firms to effectively monitor, prevent shirking, and control
corruption on the part of regional bureaucrats, I also introduce a measure of political competition
(Beazer, 2012). My measure comes from the Moscow Carnegie center, which rates the quality of
elections (freeness and fairness), the transparency of the political sphere, and pluralism (number
of parties) (McMann and Petrov, 2000).38
Table 4.5 reports the results of incorporating regional level variables. For the purposes of
increasing the efficiency of convergence, all regional level variables have been mean-centered (c.f.
Gelman and Hill (2007)). With this transformation, higher positive values indicate that regions
are institutional over-achievers, while regions with negative values are under-achievers. Models
include all variables from section 3.2, which are unchanged.
Of the models presented in Table 4.5, only Models 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 suggest that institutional
variables ceteris paribus shape the preferences of firms. Model 4.5.2 indicates that firms in regions
37Details and raw data can be found at RA Expert (2004). Unfortunately, disaggregated assessments of each sub-
component of the index are not available.
38While the original index includes ten sub-components, I focus on these three as the most relevant for assessing
political competition. The results reported below remain largely the same if the full index is used.
221
whose aggregate belief that bureaucratic discretion is high are more likely to oppose expansions
in state-controlled social policy spending, with the discretion variable reaching significance at the
99% level. This is in line with the prediction that increased discretion makes it harder for firms
to monitor bureaucratic effort and to protect themselves from rent-seeking behaviors advanced in
chapter 1. Similarly, Model 4.5.3 also suggests that as democracy, and therefore accountability,
increase, firms are more likely to support social policy, although this result only holds at the 90%
level. By contrast, the institutional measures in models 4.5.1 and 4.5.4, and 4.5.5 are not signifi-
cant at conventional levels. Perceptions of corruption, investment risk, and state capacity appear to
have no significant relationship to preferences for social policy in this sample. All three variables
do have the expected positive sign, however: better institutional quality implies more support for
social policy,
To reiterate the point made at the beginning of this section, finding significant results is both
unlikely and surprising given the small number of regions available for analysis. That being said,
results mostly conform to expectation that poor quality institutions decrease the willingness of
firms to support social policy. It is interesting to note that of the institutional variables that were
statistically significant in Table 4.5 – bureaucratic discretion and regional democracy levels – both
are linked to the notion of accountability. Independence from regional politicians (the discretion
measure) makes it harder for businesses to sanction bureaucrats for implementation failures related
to social policy, while weak democracies sap the incentives of politicians to hold lower level bu-
reaucrats accountable. Nonetheless, the small number of regions available for analysis makes it
difficult to conclude that this is the only pathology governing the relationship between institutional
quality and preferences for social policy.
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Table 4.5: Firms’ Preferences for Increased Spending on State-controlled Social Policy and
Regional-level Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy Social Policy
Log Employees 0.035** 0.037** 0.038** 0.036** 0.037**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Credit Problems -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
(1=Yes) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Profitable -0.013 -0.024 -0.012 -0.016 -0.015
(1=Yes) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Degree of Competition 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.014
(Higher=More problematic) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Exporting Firm -0.124* -0.118 -0.120* -0.108 -0.117
(1=Yes) (0.074) (0.078) (0.072) (0.071) (0.075)
Firm Provides Social Benefits 0.081 0.074 0.074 0.094* 0.080
(1=Yes) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Problems finding managers 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(Higher=More problematic) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Labor costs -0.134*** -0.119** -0.123** -0.125** -0.122**
(Higher=Larger Share) (0.051) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
State 0.190** 0.191** 0.186** 0.169** 0.183**
(1=Yes) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
privatized 0.032 0.038 0.028 0.028 0.032
(1=Yes) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059)
Reaction to contract breach -0.044* -0.040 -0.042* -0.041* -0.041
(Higher=More likely to break) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Log inspections -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.072***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Regional social policy spending 3.001 2.153 3.221 3.552 2.447
(2.738) (2.970) (2.777) (2.585) (2.685)




Regional investment rating 0.108
(Higher=More risky) (0.401)




Constant -0.000 0.004 -0.126 -0.172 -0.029
(0.346) (0.341) (0.524) (0.376) (0.357)
Sector fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Region Random Intercepts yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 526 526 526 526 526
Number of groups 11 11 11 11 11
Log-liklihood -487.8 -483.7 -489.0 -444.6 -491.0
Dependent variable is preferences for State-controlled social policy expansion.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (5000 repetitions).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 5
Preferences and Institutional Pathologies
How do institutions shape the preferences of the average firm or individual? Evidence so far has
been mixed. On the one hand, chapter 2 found no direct relationship between individual level pref-
erences and measures of institutional quality in 28 post-communist countries. While this could be
an artifact of the small number of countries in the sample, it could also reflect a reality in which
the costs of poor institutions are too diffuse to detectably alter preferences. On the other hand,
chapter 3 suggests that institutions do ceteris paribus shape support for social policy. Institutional
quality was a common theme in Russian pension reform debates, with actors identifying a wide
range of concerns. Broad swathes of society expressed fear of the government’s ability to misap-
propriate funds, increased macro-economic risk due to bad policy, the consequences of tax evasion
for benefits, and the reliability of the private sector in the face of weak contract enforcement.
This chapter attempts to adjudicate between these findings and to answer two questions that
have not been fully explored in the dissertation thus far. First, what are the preferences of those
who cannot take advantage of poor institutions to shift or mitigate the costs of social policy (i.e.
the average individual)? That is, do institutions matter ceteris paribus or do they only condition
the preferences of subsets of the population who can most benefit (or suffer) from the opportunities
they create? Second, which of the four pathologies outlined in chapter 1 (if any) links preferences
ceteris paribus to support for social policy?
To answer these questions, this chapter makes use of an original survey of 1600 Russian indi-
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viduals that includes a framing experiment designed to evaluate the link between institutions and
social policy preferences. Although the individual is the unit of analysis, I assume that the results
provide some insights into the preferences of firm. This experimental design has several benefits.
First, experimental treatments can be narrowly tailored to evoke particular pathologies of poor in-
stitutions, allowing stronger inferences about how institutions shape preferences. An experimental
design also provides clean inferences about whether preferences matter ceteris paribus in the face
of concerns over omitted variables. Second, focusing on a single country insures an apples to ap-
ples comparison of social policy preferences (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008), since variation in the
design of social policy can alter how individuals interpret survey instruments. Individuals’ experi-
ences with different configurations of social policy with respect to control, risk, and redistribution
likely affect how and when institutions shape preferences and could bias treatment effects. Finally,
as noted in chapter 4, conducting this survey in Russia allows me to study preferences in a country
where institutions are poor and individuals have first-hand experience with the consequences of
weak institutions for everyday life. Where institutional quality is better, treatments related to poor
institutions may not be credible.
In the next section, I briefly review some of the relevant theoretical background first presented
in Chapter 1 and present the main theoretical expectations of the chapter. Section 2 presents the
survey instruments and experimental treatments, as well as discusses the analytical strategy of the
chapter. Section 3 presents the analysis and main results. Section 4 concludes.
1 Theoretical Expectations
Recall from chapter 1 that four pathologies potentially govern the link between social policy prefer-
ences and institutional quality. Three of these suggest similar predictions about the ceteris paribus
relationship between institutional quality and support for social policy. First, under misappropri-
ation, authorities are weakly constrained, allowing them to misappropriate funds for unintended
purposes – whether to fund other policy priorities or to create opportunities for rents (Olson, 2000,
1993). This siphons money from social policy pay-outs, and decreases support for social pol-
icy. Second, free-riding offers a similar prediction, but focuses on expectations about revenue and
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funding Mares (2005a). It suggests that poor institutions sap state capacity and decrease both in-
centives and ability to police tax evasion. Again, this results in smaller benefits than expected,
which decreases support for social policy. Finally, under weak contract enforcement support for
social policy revolves around the inability of the government to credibly enforce contracts in weak
institutional settings: both public-private and between private actors. Since actors can take advan-
tage of weak contract enforcement to alter contracts and policies in ways that allow them to profit
from changing circumstances, individuals and firms should be wary of arrangements with third
parties that leave them vulnerable. Again, this is akin to a dead-weight cost and should decrease
support for social policy. All three of these pathologies of poor institutions should therefore be
associated with weaker support for social policy.
The final pathology – institutionally induced macro-economic risk – suggests the opposite,
however. Individual risk is a well-understood, and extremely robust, predictor of support for so-
cial policy among both individuals and firms (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, Mares, 2003a, Moene
and Wallerstein, 2001). The higher the risk, the more individuals will support social policy. This
suggests that if weak institutions increase macro-economic risk, they may also increase support
for social policy as a means of hedging. A large body of empirical work indeed suggests that poor
quality institutions increase economic volatility over time (Henisz, 2000, Mobarak, 2005, Noorud-
din, 2003, Quinn and Woolley, 2001, Rodrik, 2000b, 1999), both due to direct rent-seeking (North,
Wallis, and Weingast, 2009) and the incentives poor institutions create to engage in opportunistic
policy-reversals (Frye, 2010, Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Sen, 1983). This suggests that as insti-
tutional quality declines, individuals may be more willing to support social policy as a way of
hedging against macro-economic volatility.
An important caveat to the discussion above, however, is the extent to which individuals actu-
ally have to pay dead-weight costs associated with poor institutions. Existing work assumes that
dead-weight costs are large enough to shape the preferences of individuals in an observable way
(Becker, 1985, 1983). Similar to a perverse form of public good, however, these dead-weight costs
are diffused across an entire population: everyone contributing or collecting social policy pays
them. As a result any given individual bears a relatively small burden. In such circumstances,
these diffuse dead-weight costs may not be enough to motivate individuals to oppose social policy,
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much as diffuse benefits rarely evoke action in support of public goods provision (Olson, 1965). If
this is the case, institutions would have no ceteris paribus effect.
2 Research Design
In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, I make use of a survey experiment
carried out on the November 2014 edition of the Levada Omnibus Survey, a nationally represen-
tative survey of 1600 Russians across 45 of Russia’s regions. In this chapter, I pool respondents,
setting aside potential variation across the regions. First, as I discuss below, doing so maximizes
power, which is important given that the experiment requires at least 3 treatments and a control.
Second, most of the social policy programs in this dissertation are the responsibility of federal
agencies and their regional branches (Martinez-Vasquez, Timofeev, and Boex, 2006). As a conse-
quence, it is unclear if regional level variation across Russia’s regions would matter in evaluating
such policies.1 Third, as noted in Chapter 4 there is substantial variation in institutional quality
across Russian regions but for the most part it ranges from poor to abysmal, rather than from good
to bad. This complicates identification for any design based on comparing a “good” region to a
“bad” one. Finally, institutional quality in Russia is highly correlated with economic variables and
mineral resources (Gehlbach, 2008, Remington, 2011), further complicating a matching design.
Survey respondents were randomly assigned to one of four groups: three treatments and a
control. All groups received a set of questions about their preferences over various aspects of
social policy and spending. The first question takes the form:
There are different opinions about the level of financing for social policy and the appropriate
level of taxes for businesses and the populace. What do you think, what should be done with the
following social programs: social policy programs on the whole?
1. Taxes should be greatly decreased, along with spending on social policy.
2. Taxes should be slightly decreased, along with spending on social policy.
1It might, however, affect whether treatments based on providing respondents with information are deemed credi-
ble. I return to this point below.
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3. Taxes and spending on social policy should remain as they are now.
4. Taxes should be slightly increased, along with spending on social policy.
5. Taxes should be greatly increased, along with spending on social policy.
6. Difficult to say.
This question wording has a few advantages. First, by evoking taxes directly in the question, the
survey instrument encourages individuals to carefully think about the trade-offs between the desire
for more generous social policy and its costs. Second, due to the references to taxes and spending,
the question is designed so that the respondent is clearly thinking about their preferences over
government control. Private control in Russia is associated specifically with the accumulative
pension scheme – where private funds invest contributions collected by the government – and with
voluntary insurance, where employers provide services on their own. Only the Russian government
collects taxes, making this question clearly about government programs. Finally, in focusing on
both control and level of financing, the survey instrument is broadly similar to instruments on other
surveys commonly used in the existing literature. This makes it easier to compare responses across
surveys and speculate about generality.
Control and the level of financing are not the only interesting features of social policy. To cap-
ture other dimensions, I also include three additional questions which use the same formulation,
but ask what should be done with “programs to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor“,
pensions, and the health-care system. Each captures slightly different dimensions and considera-
tions related to social policy. While the main question of interest in this chapter is whether there
is a ceteris paribus effect of institutional quality on preferences for social policy, these additional
dimensions help test scope conditions.
Along the risk dimension, health-care and pensions capture extraordinary and life-cycle risks,
respectively. These questions also help tease out how the time horizons of policy and nature of
risks (predictable versus unpredictable) shape preferences where institutions are poor. Pathologies
that increase the dead-weight costs of poor quality institutions – misappropriation, free-riding,
and weak contract enforcement – suggest that support for social policy should decrease as time
horizons (of both risks covered and payouts) lengthen. Institutionally induced macro-economic
228
risk, conversely, is associated with greater risk and yields predictions that under poor institutions
individuals will have stronger preferences for insurance and long-term programs.
In the Russian context, programs to reduce the gap between the rich and poor and health-care
both capture preferences for highly redistributive social programs, which produce mixed predic-
tions.2 On the one hand, redistributive programs allow free-riders to reap benefits without paying.
On the other hand, the simplicity of such programs make it easier to detect misappropriation, while
redistribution can help cushion macro-economic volatility.
2.1 Treatment Conditions
Turning to the treatment conditions, each of the three treatment groups and the control had roughly
400 respondents. The treatments contained general, truthful information about some aspect of
institutional quality in Russia. Conceptually, these statements were meant to prime respondents
to think about specific aspects of poor institutions as they answered questions about social pol-
icy. This design takes inspiration from experimental work on institutional quality, but differs in
its underlying assumptions. Traditionally, prompts in this literature are designed to provide new
information that causes individuals to update their priors and alters responses.3 Individuals are
well aware of the general weakness of institutions in Russia, however, so it would be difficult to
generate a treatment that would cause such updating. Consequently, my treatment prompts are
meant to prime respondents to think about institutional quality rather than shock them. The trade-
off, however, is that priming will likely produce weaker effects than novel (shocking) information.
Consequently, this priming experiment represents a lower bound on the effect and provides a hard
test of the argument.
The statements used as treatment conditions roughly follow three of the pathologies of poor
institutions I discussed in Chapter 1: misappropriation, free-riding, and contract enforcement. As
discussed in chapter 1, the micro-logic linking each pathology of poor institutions to support for
2For a discussion of these programs in Russia, see Chapter 4.
3A classic example of this type of study is work on electoral accountability, which examines the link between
detrimental information about politicians – usually corruption ratings or criminal records – and electoral preferences.
For and example in which voters were provided information on the degree of corruption of actual candidates during an
election, see Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara (2013). Hypothetical vignettes are also often used in this literature,
see Anduiza, Gallego, and Munoz (2013), Banerjee et al. (2011), Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013).
229
social policy is quite different, even if the predictions that arise from them are observationally
equivalent along a number of dimensions. As we saw in chapter 2 many observational measures
corresponding to each are highly correlated. Offering separate treatments helps separate out at
least some of the noise due to collinearity. This being said, there is a very real trade-off between
having multiple treatments and statistical power in this experiment. Power analysis conducted
during the planning of this survey assumed that the treatment effect would be along the lines of
the magnitude of differences in means between the 50th and the 75th percentiles in income. This
would correspond to an effect similar to that identified for potential tax evaders in chapter 2 for a
similar range of institutional quality. If these assumptions hold, then a study with groups of 400
respondents should have power of at least .8 with α = .01. Thus, if effect sizes are smaller than
assumed, this design may have trouble distinguishing them statistically. As I discuss in the results
section, this turned out to be a major problem, as effect sizes were about half the size expected.
The first treatment group received a prompt designed to examine misappropriation. Although
misappropriation can take many forms, the most obvious and easy to understand is the diversion
of funds by the authorities to line their own pockets. In order to tap into this pathology, I provided
the treatment group with the national average response to a survey instrument about having to pay
bribes to receive government services drawn from the nationally representative “Penta” Survey
conducted in November of 2011. Respondents in this treatment group were told that:
Many Russians complain that in order to get things done in Russia, it is necessary to
pay bribes. Last year 24% of surveyed Russians reported that they paid bribes in order
to receive services from government authorities (Rent-seeking treatment)
The prompt is ideal, because it focuses respondents on the need to pay bribes to receive basic,
legally mandated services from the government. Consequently, respondents who receive this
prompt should be thinking about bureaucratic malfeasance and the willingness of officials to use
their official duties for illicit gain. While the prompt does not capture the full range of misappro-
priation, it nonetheless evokes the ways that weak controls on bureaucrats can cause wastage and
harm for public policy in a visceral way.
The second treatment group received a prompt designed to examine free-riding. The prompt
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was drawn from aggregating a question on the 2012 Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS) about the percentage of pay individuals receive that they believe was not reported to
employers.4 About 15% of respondents reported that some (>5%) or all of their pay was not
reported to the authorities. Obviously, this figure is an underestimate, since the question was
unusually blunt and direct. Given the sensitivity, it is no surprise that about 20% of working
respondents did not answer the question. Nevertheless, this is the only nationally representative,
contemporaneous question on tax evasion in Russia of which I am aware.
Using this data, I constructed the following statement:
A recent survey of the Russian population showed that 15% of Russians believe that
their employers do not pay some or all of the payroll taxes on their salaries, which
decreases their contributions to the Pension Fund and other social policy funds (Free-
rider treatment).
The prompt has two parts. The first portion provides the respondent with information on tax
evasion rates, priming them to think about institutional quality in general and the extent to which
others do not pay taxes. The second part of the question references pension and other social policy
funds, which should prompt respondent to think about how failure to pay taxes can negatively
impact revenue and the amount available for distribution. Taken together, this formulation should
nicely encapsulate the logic of free-riding, as well as to prime respondents to think carefully about
the relationship between tax evasion and free-riding.
The final treatment is designed to examine weak contract enforcement. Whereas the previous
prompts were drawn from information aggregated from national surveys, the prompt relating to
contract enforcement was drawn from media reports of non-government pension funds that went
bankrupt under suspicious circumstances.5 Respondents were given the following prompt:
4The RLMS survey covered 18,687 individuals across Russia and has a nationally representative sample. The
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE was conducted by the National Research University Higher
School of Economics and ZAO Demoscope together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS. Data and further descriptions can be found at: http :
//www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms− hse.
5See Firstnews (17/06/2014) “Bankrotstvo NPF Ne Povredit Klientami.” Available at: http :
//www.firstnews.ru/articles/id699101− bankrotstvo− npf − ne− povredit− ikh− klientam/.
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In the last few years, several non-government pension funds went bankrupt, such as
General Pension Fund, Family, Professional Independent Pension Fund, and Transstroy.
The Agency for Insurance Deposits (ACB) believes these cases may have been due to
fraud by their managers (Contract Enforcement Treatment).
By using actual cases of non-government pension funds closed under suspicious circumstances,
the prompt connects concerns about contract fulfillment by firms with social policy. Moreover, I
choose funds whose closure the Federal Agency for Insurance Deposits publicly linked to fraud to
lend additional authority and to distinguish these cases from natural churn in the pension market.
This design nicely captures the core motivation potentially linking weak contract enforcement and
support for social policy: third party, private actors cannot be trusted to manage social policy funds.
Before moving on, it is important to make two caveats. First, by using national average levels
of bribery and tax evasion, I make the assumption that this information is treated similarly in
regions where bribery and tax evasion are more and less pervasive than average. Violation of this
assumption would potentially introduce heterogeneous treatment effects across regions. I discuss
this possibility in greater depth in the next section.
Second, “hard to say” responses were much higher than anticipated in all of the treatment
groups and the control group. Roughly 20% of respondents in any given experimental group for
any given dependent variable provided this response. As with firms in the previous chapter, it is
difficult to know what to make of this group. On the one hand, it is hard to believe the question
is sensitive and “hard to say” responses rates are similar across treatments and the control. On the
other hand, “hard to say” responses may reflect ignorance of social policy, making respondents
hesitant to answer the question, or total indifference. This situation is analogous to non-response
amongst firms in the previous chapter. There, my interviews with firms and business associations
strongly suggested that it was not ignorance of the working of the social policy system, but actual
indifference, that drove these responses. This informed my decision to treat these observations as
neutral. For individuals, however, I have no such data to fall back on. As a consequence, I treat
these results as missing in this chapter. All results in this chapter are robust to assuming that “hard
to say” masks indifference, however.6
6Results are available upon request.
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2.2 Balance and Empirical Strategy
In order to check whether treatment was truly assigned randomly, Table 5.1 shows the mean values
of several individual and regional level variables for the three treatment groups and the control
group. The table shows that age, gender, education levels, income, household size, and the propor-
tion of non-working pensioners (a key beneficiary group of social policy in Russia) were roughly
similar across the treatment and control groups and ANOVA tests confirm that these groups are
statistically indistinguishable. In addition, the degree to which individual respondents reported
that people in similar occupations are paid informally was also balanced across groups.7
Table 5.1: Balance Across Treatment Groups
Control Misappropriation Free-riding Contract Enforcement Total ANOVA
Age 46.09 46.28 45.27 44.71 45.6 0.56
(16.27) (16.36) (16.64) (16.26) (16.39)
Gender 0.585 0.539 0.573 0.62 0.578 0.79
(0.494) (0.499) (0.495) (0.486) (0.494)
Non-working pensioner 0.267 0.284 0.258 0.265 0.268 0.59
(0.443) (0.452) (0.438) (0.442) (0.443)
Education 1.736 1.666 1.611 1.697 1.674 0.58
(0.985) (0.995) (1.031) (0.991) (1.002)
Income 6.607 6.58 6.427 6.505 6.527 0.72
(2.947) (2.985) (2.899) (2.801) (2.909)
Household 2.733 2.681 2.74 2.672 2.709 0.35
(1.135) (1.129) (1.236) (1.13) (1.161)
Regional GRP per Capita (thousands) 281.128 254.69 251.378 274.008 264.398 0.323
(187.667) (149.752) (153.021) (170.311) (165.369)
Moscow Carnegie Corruption Index 2.598 2.661 2.667 2.664 2.648 0.001***
(0.569) (0.575) (0.595) (0.593) (0.583)
ANOVA indicates p-value for one–way ANOVA with the null hypothesis that all means are equal. See text for variable descriptions
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
While individuals were randomly assigned to treatment groups, there is some evidence that
respondents in particular regions were more likely to be assigned to treatment than others. Of
particular concern, samples were unbalanced across one of the few contemporaneous measures
of institutional quality with national coverage: a measure of corruption produced by the Moscow
Carnegie Center.8 On average, individuals in regions that are more corrupt were more likely to
7The exact question wording was: “What do you think, for the average person employed in your profession and
sector, how much of their pay do you think is ‘paid in the envelope’?” ‘Pay in the envelope’ is a Russian euphemism
for unreported pay. Respondents were able to choose one of four categories ranging from (0) No pay is given in the
envelope’ to (3) Almost all pay is given ‘in the envelope’ or respond ‘Hard to Say’.
8This measure is sub-component of the Moscow Carnegie Center Index of Democracy updated through 2010,
which was produced using a survey of Russian regional experts. While other measures of corruption exist, this measure
is the only one that is both roughly contemporaneous with my survey and which covers all of the regions covered by
my survey. Other measures, such as regional averages of the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise
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receive the misappropriation and free-rider treatments.
This regional level imbalance is of particular concern if individuals in settings with good in-
stitutions interpret the treatment prompts differently than those in settings with weak institutions.
If this is the case, variation in institutional quality may influence the magnitude (and sign) of
treatment effects. How depends largely on whether the treatments represent new information that
forces individuals to update their priors or merely serves to prime individuals to think about poor
quality institutions. Recall that the treatment conditions were constructed using nationally aggre-
gated data. On the one hand, if the treatments provide new information, then we would expect
that after treatment some individuals – those in regions with stronger institutions on average – will
believe institutions are worse than they originally thought, while others – in regions where institu-
tions are weaker on average – will believe that institutions are better. This obviously complicates
interpretation, since treatment effects in these two types of regions would have opposite signs.
On the other hand, if the treatment provides little new information and instead only primes in-
dividuals to think about institutional quality, everyday experiences with regional level institutions
color responses. That is, day-to-day exposure to the consequences (or lack thereof) of institu-
tional quality should lead individuals to internalize the effects of institutions, thus fundamentally
shaping economic decision making. In regions with weak institutions, one is constantly aware
of corruption, informality, and official malfeasance, making prompts about the paucity of insti-
tutional quality credible. That being said, priming one to think about such issues is unlikely to
make much of a difference to one’s thought process, since poor institutions are an everyday part of
life. In regions with strong institutions, by contrast, information about weakness in institutions is
likely to be less credible, although it does raise issues for respondents that they would not normally
consider. Taken together, these two effects potentially undermine the identification strategy of the
experiment, as they may wash out treatment effects.
Given these concerns, the empirical plan for the remainder of the chapter is as follows. In the
next section, I initially ignore the problem of balance across regions and assume that treatment is
survey would force me to drop regions from my sample and would be inappropriate for assessing balance if the
dropped regions systematically differ from the retained ones. In the case of BEEPS, the regions in my sample that
are excluded from BEEPS are statistically distinguishable from those included in BEEPS along both regional level
reported informality and the Petrov corruption measure at conventional levels. Regions that are more corrupt or where
informality is higher, on average, were less likely to be in the BEEPS sample.
234
credible in all regions and does not improve perceptions of institutional quality. I present simple
differences in means between treatment and control groups and then make use of a regression
framework to attempt to control for regional imbalances across groups. In section 3.1, I assess the
potential for heterogeneous treatment effects across regions using the Moscow Carnegie measure.
I present simple differences in means for the subset of regions with higher and lower than average
corruption. I follow up with a regression based test.
3 Results
Analysis of the experimental treatments was conducted using simple unpaired t-tests of differences
in means, assuming unequal variance.9 Figure 5.1 examines the differences between the three
treatment conditions introduced in the previous section and the control group. Along with the first
differences between the mean responses for each of the treatment conditions and the control, the
figure also shows the 90% confidence interval estimate for this difference.
On face, Figure 5.1 suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between the
treatment conditions and support for any of the social policies examined. The directions of the
effects are potentially suggestive, however. In general, all of the treatments seem to increase sup-
port for social policy on the whole by small amounts, consistent with the macro-economic risk
pathology. The opposite seem to be the case with pensions, however, where both the misappropri-
ation and free-rider treatments decrease support for state-run pensions, as one would expect if the
dead-weight costs of institutions motivate preferences for social policy. The contract enforcement
treatment, by contrast, increases support for state-run pensions modestly, indicating greater trust in
the government under these circumstances. This being said, since none of these results hold at con-
ventional levels of significance, it is impossible to know if the direction of the effect is accurately
estimated. Table 5.2 displays the numeric data behind figure 5.1.
Two related concerns with Figure 5.1 are that the size of the treatment groups (about 400 re-
spondents each) provide insufficient power to reliably identify an effect and the treatments may
9I conducted F-tests of equal variance to test the assumptions behind this set-up. The F-tests failed to reject the
null hypothesis of equal variance. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 5.1: Estimated Treatment Effect of Each Institutional Treatment versus the Control
not capture the institutional problems individuals worry about when assessing social policy. The
former is obviously a major statistical issue, while the latter suggests that the treatment conditions
might be too subtle to produce strong results. Either of these issues would limit the size of the
observed effect. Figure 5.2 groups together the three treatment conditions and compares them to
the control group in order to provide more power. While this heterogenous treatment condition
potentially papers over important differences in the effects of specific pathologies of bad institu-
tions, it does resolve some concerns about power. Despite this, Figure 5.2 provides little evidence
that being prompted to think about institutional quality alters support for social policy. Again,
the treatment group is statistically indistinguishable from the control group across all four social
policy dimensions. As before, precise estimates can be found in Table 5.2.
Recall that in the previous section, I showed that treatments are unbalanced across regional
level institutional quality, specifically the Moscow Carnegie measure of regional corruption. Ta-
ble 5.4 presents the results of a series of regressions that attempt to assess the effects of treatment
on preferences for social policy while controlling for this. The table presents two groups of spec-
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Table 5.2: Unconditional Experimental Results
Social Policy FD (control) Rich-poor Gap FD (control) Pensions FD (control) Healthcare FD (control)
Control 3.24 3.50 3.76 3.79
(1.01) (1.15) (1.02) (1.00)
Combined Treatment 3.32 0.08 3.50 0.00 3.73 -0.02 3.80 0.01
(1.11) (1.12) (1.03) (1.00)
Misappropriation 3.35 0.11 3.49 -0.01 3.69 -0.07 3.80 0.00
(1.15) (1.12) (1.03) (0.99)
Free-riding 3.29 0.05 3.5 0.00 3.70 -0.06 3.78 - 0.01
(1.10) (1.16) (1.02) (0.99)
Contract Enforcement 3.34 0.09 3.51 0.02 3.80 0.04 3.85 0.06
(1.08) (1.06) (1.03) (1.02)
FD indicates first differences (treatment - control).
Significance levels obtained using a two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variance.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 5.2: Estimated Treatment Effect of Combined Institutional Treatment versus the Control
ifications, one in which all the treatments are lumped together into a heterogeneous treatment and
another in which the three treatment groups are treated separately. These specifications also in-
clude some individual level controls for age, gender, education, income decile, and region random
effects.10 Controlling for regional level corruption does not, for the most part, change the results
presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The treatment effects are insignificant in nearly all specifica-
tions. The single exception is the contract enforcement treatment, which seems to increase support
for policies to decrease the gap between the rich and poor at the 90% confidence level. Interest-
ingly, in all specifications the Moscow Carnegie measure of corruption is itself not significant at
conventional levels.
Taken together, this section suggests that there is no ceteris paribus effect between institutional
10Leaving these out does not alter the results. Versions of Table 5.4 without individual level controls are available
upon request.
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quality and support for social policy. The three treatment conditions corresponding to the misap-
propriation, free-riding, and weak contract enforcement all failed to elicit significant treatment
effects. The macro-economic risk pathology also finds little support, as it would have predicted
that at least one of the treatments should increase support for social policy. Moreover, this result
seems to hold across a wide range of different social policy dimensions, including over policies
that vary in their degree of redistribution and time horizons. Thus, the findings of this section sug-
gest that institutional quality does not matter much for the preferences of the average individual.
At least in Russia, it could be that the costs of weak institutions are diffused amongst too many
individuals for it to alter preferences in ways detectable by my survey instrument. Nevertheless,
such findings for the average individual are surprising.
This being said, it is important to make a few caveats. As noted earlier in this chapter, the
research design relied on rather strict assumptions about the size of the effect and statistical power
in setting up group sizes. Effect sizes should be roughly comparable to those of income or to the
effects on the self-employed identified in chapter 2. As a consequence, the three treatments and the
control included the bare minimum number of respondents in order to ensure power of 0.8. Given
the relatively high percentage (on average around 20%) of respondents that expressed no opinion
(i.e. answered “hard to say”), it could simply be that the experiment lacked power and that had
there been more respondents it would have been possible to identify an effect. Treating the “hard
to say” responses as favoring the status quo does not substantially alter the results, however.
The analysis above also relies on the fact that the experiment actually primes individuals to
think about social policy concerns and that the effect of this prime is similar across individuals
and regions. This assumption is likely violated in three ways. First, the treatments might be
too subtle to elicit a statistically significant treatment effect. The misappropriation and free-rider
treatments made use of national average responses to questions about corruption and free-riding,
which may be common knowledge to respondents. Moreover, the tie between this information
and social policy costs might have not been obvious to respondents. As a consequence providing
this information might not provide enough of a prime to alter individuals’ responses to baseline
questions about support for social policy. That is, a more shocking treatment, or one that more
clearly ties weak institutions to losses in social policy, might have produced statistically significant
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treatment effects. Unfortunately, limitations on the survey instrument precluded direct evaluation
of how respondents interpreted the treatments.
Second, my main theory suggests that we should observe ceteris paribus differences in indi-
vidual preferences based on the ability to make use of poor institutions to mitigate or shift the costs
of social policy and reap disproportionate benefits. Those who can evade taxes, for example, are
more likely to be favorable to social policy than those who cannot. Unfortunately, power concerns
and small numbers of individuals with traits associated with free-riding (analogous to professionals
from chapter 2) preclude analysis of sub-populations to verify whether this is going on.
Finally, as noted above, individuals in regions with better institutions may evaluate the treat-
ment prompts differently than those in regions with worse institutions. Either the treatments might
not match the experiences of those in “good regions” and be non-credible or they might reveal
new information and be more shocking than for those in regions with bad institutions. If either
is the case, then pooling all regions together, as I do in this section, masks heterogeneous effects.
Whereas analysis of sub-samples based on individual characteristics is difficult due to the small
number of individual observations, analysis of sub-sets of regions suffers fewer such problems.
This is particularly the case since most of my treatment conditions are phrased using data on na-
tional average responses to questions about institutional quality. Consequently, one can simply
divide regions into those with better than average and lower than average institutional quality to
assess heterogeneous treatment effects. I turn to this below.
3.1 Regional Level Institutional Quality and Treatment Effects
As noted above, it is possible that the effect of the treatment conditions on support for social policy
is conditional on the quality of regional institutions. If treatment causes individuals to update their
priors, then we might expect that the nature of this updating varies based on actual institutional
conditions in regions. If instead treatments merely prime individuals to think about institutions,
the effect of the treatment might depend on individuals’ everyday experiences. Thus, the lack of
evidence for a ceteris paribus link between institutional quality and support for social policy in the
previous section may be due to heterogeneous treatment effects across regions.
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To check for this possibility, I make use of a sub-component of the Moscow Carnegie Index
that measures corruption to separate regions with good and bad institutions.11 This index was pro-
duced using a survey of Russian regional experts with similar methodology to Freedom House’s
measure of democracy (c.f. Freedom House (2012)). The corruption sub-component was specif-
ically designed to reflect the extent to which the political and business elites of a given region
are interconnected and the influence of the latter on politics (i.e. state capture of business and
vice-versa). While much of the work on corruption has highlighted problems with measures based
on expert surveys (Treisman, 2007), I would argue that this measure is appropriate here for two
reasons. Theoretically, expert surveys tend to correlate well with popular perceptions of top-level
corruption (Treisman, 2007). As I explained in detail in chapter 1, this is precisely the sort of
corruption that can lead to fears that social policy funds will be misappropriated. Empirically, all
alternative measures for institutional quality that I am aware of were either collected years earlier in
the 2000’s or have limited regional coverage. Using dated measures would introduce measurement
error, while excluding regions would exacerbate power concerns.12 The only contemporaneous
alternative with reasonable regional coverage is a measure of regional investment risk produced by
the private firm RA Expert. Unfortunately, this measure bundles assessments of macro-economic,
financial, social, environmental, and legal risk into a single index, which introduce a great deal of
noise and render the index a conceptually poor proxy for institutional quality.
Because the misappropriation and free-riding treatments both present national average re-
sponses, I divide regions into those with above and below average scores on the corruption index
in order to check for heterogeneous treatment effects. Figure 5.3 evaluates the estimated treatment
effect for each experimental group taken individually, with Table 5.3 providing full numeric values
for these tests. Both suggest that in regions where corruption is higher than normal (at the top
of the figure and table), both the misappropriation and the free-rider treatments increased support
for social policy as a whole. Moreover, these effects were statistically significant at conventional
levels (p = 0.015 and p = 0.002, respectively). By contrast, treatment effects for the other types
11For an English language discussion, c.f. McMann and Petrov (2000). The version of the measure I used was
updated through 2010 by a team of researchers at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics.
12Measures based on the BEEPS 2012 survey, for example, would eliminate 18 regions and 427 observations from
my data set, although they would provide a good measure of the extent of informality. For a good review of alternative
corruption measures and their limitations, c.f. Libman and Kozlov (2013).
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of social policy programs – programs to decrease the gap between the rich and the poor, pensions,
and healthcare – are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Taken naively and at face value,
these results would suggest that fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk is at play, since




Figure 5.3: First Differences Between Control and Institutional Treatments: Corruption (Moscow
Carnegie Index)
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Turning to those regions where corruption is lower than average according to the Moscow
Carnegie index, the treatment conditions fail to produce a statistically significant treatment effect
over any of the social policy areas. The one exception is the contract enforcement treatment, which
elicits a treatment effect that holds at the 90% confidence level for individuals being asked about
their preference for social policy as a whole. Again, if we interpret the result naively, it would
suggest that the fear of institutionally induced macro-economic risk is operative. That being said,
interpretation here is more difficult, since support for generic, government controlled social policy
could reflect deeper distrust of private actors. Such an interpretation would also be consistent with
weak contract enforcement.
Table 5.3: Experimental Results for Corruption (Moscow Carnegie Index)
Social Policy FD (control) Rich-poor Gap FD (control) Pensions FD (control) Healthcare FD (control)
Control 3.182 3.396 3.804 3.784
(0.869) (1.171) (1.023) (1.02)
Combined Treatment 3.391 0.209** 3.453 0.057 3.814 0.01 3.847 0.063
(1.075) (1.126) (1.044) (1.029)
Misappropriation 3.505 0.323** 3.456 0.06 3.769 0.035 3.917 0.133
(1.136) (1.251) (1.157) (1.042)
Free-riding 3.532 0.35*** 3.59 0.194 3.871 0.067 3.879 0.095
(0.975) (1.115) (0.971) (0.976)
Contract Enforcement 3.167 -0.015 3.388 -0.008 3.807 0.003 3.831 0.047
(1.085) (0.971) (1.047) 1.079
(a) High Corruption
Social Policy FD (control) Rich-poor Gap FD (control) Pensions FD (control) Healthcare FD (control)
Control 3.288 3.582 3.72 3.801
(1.106) (1.132) (1.026) (0.991)
Combined Treatment 3.281 -0.007 3.531 -0.051 3.68 -0.04 3.776 -0.025
(1.129) (1.121) (1.010) (0.977)
Misappropriation 3.27 -0.018 3.503 -0.079 3.644 -0.076 3.734 -0.067
(1.149) (1.04) (0.947) (0.953)
Free-riding 3.155 -0.133 3.449 -0.133 3.6* -0.12 3.727 -0.074
(1.14) (1.185) (1.04) (0.991)
Contract Enforcement 3.48* 0.192 3.624 0.042 3.794 0.074 3.873 0.072
(1.061) (1.118) (1.024) (0.972)
(b) Low Corruption
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 5.4 attempts to address power concerns by comparing the control group to an aggre-
gation of all of the treatment groups.13 For regions where corruption is higher than average, the
heterogeneous treatment generates increased support for social policy on the whole at conventional
levels (p = 0.023). For other social policy areas, however, the heterogeneous treatment does not
produce a statistically significant change in support for social policy relative to the control. Among
13Again, numeric results can be found in Table 5.3.
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those regions with lower than average corruption the story is similar: none of the treatment effects
are statistically significant.
Figure 5.4: Institutional Treatments versus the Control: Corruption (Moscow Carnegie Index)
Taken together the evidence from Figures 5.3 and 5.4 is mixed. On the one hand, in regions
where corruption is higher than average, there is weak evidence that prompting respondents about
misappropriation on the part of officials increases support for social policy, as does free-riding.
Both results are puzzling from the stand point of theories that predict that such dead-weight costs
will decrease support, but they are consistent with fear of institutionally induced macro-economic
risk and the associated prediction that weak institutional quality goes hand in hand with high risk.
Individuals would rationally want insurance under such circumstances. Moreover, that the findings
hold for generic social policies is not particularly surprising. The macro-economic risk pathology’s
link to social policy preferences is predicated on the fact that the risk of macro-economic volatil-
ity primarily operates on individuals’ expectations of future income and stems from fear of what
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misappropriation and rent-seeking do to the economy as a whole. Individual programs are as-
sumed to be safe from predation, however. As such, we would not expect long-term social policies
(pensions) to be affected, since the government does not engage in direct predation of policies.14
Nor would we expect policies that cover other types of risks (e.g. healthcare) to be as strongly
effected by treatment. Moreover, the general lack of statistically significant treatment effects in
regions with lower than average levels of corruption is also unsurprising. In such regions, there
is less likely to be macro-economic instability due to weak institutions and therefore reminding
individuals that institutions are poor is less likely to make them think of the effects of such policies
on overall economic volatility.
On the other hand, if the macro-economic risk pathology is at play, it is somewhat surprising
that there are no statistically significant treatment effect for programs to close the gap between the
rich and the poor. Anti-poverty programs tend to also help those adversely affected by the negative
consequences of macro-economic volatility. It could simply be the case that the question wording
evokes strict anti-poverty programs, as opposed to insurance based schemes, in which case the
result would make sense even if the macro-economic risk pathology is operative. Alternatively,
as Remington (2011) argues, anti-poverty programs are not particularly efficacious at alleviating
poverty in Russia, a result reflected in popular perceptions of the programs. As a consequence,
individuals may not believe these programs can safeguard income and therefore are unwilling to
rely on them under any circumstances.
The above analysis is premised, however, on the notion that individuals are being primed by
the treatment prompts, as opposed to receiving new information. An alternative interpretation of
the results above is simply that in regions with worse than average institutional quality, individuals
read the treatment prompts and are reassured that institutions are not as bad as they originally
anticipated. The reported levels of bribery and tax evasion are based on national averages, after all,
which understate the extent to which these activities occur in some regions. Were this interpretation
true, however, we would expect that treatments would increase support for social policy across all
social policy areas. We would also expect those in regions with better than average institutions to
have the opposite reaction – believing institutional quality to be worse than they thought. Neither
14The exception, of course, being if the government has invested pension funds into the market.
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of these things occur.
In order to check the robustness of the results above, Table 5.5 replicates the analysis using
a regression framework. As before, I control for individual level demographic features (age, ed-
ucation, income decile) and include both the Moscow Carnegie Center’s corruption measure as a
continuous variable and region random effects. The main variables of interest are a set of dummies
for each of the treatment conditions and interaction terms constructed by interacting the treatment
dummies with the continuous Moscow Carnegie Center corruption indicator.
Models 5.5.1 - 5.5.4 make use of an aggregation of the three treatment conditions and largely
confirm the results of examining differences-in-means. In line with Figure 5.4, the interaction
between the heterogeneous treatment effect and the Corruption index is negative and significant
at the 90% level for attitudes towards social policy as a whole. While not significant on its own,
the main effect of the treatment is also positive. This indicates that where regional corruption is
low, the treatment effect decreases support for social policy, but as the level of regional corruption
increases, the treatment produces increasingly positive attitudes towards social policy.
Disaggregating the treatments tells a somewhat similar story. In Models 5.5.5 – 5.5.8 also
roughly confirm the results of its corresponding figure (5.3). In most cases the treatment condi-
tions appear to increase support for social policy, although only in one specification is the main
effect of any of the treatment conditions significant. The contract enforcement treatment increases
support for policies that reduce the gap between the rich and the poor at the 90% level. More
interesting, however, are the interactions between the treatment conditions and support for social
policy. The interaction between the corruption index and the misappropriation treatment is nega-
tive and significant for attitudes towards social policy as a whole and for healthcare. This suggests
that treatment increases support for social policy at high levels of corruption, but decreases it at
low levels of corruption. Similarly, the interaction between the free-rider treatment and the corrup-
tion index is also negative and significant at the 90% level for attitudes towards social policy as a
whole. All of these findings are in line with what was suggested in Figure 5.3.
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4 Conclusion
Before concluding, it is worth briefly discussing the overall results of the chapter. The previous
two sub-sections present somewhat surprising results about the preferences of individuals from a
theoretical standpoint. There is little evidence that being reminded of particular pathologies of
poor institutions change the preferences of the average individual for social policy. This is not
only true with respect to state-led social policies, but also to policies that are clearly redistributive,
address life-cycle risks, and address extraordinary risks. Conditioning on regional characteristics
changes these results somewhat. Reminding individuals of misappropriation and free-riding in
regions with weaker than average institutions makes them more likely to support generic, state-run
social policies.
On face, these results fit somewhat weakly with the broader argument of this dissertation.
Much of the formal foundation for the theory laid out in chapter 1 would suggest that weak institu-
tions, particularly those that allow for misappropriation and free-riding, decrease support for social
policy amongst those who must shoulder the costs (Becker, 1985, 1983). Recall that my theory
mainly extends this work by pointing out that some groups can take advantage of weak institutions
to mitigate the costs of social policy, or shift them onto others. Nonetheless, my model follows
many others in suggesting that the average individual loses from social policy in poor institutional
settings and therefore should oppose it. One thing that this chapter suggests, however, is that dead-
weight costs may not be as much of a concern as previously thought. That is, although one would
expect such costs to decrease individuals’ utility from social policy, it may not do so by enough to
show up on standard survey instruments.
At the same time, the chapter also suggests that under some circumstances individuals may be
willing to support social policy when institutions are poor. Specifically, reminders of misappro-
priation and free-riding actually increase individuals’ support for social policy in regions where
corruption is more pervasive than average, although these treatments have no effect where cor-
ruption is less of a problem than average. This finding is in line with the macro-economic risk
perspective presented in chapter 1, which argues that poor institutions increase support for social
policy indirectly by increasing macro-economic risk and thus demand for insurance. That these
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effects do not strongly hold for anti-poverty programs, pensions, and healthcare is unsurprising if
these programs do not provide clear insurance against macro-economic volatility. It is also unsur-
prising that these findings do not hold in regions that are less corrupt than average, since they are
less vulnerable to turmoil caused by weak institutions and corrupt officials.
Of course, it is not clear that one can take the results of this chapter entirely at face value.
First, there is some evidence that randomization failed at the regional level and that regions with
worse institutions, on average, were more likely to be treated. Although I attempted to correct for
this in a regression framework and results roughly remained the same, the imbalance introduces
issues with omitted regional-level variables. Second, the experiment was designed such that under
the assumptions outlined in section 2.1 there would be just enough individuals in each treatment
group to identify the treatment effect (if any exists) 80% of the time. If treatment effects were
smaller, or their standard errors larger, than estimated, then identifying an effect would be quite
difficult. Indeed, effect sizes were much smaller than anticipated, raising concerns that the test
lacked statistical power. Third, as noted above, “hard to say” responses were quite prevalent in the
sample across all treatment groups. Although assuming that such individuals are indifferent and
coding them as neutral responses does not significantly change results, dropping these individuals
from the analysis exacerbates concerns about the statistical power of the survey experiment.
Third, it is difficult to say for certain how the treatment conditions were interpreted by indi-
viduals. Was the information given in the treatments a prime that got individuals thinking about
institutions or did it shape their perceptions of institutional quality? In particular, was the informa-
tion given more likely to reassure respondents in settings with weaker than average institutions and
scare those in settings with better than average institutions? Unfortunately, there were no instru-
ments on the survey that would allow an empirical answer to this question. Evidence gleaned from
looking at sub-samples of regions with higher than average corruption versus those with lower than
average corruption suggests that individuals were not updating priors based on new information.
If they had been, we would expect significant effects in both sub-samples across all social policy
dimensions. Instead, they are only observed for generic social policy and only for those in settings
with worse than average institutions. Finally, it could be the case that the prompts used were too
subtle to produce an effect, even though institutional quality might be quite important for pref-
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erences. That is, a more shocking vignette about institutional quality might produce a treatment
effect where these comments, based on national averages, did not. Unfortunately, the survey did
not allow for questions that might allow us to evaluate this possibility.
Taken together, then the only solid conclusion that can be made about the experiment presented
in this chapter is that it is important to be very cautious about the results. Conservatively, however,
the chapter does suggest that more care needs to be taken in thinking about how institutions, as a
source of dead-weight costs, shape preferences. Failure to find significant effects in this chapter
may come from the fact that for the average citizen, institutional quality must be truly dreadful to
cause the sorts of changes that would show up in survey instruments. While surprising, this result
does not necessarily call my theory into question. Just because some benefit disproportionately
from the ability to mitigate or shift the costs of social policy when institutional quality is poor does
not mean that everyone else loses in a noticeable way. It could be that social policy under weak
institutions is a reflection and inversion of the classic problem of public goods: diffuse costs lead
to indifference in the public, while concentrated benefits lead to support amongst a select few.
Moving forward, this chapter suggests that future work needs to be more careful about concep-
tualization and operationalization of the links between various pathologies of poor institutions and
support for social policy. Particular care must be taken to calibrate treatments to the expectations
of individuals about their institutional environments in order to understand whether the pathologies
being explored genuinely do not matter or whether the treatments are not being taken seriously by
respondents. Care also should be taken to design future experiments in ways that would allow for
a more nuanced analysis of sub-populations that are particularly likely to benefit, or suffer, due to
weak institutions. Only in these ways will future experiments contribute to our understanding of
why and when institutional quality is linked to social policy preferences.
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Table 5.4: Experimental Regression Results: Unconditional Effects
Social Policy Rich-poor Gap Pensions Healthcare Social Policy Rich-poor Gap Pensions Healthcare
Corruption Index -0.122 0.108 -0.096 -0.120 -0.121 0.109 -0.095 -0.120
(Higher = better) (0.136) (0.117) (0.136) (0.134) (0.136) (0.118) (0.137) (0.135)
Combined Treatment 0.112 0.119 0.040 0.047
(0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Misappropriation 0.147 0.092 -0.005 0.024
(0.095) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097)
Free-riding 0.060 0.079 -0.018 -0.009
(0.093) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
Contract Enforcement 0.136 0.192* 0.154 0.135
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,038 981 1,046 1,050 1,038 981 1,046 1,050
Number of groups 45 44 45 45 45 44 45 45
chi2 9.586 16.94 5.881 8.863 10.65 18.38 9.332 11.04
Log-likelihood -1459 -1416 -1372 -1357 -1458 -1415 -1370 -1356
Individual Level Controls: Age, Gender, Education, Income Decile. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.5: Experimental Regression Results: Conditional Effects
Social Policy Rich-poor Gap Pensions Healthcare Social Policy Rich-poor Gap Pensions Healthcare
Corruption Index 0.028 0.217 -0.091 -0.142 0.034 0.218 -0.091 -0.138
(Higher = better) (0.158) (0.151) (0.162) (0.160) (0.157) (0.151) (0.163) (0.160)
Combined Treatment 0.111 0.118 0.040 0.047
(0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Combined Treatment x Corruption Index -0.228* -0.147 -0.007 0.031
(Higher = better) (0.122) (0.130) (0.126) (0.125)
Misappropriation 0.148 0.091 -0.006 0.034
(0.095) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097)
Free-rider 0.068 0.090 -0.010 -0.006
(0.093) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095)
Contract Enforcement 0.128 0.186* 0.151 0.130
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100)
Misappropriation x Corruption Index -0.236 -0.089 0.019 -0.093
(Higher = better) (0.156) (0.163) (0.157) (0.157)
Free-rider x Corruption Index -0.345** -0.299* -0.106 0.008
(Higher = better) (0.150) (0.157) (0.153) (0.152)
Contract Enforcement x Corruption Index -0.093 -0.025 0.099 0.183
(Higher = better) (0.155) (0.161) (0.160) (0.156)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,038 981 1,046 1,050 1,038 981 1,046 1,050
Number of groups 45 44 45 45 45 44 45 45
chi2 13.05 18.23 5.883 8.927 16.56 22.88 11.02 14.04
Log-likelihood -1457 -1415 -1372 -1357 -1455 -1413 -1369 -1354




I began this dissertation with the question of who supports social policy in the post-communist
countries of Eurasia and Eastern Europe. In the introductory chapter, I argued that the answer is
multi-faceted. On the one hand, existing theories based on class or risk should hold just as strongly
in the post-communist states as they do in Western Europe or the US. On the other hand, the lack
of state capacity in the developing world settings and inability of governments to credibly commit
to policy cast doubt on fundamental assumptions in existing work. I argued that institutional
quality is a potentially important, yet oft overlooked, determinant of support for social policy.
Weak institutions increase dead-weight costs for most, but create opportunities to shift or mitigate
costs for some. By changing the distribution of winners and losers from social policy, they alter
expectations of who supports and opposes it. I argue that the politically well-connected and those
with a comparative advantage in tax evasion are particularly likely to profit from, and therefore
support, social policy when institutions are poor. The dissertation finds evidence consistent with
this argument for both individuals and firms. Findings on the ceteris paribus effect of institutions
on the preferences of the average individual or firm are mixed, however.
In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the main argument and findings of the dissertation in order
to assess what we have learned about support for social policy in the post-communist countries and,
more broadly, in the developing world. Section 2 addresses the contributions of the dissertation and
its implications for the broader field of comparative political economy. Finally, section 3 discusses
questions left unanswered by this dissertation and suggests some options for future research.
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1 Summary of Main Findings
This dissertation began from the premise that settings with weak institutions are characterized by
a lack of constraints on the state and its officials, which in turn create a set of pathologies that
alter expectations about the balance between the costs and benefits of social policy programs.
Specifically, weak institutions make it difficult for the state and its officials to credibly commit to
implementing policies as dictated by statute and severely weaken the capacity of the state to carry
out basic functions. In chapter 1 I made the simple point that social policy shares important char-
acteristics with investment: contributions made today are expected to result in benefits tomorrow
(or for firms in higher availability of human capital). Like investments, I argue that social policy is
potentially vulnerable to four pathologies that emerge when institutions are weak and governments
poorly constrained: misappropriation, macro-economic risk, free-riding, and weak contract en-
forcement. These pathologies shift expectations over the costs and benefits of social policy, which
influences preferences. While for most actors these pathologies increase the dead-weight costs of
social policy, some can abuse them to lower the costs of social policy. Under misappropriation
and contract enforcement, it is the politically well-connected who can abuse poor institutions to
mitigate costs and to reap rents from social policy. With free-riding, it is those able to evade taxes
that can shift costs onto others and free-ride on benefits.
The empirical portion of the dissertation is dedicated to testing various observable implications
of each pathology in order to build support for the broader theory. Chapters 2 begins by providing
a cross-national plausibility test of two aspects of the theory using survey data from the Life in
Transition Survey (LiTS) covering 28,000 individuals from 28 post-communist countries. First,
I leverage well-understood correlates of the ability to evade taxes in order to test one observable
implication of free-riding: individuals with characteristics associated with tax evasion are more
likely to support social policy in settings with weak institutions than similar individuals in settings
with good institutions. The chapter finds evidence in favor of this hypothesis using various proxies
for the ability to evade taxes and several different ways of measuring institutional quality and
the size of the informal economy. Interestingly, this result potentially also tells us about firm
preferences, since one group that can easily evade taxes – the self-employed – are also typically
small business owners. As there are no firm level controls in the LiTS survey, I mainly treat
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this group as a set of individuals. Second, I also test whether support for social policy has a
direct relationship with various standard measures of institutional quality. No evidence for such
a relationship is found, although this may be an artifact of the small number of countries in the
posts-communist sample.
Chapter 3 attempts to validate the micro-logic of my argument. Each of the four pathologies
has important observable implications for the types of arguments actors make when discussing so-
cial policy. I make use of a case-study of the 2001 Pension Reforms in Russia in order to evaluate
the arguments made by actors. In the first part of the chapter, I examine legislative debates, finding
evidence in favor of a link between free-riding, misappropriation, and macro-economic risk and
social policy preferences. In the second part of the chapter, I examine the perspective of the gen-
eral populace, business associations, and other non-governmental organizations using a database
of 1791 unique opinions expressed about pension reform culled from over 8,794 newspaper and
trade journal articles. Using close content analysis, I examine the arguments made in the press
both for and against reform. Some argued the state would immediately divert funds to other pol-
icy priorities or engage in rent-seeking. Others believed it had not learned from the 1998 Asian
Financial Crisis and would trigger another economic meltdown. Still others were more concerned
about vesting control in private pension funds, arguing that they were cynical vehicles to secure
investment for parent firms or cover for outright theft. Finally, a small subset were concerned about
persistent tax evasion. These arguments conform to the expectations of my theory given misap-
propriation, macro-economic risk, contract enforcement, and free-riding, respectively. Moreover,
such concerns were substantively important, making up a relatively large proportion of the public
discussion.
Chapter 4 provides an explicit test of the firm-level predictions of my theory using a survey
of 666 Russian firms. Because regional variation is weak in the survey, I depart from the premise
that institutional quality is generally poor and test whether actors that should support social policy
in such settings – the politically well-connected and those with characteristics associated with tax
evasion – do so. I show that state-owned firms – who benefit from direct connections to the gov-
ernment – and those who are rarely inspected – who are less visible to authorities – are more likely
to support social policy. I then show that my results are robust to a variety of alternative explana-
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tions and that both state-ownership and inspections are conceptually valid measures (i.e. capture
connections and ease of tax evasion, respectively, and not other variables). Thus, the chapter finds
support for both misappropriation and free-riding as pathologies that shape preferences for social
policy. An important caveat to the chapter, though, is that it is not clear if well-connected and
less visible firms always support social policy or if they only do so when institutions are weak. It
could be that these groups are simply harder to identify when institutions are good. Unfortunately,
this survey has insufficient region level observations to tell. Results on the self-employed from
chapter 2 suggest that preferences do indeed vary with institutions, although that chapter’s lack of
firm level controls makes it harder to treat the self-employed as firms.
Finally, chapter 5 attempts to unpack the relationship between institutional quality, specific
pathologies of poor institutions, and the preferences of the average individual. Chapter 5 leverages
a set of novel framing experiments narrowly tailored to evoke the four pathologies of poor institu-
tions central to my argument, allowing it to mitigate omitted variable concerns and measurement
issues in tests like those in chapter 2. The results suggest that there is in fact no ceteris paribus re-
lationship between institutional quality and support for social policy, although subsequent analysis
suggests that this is due to heterogeneous treatment effects. Consistent with macro-economic risk
as a pathology that shapes social policy preferences, treatments evoking bribery and tax evasion in-
crease support for generic social policy, but only in settings with weak institutions. Unfortunately,
several flaws in the research design make the results inconclusive. First, balance was problematic
along some variables: regions with weaker than average institutions were more likely to receive
treatment. This could account for the heterogeneous treatment effect noted above. Second, it is not
clear how the treatments were interpreted, leaving open the possibility that they were too subtle
to evoke responses. Finally, treatment effects were smaller than anticipated, making it difficult
to recover statistically significant results with the group sizes used. The results must therefore be
treated cautiously.
Taken together, the empirical portion of the dissertation provides support for some elements
of the theory, although not for all. Chapters 2 and 4 provide support for the notion that some
groups’ are more likely to support social policy when institutions are weak. The former suggests
that individuals capable of evading taxes are more likely to support social policy in settings where
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tax evasion is easier due to weak institutions. The latter suggests that where institutions are weak,
politically well-connected firms and those less visible to the state support social policy. These
findings support misappropriation and free-riding as pathologies of poor institutions that shape
preferences and do so at both the individual and the firm level. Chapter 3 further provides support
for a relationship between all four pathologies of poor institutions and support for social policy,
indicating that the logic of each was expressed in Russian social policy debates carried out in the
popular and business press. Finally, chapter 5 provides weak evidence that prompts about poor
institutions may actually heighten support for generic social policy, albeit only where institutions
are poor. This is consistent with the fear that institutional quality may heighten macro-economic
volatility and risk.
Where the dissertation does not provide support for my theory is in predictions about how in-
stitutional quality shapes the preferences of the average firm or member of the populace. Chapter 2
fails to find a significant effect of various measures of institutional quality on support for social
policy. Chapter 5 similarly fails to find that treatment prompts designed to evoke the pathologies
of poor institutions produce a significant effect on the preferences of individuals, although here re-
sults are quite tentative for reasons discussed above. Theoretically, these findings may make sense.
As I argued in chapter 1, predicting the effect of institutional quality on preferences rests largely on
the intuition that institutions impose dead-weight costs on social policy that make it less attractive.
If dead-weight costs are sufficiently spread across the population, they may not be large enough to
produce a noticeable decline in support for social policy. Empirically, caution is in order, since a
number of issues with the tests in Chapters 2 and 5 make them less reliable for making inferences
about country or regional level effects. Thus, this question requires further attention.
2 Contributions and Implications
This dissertation contributes to several areas of broader importance to the study of the welfare
state and comparative politics more generally. First, it extends the study of the welfare state to
the developing world. As Mares and Carnes (2009) argue, studying the developing world is of
value due to the unique historical developmental trajectories and institutions of these countries
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when compared to the mostly European and Anglo-saxon cases that have dominated the existing
literature. These unique features call into question the generality of existing theory and suggest new
avenues of study. This dissertation joins a growing body of literature that has begun to explore how
these unique features of the developing world condition preferences for social policy and to begin
to define scope conditions for existing work (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, Ansell and Samuels,
2014, Berens, 2012, Cramar and Kaufman, 2011, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).
Specifically, my dissertation advances the literature by subverting one of the most common
assumptions of work on the welfare state: governments can credibly commit to enforcing and
implementing policy as legally mandated. While work examining the crisis of the welfare state
has touched on situations where government commitments are not credible, this literature focuses
on structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the state – globalization, aging and
increasing life expectancy, negative shifts in the dependency ratio, etc. (c.f. Kato (2003), Myles
and Pierson (2001), Pierson (2001a)). As a consequence, this work has emphasized a trajectory of
reform that attempts to balance long-term sustainability with minimal cost to existing stakeholders.
My work, by contrast, is explicitly rooted in insights from work in the new institutional economics
tradition, which highlights the consequences of the inability to hold state officials to account – pre-
dation, opportunistic policy reversal, and shirking – for individual economic activity (North, 1990,
North and Weingast, 1989, Olson, 2000, 1993). These institutional pathologies create profound
mistrust not only in the government’s competence but in its fundamental willingness to adhere
to the law, even where there are no exogenous pressures. Thus, the welfare state must deal with
prosaic concerns of sustainability and coverage and do so in a way that engenders trust. One of
the major implications of my study is that in settings with weak institutions social policies must
address fundamental concerns about rule of law. As a consequence, adopted social policies may
need to be “second best” from the standpoint of sustainability or best practices in order to accepted
by a distrustful populace and business sector (Rodrik, 2000a).
Second, my work joins a growing body of work on the comparative economy of the wel-
fare state in highlighting the conditionality of many existing theories by showing that micro-level
predictors have important interactions with macro-level ones. While work on micro-level pref-
erences for social policy has long sought to understand counter intuitive support for the welfare
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state among the wealthy or opposition to it among the poor, many of these studies have focused
on different individual level predictors (Benabou and Ok, 2001, Iversen and Soskice, 2001, Moene
and Wallerstein, 2001, Rehm, 2009). More recent work has innovated by exploring the interac-
tion between macro-level characteristics and individual level ones and using these interactions to
explain why otherwise similar individuals perceive different costs and benefits from social policy
in different settings (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Alesina et al., 2001, Cameron, 1978, Finseraas,
2008a, Lubker, 2007, Mares, 2005a, Rehm et al., 2012, Rodrik, 1998, 1997). My work joins this
literature by providing additional evidence that macro-level factors are critical for understanding
how individuals map their own characteristics onto concrete expectations about the utility of social
policy. In doing so, it helps define some of the scope conditions of existing work in ways that help
us to more clearly understand how and when we can apply existing insights to the study of welfare
state preferences in the developing world.
My work distinguishes itself, however, by adding nuance to existing interpretations of how
macro-level institutions shape individual preferences. Macro-economic contextual factors are
thought to matter, because they heighten individuals’ perceptions of income risk (trade openness
and income-risk correlations) or suggest that certain types individuals may have to bear a dispro-
portionate tax burden (inequality, ethnicity). My theory is compatible with both of these views, but
also suggests that macro-economic factors can also lower the relative costs of social policy for in-
dividuals with characteristics that allow them to take advantage of flaws in the welfare state and the
state institutions underpinning it. That is, the welfare state becomes attractive where individuals
can use weak institutions to game social policy in unintended ways to reap unexpected (from the
legal standpoint) benefits. Thus, my work implies that it is important to move beyond traditional
focus on income and risk in order to think more broadly about factors that can generate advantages
(or disadvantages) in weak institutional climates.
Third, my dissertation contributes more broadly to recent work on the political economy of
institutions and economic behavior by specifying the pathways by which institutions shape in-
dividual preferences to institutional quality. Seminal theoretical work on the political economy
of investment has often been imprecise about the channels by which institutional quality shapes
economic behavior (c.f. North (1990), North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), North and Weingast
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(1989), Rodrik (2000a).Empirical work has also tended to be ambiguous about which pathologies
of institutions explain the link between poor quality institutions and growth outcomes (c.f. Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003)). Recent work has attempted
to add precision to this field by exploring both specific institutions that enable states to make cred-
ible commitments (Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Haber, 2007, Haber, Maurer, and Razo, 2003)
and the precise conditions under which these institutions fail in both democracies and autocracies
(Frye, 2010, Frye and Yakovlev, 2013, Keefer, 2008). My dissertation contributes to this latter
trend theoretically by providing additional micro-level theory that identifies precise pathologies of
poor institutions – rent-seeking, free-riding, and weak contract enforcement – and how they might
shape preferences over economic policy. In doing so, my dissertation provides insight into how
individuals and firms evaluate the pathologies of poor institutional settings, when they believe they
can profit from them, and when they are willing to support state-led economic policies despite (or
because of) them. It also contributes empirically to this literature by providing micro-level tests
of the argument. While my study is not directly related to work on the political economy of in-
vestment, to the extent that social policy preferences encapsulates some of the same considerations
– payments made today for benefits collected tomorrow in an environment where the state and
other actors can take advantage – my work provides broader insights into the micro-level logic of
economic behavior under weak institutions.
Finally, and perhaps most narrowly, my dissertation also contributes to the growing corpus of
work on the welfare state by bringing in new empirical data and methodologies for studying both
individual and firm level preferences. To my knowledge, this dissertation is among the first stud-
ies to use survey experiments to explore welfare state preferences at the individual level.1 While
survey experiments are not appropriate for testing all hypotheses related to preferences for social
policy, for theories such as mine, which rely on variables outside of individual characteristics, ex-
perimental manipulations can potentially allow for cleaner inferences about the micro-logic behind
preferences. These techniques potentially hold a great deal of promise in exploring a number of
factors, such as tax burdens, beliefs about fund solvency, beliefs about the efficacy of social policy,
macro-economic risk, etc. that have proven difficult for scholars to study in the past due to weak
survey instruments, endogeneity, or extreme multi-collinearity with other variables of interest.
1For another recent example, see Barber et al. (2013).
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At the firm level, this dissertation is one of the first that I am aware of to make use of survey
data to explore firms’ preferences for social policy. Although existing studies have made great
strides with the use of archival and interview data, surveys compliment and enhance existing work.
Not only do surveys allow for truly systematic tests, but they also help to resolve the problem of
“silent” firms and sectors that organize poorly and/or produce little or no written record of their
preferences over social policy. While these firms may not have taken active roles in lobbying, their
tacit support is nonetheless critical for the continued survival of the welfare state. Knowing more
about the preferences of such groups can help us to better predict the coalitions that maintain the
welfare state, as well as preference cleavages over reform proposals.
In addition to these direct contributions, my dissertation also has a number of implications for
important debates in political science and comparative economics. First, my work has important
implications for our broader understanding of welfare state development: both past and future.
Cross-class coalitions have been decisive in shaping the development of the welfare state in many
settings, but the formation of these coalitions largely depends on the confluence of individual
actors’ and firms’ preferences (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001, Mares, 2003a, Swensen,
2002). My work suggests two important observations about these coalitions. First, the coalitions
that support the welfare state are deeper and more encompassing than previously thought in the
developing world, likely including groups that would not traditionally favor the welfare state but
who can take advantage of political connections or the ability to free-ride to profit from it. Although
such groups may not directly participate in social policy debates, their influence can still be seen
in the positions of government officials, as well as in how their existence shapes the preferences of
other actors. Second, the drag of poor institutions on the overall welfare state does not necessarily
decrease support for social policy in the population, in general, and among the most vulnerable
groups, more specifically. To the extent that poor institutions increase risk, these groups may still
be willing to support the welfare state as an additional hedge.
These two observations, in turn, help us make sense of a paradox of social policy: the welfare
state has its roots in autocratic, poorly institutionalized settings, where politicians have few incen-
tives to honor it (Gerschenkron, 1962, Haggard, 1990, Mares and Carnes, 2009, Perotti, 1996).
These observations also help to resolve the clash between theories about the use of redistribution
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to secure political support (Blaydes, 2010, Gandhi, 2008, Magaloni, 2006, Marques et al., 2016,
Ross, 2001, Smith, 2004) and those predicting that the opposition of economic elites to redistribu-
tion leads to repression, autocracy, and revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Boix, 2003).
It turns out that some elements of the wealthy know that they can profit from social policy (or at
least shift the costs to others), while some among the populace and business sectors know that they
can free-ride at the expense of others. At the same time, the masses may look on social policy as
a means of insuring against the uncertainties inherent in economies with poor institutions. Thus,
it makes sense that we observe empirically that social policy is a tool for reproducing political
power, even in settings with weak institutions, and that its magnitude has little to do with regime
type, even if the welfare state is less encompassing where institutions are weak (c.f. Mares (2005a),
Muligan et al. (2004), Wibbels and Ahlquist (2008)). This also suggests that understanding who
supports the welfare state is of great substantive interest to policymakers seeking to understand
regime stability. While social policy is a tool of reproducing power, it is also a contentious one that
can easily form the core of mass protest movements (Robertson, 2010).
Second, my work also has important implications for work on the sources of state capacity.
Much has been written recently about the links between the incentives of political elites and and tax
regimes (c.f. Acemoglu et al. (2011), Besley and Persson (2009), Haber, Maurer, and Razo (2003)),
particularly in the post-communist states, where such regimes had to be set up de novo during the
transition (Easter, 2002, Gehlbach, 2008). This body of work has emphasized the ways in which
political elites engineer tax systems that allow them to exert minimal effort, while providing the
resources necessary to reproduce power. My work has little to say about the politicians who profit
from weak state capacity but compliments this literature by highlighting the ways in which weak
institutions can generate benefits for specific groups of actors. By focusing on groups within
the populace and business community that profit from weak institutions and have incentives to
continue to support them, my work suggests that micro-level support for weak institutions may be
wider than previously thought, extend to actors outside of the elite, and flow through channels, such
as social policy, outside of pure exchange. The implication is that elites can potentially reinforce
support for weak states through judicious use of social policy to generate support amongst social
groups, such as the informal sector, who can profit from weak institutions. As in Hellman (1998)’s
classic model, such actors have incentives to support weak state capacity to preserve their benefits.
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Finally, the findings of this dissertation have important implications for broader work on
the political economy of reform and attitudes towards the market. As with work on the micro-
foundations of the welfare state, much of this literature has focused on individual level characteris-
tics associated with success on free markets as a key predictor of support for reforms and markets
(Duch, 1993, Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, Gibson, 1996, Kaltenthaler et al., 2006). While more
recent work has explored how institutions condition these preferences, it has primarily called at-
tention to the ways in which institutions distort markets and nullify expected gains from those who
should be market winners. This results in weaker support for economic reform and for anti-market
policies such as the reprivatization (Denisova et al., 2009, Grosjean and Senik, 2008a,b). My work
compliments such findings and extends them to attitudes towards the welfare state, perhaps one of
the most interventionist of state institutions. It suggests, however, that poor institutions can have
positive effects on the expected returns of some – those with privileged connections or who can
free-ride – in the presence of interventionist economic policies such as the welfare state. Conse-
quently, opposition to the market in settings with weak institutions may stem from both negative
fears that one’s returns will be low and positive hope that one can use institutional weakness to
profit from state intervention.
3 Future Work
This dissertation provides some evidence of the importance of institutional quality for individuals’
and firms’ support for social policy, but it still leaves a number of important questions unanswered.
Perhaps the most important is whether institutions have a ceteris paribus effect on the preferences
of the average individual or firm. Theoretically, this dissertation suggests that the relationship
between support for social policy and institutional quality could be either positive (if institutions
heighten macro-economic risk) or negative (if they enable misappropriation, free-riding, and/or
weak contract enforcement). Empirical findings were also mixed. While qualitative analysis of the
2001 Russian pension reforms providing evidence that weak institutional quality degrades support
for social policy, evidence from the LiTS survey found no significant effects. An original survey
experiment also produced inconclusive results. Consequently, a great deal remains to be done to
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resolve this fundamental question.
A second remaining question is whether institutions function as enabling conditions – mak-
ing it more likely that certain groups can profit from political connections or tax evasion – or
whether they fundamentally alter preferences. The cross-national individual and Russian firm sur-
vey evidence presented in this dissertation both find strong relationships between particular types
of characteristics – associated with the ability to profit from the welfare state in settings with poor
institutions – and support for the welfare state in settings with weak institutions (see chapter 2 and
4). It is not clear, however, if this is simply because we are more likely to find individuals with
these characteristics in settings with poor institutions, these characteristics map onto the ability to
take advantage of the welfare state more cleanly in settings with poor institutions, or if the envi-
ronment fundamentally alters how actors evaluate costs and benefits. Put another way, if we could
generate a pure measure of the ability to free-ride, to give one example, would we find the individ-
uals with the same “free-riding score” have the same preferences in environments with good and
bad institutions? Or do the institutions contextualize the effect? Further tests are needed to sort
out this effect and to more clearly understand what the micro-logic behind it is. One particularly
promising direction for this would be the use of cross-national laboratory experiments to simulate
a working environment and welfare state, which then introduce various institutional pathologies
for players to abuse. Comparing the results of such experiments across countries with varying
institutional quality would answer many questions about the nature of the institutional effect, in
addition to providing even stronger inferences about the pathologies that govern the relationship.
Another related unanswered question is about the external validity of my findings. I have
assumed throughout this conclusion that my findings are not specific to the post-communist coun-
tries. This may be problematic, since support for social policy is unusually high in the post-
communist settings, likely as a result of the institutional legacies of Communism (Alesina and
Fuchs-Shundeln, 2007, Corneo, 2001, Corneo and Gruner, 2002, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).
This dissertation has employed a strategy of controlling for these legacies where ever possible, thus
providing some assurance that the effect of institutional quality is separate from that of Communist
legacies. It also examined the arguments used by actors during actual social policy debates, show-
ing that these conformed to institutionalist concerns rather than to pure ideology. Nonetheless,
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future research outside the post-communist context would be helpful in verifying the generality of
my findings.
Finally, this dissertation also leaves open the question of how and when preferences for social
policy translate into concrete policy. While a huge number of studies have examined how and
when social groups and firms are able to successfully pass welfare state legislation in democratic,
well-institutionalized settings, there is significantly less work on the policy-making process in
settings with poor institutions.2 The qualitative evidence presented in chapter 3 showed that while
institutional concerns did enter into the debate on pension reform in Russia, but it is less clear
how much these concerns ultimately changed the course of policy. Certainly, business groups were
able to mitigate concern about state-control in a setting with weak institutions by successfully
advocating a privately run pillar, but even this was sabotaged somewhat by the ability of state
organs to selectively enforce the law so as to delay introduction of the private pillar. Future work
should concentrate attention on the policy-making process surrounding social policy legislation
in settings with weak institutions in order to better differentiate these cases from existing works
and to better understand to what extent social groups identified in this dissertation actively push
welfare state policies, as opposed to quietly profiting.
2C.f. Cusack et al. (2006), Garrett (1998), Garrett and Mitchell (2001), Hall and Soskice (2001a), Iversen and
Soskice (2006), Manow (2009), Mares (2003a), Swensen (2002). For a rare example that explores policymaking in a
setting with weak institutions, though, c.f. Cook (2007), Remington (2014), Sokhey (2010).
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